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Two-stage early contractor involvement (2S-ECI) is a two-stage procurement process for 
firstly employing a contractor during the design stage, and then entering into a contract for 
construction. 2S-ECI contractual practices remain generally unknown in New Zealand despite 
the well-documented advantages of involving contractors in the design-stage planning. 
Clients, with the help of their consultants or lawyers, must draft their own, often bespoke 
contract to engage the contractor’s services during the design stage because there are no 
standard forms of pre-construction services agreements (PCSAs) in New Zealand for 
employing contractors during the design stage. Some of these contracts, especially if done 
without professional advice, are drafted inadequately. 
 
This study attempts to remove these ambiguities and explore the effect 2S-ECI has on 
contractual risks; the optimal contractual ingredients to consider at the pre-construction stage 
such as timing, obligations and liabilities; the effect of 2S-ECI on market pricing; and the 
overall benefits, challenges, and opportunities to improve the effective use and uptake of 2S-
ECI in New Zealand.  
 
A mixed-method research approach was adopted which comprised case law analysis, contract 
document analysis, and comparing these legal doctrines against industry perceptions which 
was obtained through conducting interviews and surveys. Three bespoke contract agreements 
used on 2S-ECI in New Zealand commercial construction projects were compared with two 
standard form PCSAs published in the UK. Perceptions of 2S-ECI use in New Zealand were 
explored through interviews of 21 senior construction practitioners. Interview findings were 
validated through surveying the interview sample 
 
A contractual framework was developed to provide a clearer contractual process, identify 
contract ingredients for the pre-construction stage and establishing the effect of early 
involvement on the contractor’s obligations during the construction stage. The framework 
helps clients and project managers to develop procurement strategies using 2S-ECI, including 
as a starting point, the type of project suited to 2S-ECI. It also helps decision makers like 
architects, engineers, and quantity surveyors, to make more informed decisions on who should 
pay for instructed drawing details that come after entering into a construction contract such as 
the New Zealand Standard NZS3910:2013 Conditions of Contract for Building and Civil 
Engineering Construction. The framework considers; (i) when to treat claims for drawing 
details as variations; (ii) the legal implications of a contractor’s involvement in design 
development; and (iii) the legal implications on construction managers if there are claims from 
direct trade contractors against the client under a construction management procurement. 
 
Findings from the survey analysis shows the majority of interviewees see value in early 
collaboration between designers and contractors, but qualify this in that the actual value 
depends on the extent of the contractor’s contribution and that the tangible benefits are difficult 
to measure. Many felt that contractors had a moral duty to reduce their claims for design 
development during the construction. However, none was aware of the effect of early 
involvement on the contractor’s contractual obligations during the construction stage. 2S-ECI 
may have the potential to reduce the cyclical boom bust nature of construction pricing and 
provide a more equitable risk distribution between the contracting parties. 2S-ECI is best 
suited for projects involving work to existing building operations where the cost of disruption 
outweighs any premium incurred with the contractor’s early involvement in logistical planning; 
where the selection of preferred contractors through open-book negotiation is desirable; where 
securing resources in heated markets is otherwise difficult through competitive tender; and 
where designers want the contractor’s input for more complex design solutions. 
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Challenges to the effective use and uptake of 2S-ECI in New Zealand were identified as part 
of the survey. The challenges include lack of clear 2S-ECI definition, unclear expectations and 
difficulty measuring the benefits, incomplete design documentation, and amendments made 
to standard contract terms transferring greater risks to contractors – without fully considering 
which party may be best able to manage the risk. The bespoke pre-construction contract 
documentation used often lacked scope of obligations and liabilities. Opportunities for 
improving the use and uptake of 2S-ECI in New Zealand include educating industry about 2S-
ECI, developing a standard form of pre-construction services agreement (PCSA) for New 
Zealand, contractors developing specialist expertise in design coordination, buildability 
analysis and value management, and agreeing fixed-price construction contracts based on 
fully complete quality drawings. These findings also contribute to developing procurement 
policies that support transparency and appropriate risk equity and transfer toward the party 
who is best able to manage the risk within the New Zealand construction industry.  
 
A pre-construction services agreement (PCSA) was drafted with ingredients based on the 
findings (appendix 4). The framework also includes a flowchart that guides claims entitlement 
and a table comparing head or main contractor and consultant construction manager 
obligations was developed. This provide a practical guide for contract administrators and 
includes a summary of interpretation of terms to inform contract drafters that can help reducing 
ambiguity for all construction contracts. This has the potential to help avoid unwarranted 
disputes. 
 
It was also recommended that skills in construction law and buildability analysis within the 
construction industry be enhanced and for tertiary education institutions to play a greater role. 
These include skills in buildability-related claims-entitlement, the effect of early contractor 
involvement, the application of design buildability analysis, and design coordination and 
management within a building information model (BIM) system environment.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 RATIONALE AND IMPORTANCE BEHIND THE RESEARCH 
A key claimed advantage of 2S-ECI is that it reduces design risk by harnessing contractor 
input on buildability and as a result reducing the chances of claims and disputes on design 
buildability during the project implementation. Typically, construction professionals such as 
architects, engineers, and quantity surveyors make decisions on contractors’ claims 
entitlement throughout a construction project. However, typically they are not legally trained 
to interpret contracts. Under common law, contractors legally warrant that they can build what 
the client’s design team has designed, and do so for the fixed price they have offered. Despite 
this contractual commitment, contractors sometimes find they cannot build what has been 
designed, and are provided further detailed drawings by the client’s design team. If the 
contractor has been involved in the design development, this becomes a more complex legal 
issue, which the architect, engineer, or quantity surveyor is expected to know how to resolve 
and make decisions on the contractor’s entitlement to additional time and cost. Earlier studies 
and cases have addressed contractor’s buildability obligations relating to ground conditions 
and foundations, but not on design development.  
 
Standard textbook definitions of procurement systems complicate the definition of 2S-ECI. ECI 
as a concept includes any procurement system that involves contractors during design, 
including design and build (DB) and management contracting (MC). A variation of that includes 
the construction manager acting as a professional advising the client under the construction 
management (CM) procurement system where clients employ trade contractors directly and 
the construction manager managing them. 2S-ECI describes a procurement system in its own 
right. However, overlapping this with these other standard textbook procurement systems, 2S-
ECI it could be considered a two-stage tender process for entering contracts under the 
standard textbook procurement systems. This ambiguity has sometimes led to earlier 
inconsistent research findings.  
 
The use of early contractor involvement (ECI) appears to be growing in New Zealand 
(MinterEllisonRuddWatts, 2016; Cain, 2016). ECI was used by the Department of Corrections 
(Naylor Love, 2016) and Otago Polytechnic (Otago Daily Times, 2016) the Lincoln 
University/AgResearch Joint Facility (The Treasury, 2017) and the Christchurch Convention 
Centre (GETS.GOVT.NZ, 2014). A regional manager for a national construction company 
estimates that approximately 30% of turnover in Otago is through two-stage ECI (Personal 
communication, Tutty, 5 August 2016).  
 
The introduction of 2S-ECI follows a move toward management-based and contractor-led 
procurement pathways in order to improve project performance (Masterman, 2002). Various 
reports in the United Kingdom (Simon Committee Report, 1944; Latham Report 1994; Egan 
Report, 1998; Egan Report, 2002) steered the industry toward more relational procurement 
strategies such as partnering in order to improve productivity and reduce disputes. Similarly, 
in an attempt to improve productivity in the New Zealand construction sector, the Ministry of 
Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE, 2016) identified procurement as a key focus and 
in 2015 released; Planning Construction Procurement: A Guide to developing your 
procurement strategy. The guide includes alternative management-based procurement 
pathways such as management contracting (MC) and construction management (CM), and 
contractor led, design and build (DB). Means of improving procurement practices include; 
better advised clients; considering whole-life cost; more standardization; and collaboration and 
early-involvement in the construction process between clients, designers and contractors 
(MBIE, 2013).  
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However, 2S-ECI processes and user perceptions about its effectiveness remain largely 
unknown. This makes measuring the benefits of ECI difficult (Cheng and Li, 2004). Multiple 
studies support the need for research in this area. Turner and Riding (2015, p180) highlighted 
the lack of literature and clear definition of ECI and identify a badly structured processes that 
impacts on trust and collaboration as a common hindrance to ECI use. Mosey (2011, p2) 
relates problems with defining early-contractor partnering models and requirements of project 
team members with the slowed uptake of partnering within the industry. Song, Mohamed and 
AbouRizk (2009, p14) also argue that much of the resistance to ECI uptake is due to a lack of 
understanding of the concept and its benefits. Farooqui and Ahmed (2008) highlighted the 
bespoke nature of ECI as a challenge and recommend developing client attitudes in order to 
improve constructability through the input of construction knowledge. Pheng, Gao and Lin 
(2015, p831) concluded that ECI can improve productivity, but that this requires greater 
awareness from building professionals.  
 
The benefits of 2S-ECI are generally associated with harnessing contractor’s buildability input 
to de-risk the design and generally improve project planning and reduce claims and disputes 
(Mosey, 2011). However, there is scant research into the contractual provisions for 2S-ECI 
such as parties’ obligations and the contractual effect of early involvement on the contractor’s 
claim entitlement during the construction stage. There are no standard pre-construction 
services agreements (PCSA) support 2S-ECI in New Zealand leaving parties to draft their own 
bespoke agreements. Standard form PCSAs have only emerged from the United Kingdom 
since 2011 to support JCT and NEC contracts (see Chapters 5 and 6). Comparing these 
provisions with the bespoke practices and user perceptions could provide a value framework 
from which to develop a standard from PCSA for use in New Zealand to support 
NZS3910:2013 (SNZ, 2013). 
 
Even 2S-ECI lacks clear definition in previous research and may be confused with ECI as a 
concept, which includes any procurement pathway that involves contractors before or during 
design. These pathways have been categorised into ‘models’ such as design and build, 
management contracting and construction management. Such attempts at categorising 
procurement into succinct ‘models’ has been criticised (Rowlinson and McDermott, 1999). 2S-
ECI may be considered a two-stage tendering process to support these different models, or 
these models could be considered variations of the 2S-ECI pathway.  
 
The New Zealand construction industry generates over NZ$30 billion per annum and expected 
to grow to $41b in 2023 (MBIE, 2018). Construction contributed over 6.1 percent of NZ’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2017 and the industry is expected to employ 571,300 employees 
by 2022 (MBIE, 2017). Being a significant industry in New Zealand, even a 1% saving in 
process efficiency could equate to a saving of up to NZ$300 million per annum.  
 
However, growth across the sector has seen contractors incurring greater risk. Contractors 
are entering fixed price contracts based on incomplete designs and amended contract terms 
(that were standard form) that transfer greater risk onto the contractor. Previous research has 
found incomplete drawings a dominant source of variations during construction and increased 
contractor tender risk amongst Australian contractors (Tower and Bacarini, 2008). The risk 
transfer onto both contractors and consultants in New Zealand has been described as 
reaching ‘inequitable’ levels (NZIQS, 2019) and there are calls for better risk equity and greater 
focus on risk training across the construction industry (Fleming, 2019). This follows major 
players exiting the sector, including Fletcher Construction, Mainzeal and Ebert Construction 
(Harris, 2018). 
 
Construction professionals (quantity surveyors, project managers (PMs), architects and 
engineers) generally decide claim entitlement. However, until recently, tertiary-level 
construction qualifications have contained little or no content on contract interpretation, 
effectively reserving such content to university law programmes across New Zealand. Lay 
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readers may interpret written clauses (express terms) differently from those who have studied 
the influence of implied terms that exist through case law precedent or legislation. For 
example, general clause phrases, such as ‘anything reasonably unforeseeable by an 
experienced contractor’, may appear to provide grounds for extending time due to delay 
caused by the client. However, courts have found such clauses to be ineffective on that basis 
that changing from the common law position (in this case that an act of prevention would 
constitute a breach of contract not a variation to it) requires specific provisions to do so 
(Thomas and Wright, 2011). 
 
Deciding whether drawings instructed during construction vary the contractor’s fixed-price 
contract is more complicated than when clients simply instruct scope changes. This is because 
the long-held common law position is that by offering a fixed-price contract based on drawings 
supplied by the client, the contractor legally warrants that they can build what has been 
designed and do so for the fixed price offered. Relevant principles of contract law include, 
including absolute liability, fitness for purpose and the inclusive-price principle. Yet when 
contractors request details during construction, they are effectively doing so on the very basis 
that they could not otherwise build what has been designed. Considerations include; whether 
the contract would be frustrated on the basis that the design problem was reasonably 
unforeseeable and performance would be impossible without doing the work; whether the 
detail corrects a design documentation error, and whether early warning by the contractor may 
have mitigated the costs. A further complication is designers found negligent for their drawings 
lacking ‘buildability’, in case law and under the New Zealand Licensed Building Practitioner 
(LBP) scheme. 
 
The introduction of early contractor involvement (ECI) further complicates design obligations, 
when contractors or consultant managers provide early input into design buildability. The entity 
responsible for managing construction may be employed using a head construction contract 
or a contract for services. A contract for services is used where the client employs trade 
contractors directly. Alternatively, 2S-ECI uses a hybrid of first-stage services contract and 
second-stage head contract (2S-ECI) (Finnie et al., 2018; Whitehead, 2009). 
 
In the absence of a clear contractual framework for 2S-ECI in New Zealand, clients and 
consultants are left to research procurement pathways and develop their own bespoke 
practices, potentially creating inconsistency and adding to transaction costs. This further risks 
sub-optimal process that in-turn negatively influence the perception of 2S-ECI and reduces 
overall uptake. 
 
Figure 1 presents a process overview of 2S-ECI based on the author’s ethnographic 
experience working for a construction company in New Zealand and from initial scoping 





Figure 1: Flowchart of Two-stage ECI Procurement Process  
 
1.2 AIM 
The aim of the study is to develop a framework for two-stage early contractor involvement (2S 
ECI) in New Zealand commercial construction projects. The contractual framework will 
improve knowledge about procuring construction projects to improve the fulfilment of set 
targets, particularly time and cost, within minimal risk.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions are: 
 
 
1. What types of projects are best suited to 2S-ECI? 
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2. What effect does 2S-ECI have on contractual risks? 
 
3. What are the optimal contractual ingredients to consider at the pre-construction stage, 
such as scope of services, timing, obligations and liabilities, i.e., for a pre-construction 
services agreement (PCSA)?  
 
4. What are the overall benefits, challenges and opportunities to improve 2S-ECI, 
including the effect on market pricing? 
 
 
The contractual framework will establish the contractual obligations of parties. Optimal 
contractual provisions are explored in terms of; timing of contractor involvement, scope of pre-
construction services, pricing, liabilities, and the optimal project type suitable for 2S-EC. From 
this, 2S-ECI can be compared with the traditional procurement pathway in terms of the effect 




The study focuses on contractual obligations of construction contracts and the effect of 2S-
ECI on entitlement for design buildability related claims. This evaluation includes interpretation 
through implied principles of contract law. This builds on the author’s thesis on contractor 
buildability obligations forming part of a Master’s degree in Construction (Construction Law) 
completed at Massey University in 2016. The Master’s thesis explored contractor obligations 
pertaining to buildability and identified areas of contract terms that could be prone to legal 
interpretation, potentially varying claim decisions between construction professionals and 
lawyers.  
 
The type of project is more relevant to 2S-ECI than the type of client. Clients may be procuring 
a one-time development, or have return business. They may be public or private. According 
to Turner and Riding (2015), ECI processes may be adapted to suite the type of client and 
their project, and on an ongoing or one-off basis. ECI processes share common principles with 
alliance contracts in terms of trust, partnership and often target value pricing and shared 
incentives. Ma and Xin (2011, p83) concluded that ECI is best suited to projects with high risk 
and uncertainty (where tender prices would otherwise be high to reflect the uncertainty), but 
smaller than a typical alliance project. The key distinctions between ECI and alliances is that 
ECI does not feature ongoing relationships or pain/gain share pricing. Traditional procurement 
remains more suitable for straightforward projects. 
 
This study focuses 2S-ECI used on commercial construction projects of all size, whether public 
or private. Commercial projects include retail, health, large residential and industrial buildings, 
but does not include infrastructure works such as roading.  
 
ECI describes any form of procurement that involves contractors during the design stage. ECI 
is generally associated with projects of high risk and uncertainty, rather than the type of client. 
Past research demonstrates that ECI is typically used for projects that benefit from contractor 
input around planning, risk mitigation, and design buildability, on large complex projects 
(Turner and Riding, 2015; Whitehead, 2009) and high-value long-term work (Turner and 
Riding, 2015). Although construction management (CM) procurement is generally aligned to 
clients who are experienced in construction on the basis that they can employ the trade 
packages directly and a consultant construction manager (CCM) to administer them without 
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the single-point accountability of a head contractor, as discussed in Chapter 5. On the other 
hand, 2S-ECI does involve a head construction contract. Client appetite for risk and 
relationships between parties influence the use of 2S-ECI. The distinguishing feature between 
2S-ECI and design and build concerns who owns and controls the design, the client or 
contractor (rather than the type of client). Under design and build, the design and build 
contractor controls design decisions as far as they comply with the client’s brief. In the pre-
construction stage of 2S-ECI, the contractor only provides design input for the client’s or their 
representative’s approval. Then the construction contract may be construction—only or the 
design may be novated to the contractor (novated design and build) to become a design and 
build construction contract. For example, (regardless of client type), large and complex 
bespoke multi-million-dollar residential housing, designed by architects and engineers, 
involving complex buildability issues, may benefit from a two-stage procurement process to 
involve the contractor during the design-stage, whereas simple housing designs may not.  
 
 
Standardisation provides advantages of tried and tested familiarity to both the less 




The following are excluded from the scope of the study; public private partnerships (PPPs), 
small residential housing, and infrastructure works. Large government infrastructure projects 
sometimes use PPPs. PPPs involve a complex project governance group including 
government, banks, and contractors. Therefore, PPPs are not relative to mainstream 
commercial construction project in New Zealand. Franchise house builders use design and 
building contracts for the majority of residential housing in New Zealand. Again, this is not a 
feature of 2S-ECI.  However, findings from this research may be generally applicable (external 
validity) to other types of construction such as architectural houses and large infrastructure 
works. The author is aware of 2S-ECI processes used in small residential works, such as 
alterations and extensions. However, this does not form part of the scope.  
 
The interviews conducted were limited to clients, PMs, designers, PQSs, and head 
contractors. This is because the 2S-ECI process is a contractual agreement between the client 
and the head contractor. Typically, the head contractor then procures the subcontractors on 
an open-book basis. Further studies could explore perceptions of 2S-ECI among specialist 
subcontractors. Attempts were made to interview industry participants who worked on 
Christchurch projects procured through 2S-ECI that were reported in the media as disasters, 
after suffering major budget blow-outs, such as the Metro Sports Facility. However, 
government level investigations prevented those involved from commenting. Further research 
could more specifically explore 2S-ECI use during the earthquake rebuild. The absence of 
specific focus on the Christchurch rebuild does not distort the findings from the New Zealand 
construction industry. The 21 interviewees from across New Zealand had extensive 
experience, and many belonged to national firms and spoke regularly with other divisions 
adding to the robustness of the research. In any case, the Christchurch rebuild represented 
exceptional circumstances, and not the norm of construction practice.  
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This first chapter presents the overall research context, the research questions, and rationale 
and importance of this research. 
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In the second chapter, presents the applied research design and methods.  
 
In chapter 3, presents a review of literature pertaining to early contractor involvement. 
 
In chapter 4, presents an analysis of existing standard form contractual documentation and 
procedures the support forms of early contractor involvement.   
 
In chapter 5, presents an evaluation of contractual design obligations for construction including 
the effect of 2S-ECI. 
 
In Chapter 6, presents the use of 2S-ECI in New Zealand commercial construction in terms of 
the contractual documentation used and perceptions from users.  
 
In Chapter 7, presents the analysis of survey data collected from the interview sample.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the 2S-ECI framework, providing guidance for users, key ingredients for 
pre-construction services agreements (PCSAs), and overall advantages, and opportunities for 
improvement and further research. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS  




• Finnie D, Ameer Ali N and Park K (2021) Early contractor involvement: a review of pre-
construction service agreements, Procurement and Law, 174(1):1-8 https://doi. 
10.1680/jmapl.20.00038 
 
This article evaluates optimal contract provisions for 2S-ECI through comparing two 
standard form ECI agreements published in the United Kingdom with two bespoke 
agreements used in NZ and collating with industry perceptions through 21 interviews 
across NZ.  
 
• Finnie D, Ameer Ali N and Park K (2019) Design development post contract signing: 
client’s or contractor’s cost New Zealand?. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers – Management, Procurement and Law. 
https://doi.org/10.1680/jmapl.18.00044 
 
This article evaluates contractor entitlement to claim costs for detailed drawings 
instructed after entering a fixed price construction contract applying principles of 
contract law and considering the effect of 2S-ECI.  
 
• Finnie, D, Ameer Ali N and Park K. (2018) Enhancing offsite manufacturing and 
prefabrication through early contractor involvement (ECI) in New Zealand. 
Management Procurement and Law, 171(4):1-35 
https://doi.org/10.1680/jmapl.17.00029  
 
This article evaluates how 2S-ECI contractual provisions help overcome key barriers 






• Finnie D, Ameer Ali N, and Park K (2019, August) Improving 2-stage early contractor 
involvement: lessons from New Zealand. Paper presented at the 22nd Pacific 
Association of Quantity Surveyors Congress, Kuching Sarawak, Malaysia. 
 
This paper evaluates overall industry perceptions toward 2S-ECI in New Zealand 
through 21 interviews across New Zealand in terms of what is working well, and 
opportunities to improve 2S-ECI. 
 
• Finnie, D. and Ameer Ali, N. (2016, December) Enhancing offsite manufacturing and 
prefabrication through procurement practices. Presentation at the New Zealand 
Modular Construction and Prefabrication Conference, Auckland, New Zealand. 
 
This PowerPoint presentation evaluated how 2S-ECI contractual provisions work to 
overcome key barriers to off-site manufacturers. Audience feedback helped inform 




• Finnie, D. (2011, 8th June) Design buildability Claim Entitlement under 
NZS3910:2013, Considering Early Contractor Involvement. Presentation to the 
Adjudicator’s Association of New Zealand (AANZ) annual training day, Auckland New 
Zealand. 
 
• Finnie, D. (2018, 28th March) Employing a builder: when can they claim more time or 
money?. Presentation at Otago Polytechnic, Dunedin, New Zealand.  
 
These were local PowerPoint presentations sharing findings into when contractors can 
claim costs after entering a fixed price construction contract for drawings supplied by 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
 
2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study adopts an exploratory approach to identify the relationships between process 
variables (Fellows and Liu, 2015 p91) such as scope, obligations, timing, pricing, risk, and 
project governance structure to develop a framework for 2S-ECI.  
 
2S-ECI procurement is an emerging area of procurement research. The first definitive work 
specifically addressing 2S-ECI was by Mosey (2011). There are plausible reasons for this. 
First, previous literature has described the challenges in defining construction procurement 
processes and into systems or models (Rawlinson, 2013). Second, construction procurement 
processes are often complex and complicated by a large range of factors, such as the 
influence people in the project and their relationships (Mastermind, 2002; Dissanayaka, 1998; 
Walker, 1995) and the form of contract used which, in New Zealand, is likely to have amended 
terms (NZIQS, 2019). Previous research into ECI has found that procedures vary across 
countries including the United Kingdom, USA, Australia, and New Zealand (Turner and Riding, 
2015). In the United Kingdom, ECI is typically considered a form of partnering (Rahman and 
Alhassan 2012; Mosey, 2011) while in Australia ECI has been associated with hybrid models 
developed for infrastructure projects where the first-stage is a form of partnering and the 
second-stage is often a design and build contract (Whitehead, 2009). While prior studies have 
considered the relational aspects of ECI (Strahorn, Gajendran and Brewer, 2015; Menches 
and Chen, 2012; Ross, 2011; Lee, Seo, Park, Ryu and Kwon, 2009; Song, Mohamed and 
AbouRizk, 2009; Zuo and Zilante, 2006) there is little known about the contractual liabilities 
associated with ECI. In comparing whether the entity employed to plan and manage 
construction should be employed through a contract for works or a construction contract, again 
relational aspects have been studied, (Jergeas and Put, 2001; Tenah, 2001) but the first 
reported court case involving a construction management agreement (CMA) was in 2001, 
Great Eastern Hotel v John Laing Construction Management Ltd (2005). This makes 
establishing any absolute cause and effect of relationships difficult.  
 
An exploratory systems approach to research is therefore preferable over an analytical 
approach of existing systems. The systems approach assumes that reality is the sum of 
components that often have indicative relationships, but that in which reality differs from the 
sum of its components. Rowlinson and McDermott (1999, p12) described how attempts to 
define procurement pathways have been called ‘virtually meaningless’, and that such systems 
may actually share more commonality than differences. They argue (on p35) the need for a 
set of key variables to define the contract strategy. In comparing the pros and cons of 
traditional versus alternative procurement pathways, Ashworth (2012, p94) concluded that ‘if 
a single method was able to be devised which addressed all of the problems then the 
remaining methods would quickly fall into disuse.’ Therefore exploring the systems used to 
procure 2S-ECI is preferable to analysing any one prescribed textbook procurement ‘model.’  
 
A quantitative approach would fail to represent 2S-ECI in New Zealand construction because 
surveying industry, asking them to rate and rank based on textbook procurement definitions 
(design and build, management contracting and construction management) would fail to 
explore the 2S-ECI process when those textbook definitions are problematic. This is supported 
by Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi and Savicky (2009)’s argument that the construction industry is 
fundamentally misunderstood by academics whose attempts at improvement have focused on 
technical expertise over systems. They argue that continually surveying pre-set questions 
based on prior literature contributes to the stability when a systems overhaul is required. 
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This research uses a qualitative strategy. This is supported by Fellows and Liu (2015 p71) 
who describe a ‘paradigm shift’ towards the more qualitative, interpretive approach in 
construction management research. A soft systems methodology is appropriate for social 
problems and tackling ill-structured problems such as value management (Fellows and Liu, 
2015 p49). Construction management researchers often view the temporary project 
organisation as a social-technical system and, in the study of the relationships between project 
participants, taking the social constructivist's approach (Fellows and Liu, 2015 p74). This is 
where knowledge is constructed based on experience and social interaction. This supports 
qualitative approaches such as interviews.  
 
Legal scholarship research methods established the contractual obligations of the entity 
employed to plan and manage construction, and the influence of 2S-ECI on those obligations. 
Construction procurement involves both inter-personal and definitive contractual relationships. 
Toolanen (2008) described a procurement system as the process of engaging the various 
parties to the project and establishing the temporary project organisation and setting out each 
parties’ responsibilities obligations and liabilities and how they are compensated (see 
Toolanen, 2008. According to Chynoweth (2008, p29-30) legal doctrines analysis, such as 
dealing with the law of contract, is largely concerned with the interpretation of legal texts (such 
as contracts) and can often be better understood when combined with industry perceptions. 
The evaluation of obligations based on recognised legal doctrines (‘black letter law’) and 
developing legal doctrines in the context of 2S-ECI falls under the expository and legal theory 
research as defined by (Arthurs (1983) taxonomy of legal research in Knight and Ruddock, 
p29). The doctrinal research analyses legal texts such as court reports and legal commentary 
to establish contractual obligations. For example, the legal term ‘reasonable skill and care’ 
defines the legal duty required of a professional consultant such as a PM, architect or PQS. 
Legal theory also considers the context of the legal institution. For example, the Common law 
of England is important in the New Zealand legal system. Originally, New Zealand shared its 
statutes with England. Now only a few British Statutes apply here, like Magna Carta and the 
Great Bill of Rights, however, according to the Imperial Laws Application Act 1989 the 
Common law of England remains New Zealand’s Common Law until changed by our courts. 
This is why many New Zealand contract cases are English cases, which are binding, not just 








It is important to evaluate the contractual obligations required of parties when comparing 
procurement pathways. Contractual risk transfer is a major problem in New Zealand 
Law reform research (Socio-legal 
research ‘law in context’)
Expository research (Conventional 
treatise and articles/ ‘black letter 
law’)
Fundamental research (Sociology of 
law, critical legal studies, law and 
economics, etc.)
Legal theory research 




construction (NZIQS) with calls for more contractual risk training in the sector (NZIOB, 2019). 
Yet, contractual legal research appears largely separated from construction management 
research despite construction professionals administering construction projects, not lawyers.  
Knight and Ruddock (2008, p1) describe the philosophical debate that emerged in the 1990’s 
about the dominance of positivism and the role of theory in the journal of Construction 
Management and Economics. Over a decade later, Knight and Ruddock (2008, p6) found that 
positivism and quantitative research approaches still appear to dominate, with almost all of 
the 107 papers published in the Journal of Construction Management and Economics volume 
24 in 2006, being based on surveys or interviews. In preparation for this study, research 
methods were studies from the following three texts on the topic of research methods in the 
built environment: 
 
• Fellows, R. and Liu, A. (2015) Research methods for construction (4th ed.). Wiley 
Blackwell. 
 
• Knight, A. and Ruddock, L. (2008) Advanced research methods in the built 
environment. Wiley-Blackwell.  
 
• Naoum, S.G. (2013) Dissertation research & writing for construction students (3rd ed.). 
Routledge. 
 
In addition, a fourth on more general ‘real world’ research: 
 
• Robson, C. (2002) Real world research (2nd, ed.) Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.  
 
All four books compare qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, and the use of 
surveys and questionnaires. Only Knight and Ruddock (2008) mention legal research methods 
or ‘legal scholarship’. Knight and Ruddock (2008, p28) provide that ‘legal researchers have 
always struggled to explain the nature of their activities in other disciplines’ and may often be 
viewed as not truly academic. With such a cynosure of empirical data based on surveys and 
questionnaires it is easy to see the potential for friction between the scientific (natural and 
social science) researchers and those legal scholars who, rather than relying on empirical 
data, focus on developing a more theoretical debate to answer the question; ‘what is the law?’ 
in particular contexts. Knight and Ruddock (2008, p33) provide that: 
 
Scientific research in both natural and social sciences, relies on the collection of 
empirical data, either as a basis for its theories, or as a means of testing them. In either 
case, therefore, the validity of the research findings is determined by a process of 
empirical investigation. In contrast, the validity of doctrinal research findings is 
unaffected by the empirical world. 
 
Scientific research places a strong focus on the establishment of a ‘research methodology’, 
which aligns the selected research tools with the philosophical viewpoint (ontological and 
epistemological positions) of the researcher, considering for example whether reality is 
absolute (positivism) or subjective (interpretivism). In contrast, legal scholars focus on 
developing legal doctrine through logical deduction, reasoning, and applying legal principles 
to hypothetical classes of situations. ‘The most widely used technique is undoubtedly the 
process of analogical reasoning’ (Knight and Ruddock, 2008, p30). As such, there is no such 
focus on the development of a ‘research methodology’ in legal scholarship. As described by 
Knight and Ruddock (2008, p32): 
 
Its [legal scholarship] approach involves the development of scholastic arguments for 
subsequent criticism and reworking by other scholars, rather than any attempt to 
deliver results which purport to be definitive and final. Any 'methodologies' in this type 
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of research are therefore employed subconsciously by scholars (and practicing 
lawyers) who would most usually consider themselves to be involved in an exercise in 
logic and common sense than in the formal application of a methodology understood 
by researchers in the scientific disciplines. 
 
Scientific researchers may consider research that bases its conclusions on theoretical 
arguments without any empirical data (such as surveys or questionnaires) as a mere ‘literature 
review.’ However, it is difficult to see how surveying construction professionals (who are 
unlikely to be legally trained) about contractual legalities is going to develop the law in the field 
of construction procurement. The law is the law, regardless of individual’s perceptions of what 
it should be. This demonstrates a philosophical flaw in any assumption that construction 
research should solely focus on empirical evidence in the form of surveys and questionnaires. 
The New Zealand construction industry can clearly benefit from research that integrates 
construction management with legal analysis.   
 
2.2 APPLIED RESEARCH METHODS 
The following mixed research methods were used to address the questions of this study (see 
figure 3): 
 
• Literature review within the field of construction procurement to obtain knowledge of 
prior and ongoing research on procurement pathways that involve contractors during 
the design stage. This examination included mainly journal and conference articles, 
textbooks and reports.  
 
This helped toward establishing the key process parameters for 2S-ECI, research 
question 2: What are the optimal contractual ingredients to consider at the pre-
construction stage, such as timing, obligations and liabilities. It also helped to establish 
what is already known about 2S-ECI in terms of risk and market pricing (research 
questions 1 and 3) and about previously identified challenges to using 2S-ECI and 
opportunities for improvement (research question 4). 
 
• Legal scholarship to establish the contractual obligations of parties to construction 
contracts and the effect of early involvement on those obligations. Legal scholarship 
includes the interpretation of contractual obligations in terms of both the express 
contract terms (those written in the contract) and terms implied through case law 
precedent and legislation.  
 
This helped to answer research question 2: What effect does 2S-ECI have on 
contractual risks? 
 
• Document analysis to compare contractual documentation used in 2S-ECI and the 
efficacy and efficiency of how contractual obligations particularly in terms of ability to 
add value and reduce risk.  
 
This helped answer research questions 1 and 2: Risk and optimal contract ingredients. 
 
• Interviews to establish how 2S-ECI is conducted in New Zealand construction and to 
explore user perceptions about how the different process components affect project 
performance through 2S-ECI and gauge the overall effect on risk, pricing, benefits, 
challenges and opportunities for improvement.  
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This helped answer research questions 1 – 4. Risk and optimal contract ingredients, 
and the effect of 2S-ECI on market pricing and the overall benefits, challenges and 
opportunities to improve 2S-ECI 
 
• Survey questionnaire in the forms of a single-stage Delphi method sent to all 
interviewees (as an expert sample) to help validate the interview findings by capturing 
the views of expert sample population of all ideas raised within the interview sample.  
 
This also helped answer research questions 1 – 4. 
 
Further details of each research method and its application are provided in the respective 




Figure 3: Research framework 
 
 
2.3 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY  
 
Reliability and validity are important in research studies in order to produce accurate results, 
using a clear research methodology so that others may repeat the study, and so that findings 
may be used in other research and application in practice (Fellows and Liu, 2015). Validity for 
exploratory studies can be subdivided into construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability (Yin, 1994). Construct validity is a measure of how well the study reflects the 
area of interest in question, internal validity is used to measure causalities in an explanatory 
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study and external validity is a measure of how general the results of the study can be 
regarded. Reliability is a measure of the reproducibility of the study.  
 
A key focus of validity is how well the questions asked in interviews or surveys address the 
research topic. The semi-structured interview questionnaire was adapted from a questionnaire 
used by Gameson and Sher (2009) to study perceptions of procurement. The questionnaire 
was trialled with interviews and refined before continuing. Interviews also provided the 
opportunity to more deeply explore the respondent’s views. This is supported by Robson 
(2002, p271) who recommends interviews for exploring perceptions of new organisational 
processes. Robson (2002, p272) describes how ‘face-to-face interviews offer the possibility of 
modifying one’s line of enquiry, following up interesting responses and investigating underlying 
motives in a way that postal and other self-administered questionnaires cannot.’ However, 
interviews can create practical challenges. For example, throughout the process, some 
interviewees would raise valuable points that might have been applicable to earlier 
interviewees, however, re-interviewing the sample to gain their views each time a new point 
is raised was impracticable. Therefore, a survey questionnaire based on coded interview 
findings provided a reliable way to test ideas amongst the expert sample. The survey enables 
all of the interviewees (in the form of an expert panel) to rate all ideas raised from the sample, 
such as the challenges of using 2S-ECI and the opportunities to improve it.  
 
Surveying the interview sample provided a mixed-method research approach, in that, the 
interview findings (a quanlitative approach), were tested through the survey (a qualitative 
approach). This can help counter the threats to validity, although practical difficulties can still 
arise when different sources yield conflicting results (Robson, 2002, p174). The mixed-method 
approach is supported by Knight and Ruddock (2008, p8) who describe how quantitative 
methods can be used to corroborate qualitative data (or vice versa) through providing 
methodology triangulation. Mixed-method approaches also feature in previous research into 
construction procurement (Edkins and Hedley, 2006; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005 etc.). 
Edkins and Hedley (2006) used a two-stage qualitative then quantitative research 
methodology to explore the extent to which effective relationships and legal factors determine 
PPP performance outcomes in United Kingdom construction. The first stage involved 
ethnographic case studies and the second stage used survey questionnaire. Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy (2005, p366) used multiple research methods to develop a framework for 
building relational project teams comprising ‘literature review, two questionnaire surveys, one 
case study and one interview-based survey of local industry experts’. Document analysis and 
case studies also feature as prominent research methods for exploring construction 
procurement practices (Jergeas and Put, 2001; Larsen, Kao, Soentanto and Goodier, 2006; 
Song, Mohamed and AbouRizk, 2009, p14).  
 
2.4 ETHICAL PROCEDURES: INTERVIEWING AND DATA COLLECTION 
The main risk of harm to participants is the sharing of commercially sensitive views or 
information, including commercially sensitive project data. Participants risk facing employment 
disciplinary procedures or embarrassment. At an organisational level, firms risk losing 
commercial advantage. Ethical considerations are particularly important when conducting 
interviews. A risk is that the interviewer may manipulate the data collected. It is crucial that all 
views expressed are those of the interviewee and not the interviewer. Robson (2002, p273) 
warns that ‘the lack of standardisation that it implies inevitably raises concerns about reliability, 
Biases are difficult to rule out.’ This study was conducted in accordance with Massey 
University Ethical Conduct for Research. The research method was submitted to the Massey 
University Human Ethics Committee (MUHEC) using the online process for full ethics 
approval. An ethical analysis of the research methodology was conducted after reading the 
Massey University Ethical Conduct for Research. This was then discussed with the research 
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supervisors. These principles were applied in the interviews. The ethics application was 
approved under NOR 17/48. The following strategies were used to minimise harm: 
 
2.5 MINIMIZATION OF HARM 
 
Conflict of interest:  
 
Some interviewees in this research worked on projects for the tertiary institution where the 
researcher is an employee. Other interviewees had working relationships with the researcher 
when he worked for a construction company (2002 – 2009). Therefore, the researcher knew 
some interviewees.  
 
Extra care was taken with questioning and interpreting participants’ comments to adopt a 
scholarly stance. It was made clear to participants (through the Information Sheet and 
interview introductions) that the researcher role is separate from any previous roles.  
 
Interviewees were offered written transcripts of their interviews and the opportunity to edit for 
correctness.  
 
Informed consent:  




Sensitive comments were described in a generic manner to avoid potential identification. For 
example, a rebuild of a hospital in Dunedin could easily be linked to the parties involved. Such 
a project could be described as a ‘large, complex and highly serviced project’ in Dunedin. 
Identifying codes will be assigned to names of people and projects (e.g., respondent a, 




Recorded consents were stored in a safe and secure manner under the control of the research 
supervisors. This facilitates future reference to these forms if necessary.  
 
Interviews were recorded using an audio device or written notes, then transcribed. 
Transcriptions were provided to the responded to edit for accuracy. All written transcripts are 
submitted through the student’s supervisor before going to any other party. 
 
Data was stored on secure computers or networks.  
 
Respondents were given the option to receive a summary of key findings upon completion.  
 
Raw data is archived for three years from the completion of the thesis to enable future 




Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This section critically analyses knowledge relating to ECI from literature, and identifies gaps 
in knowledge. This chapter is structured as follows: 
 
• Literature relating to procurement definitions and the main different procurement 
models;  
• Market pricing in terms of traditional versus relational procurement and price-based 
versus value based procurement; 
• Advantages of ECI; 
• Considerations such as project suitability, pricing provisions, and scope of pre-
construction services;  
• Potential challenges of ECI and comparisons between head contract versus 
consultancy contract; 
• Challenges on procurement decision-making and the advantages of standard form 
contracts. 
 
3.1 PROCUREMENT DEFINITIONS 
Previous studies have sometimes attempted to gauge the advantages and disadvantages of 
ECI, without first establishing any clear contractual framework. For example, Francis and Kiroff 
(2015) surveyed the perceptions of ECI based on their assertion (based on ‘personal 
communication’) that design and build is the most commonly used form of ECI in Auckland 
commercial construction market. Therefore, their findings could be considered the perceptions 
of design and build, and not ECI, which, as a concept, includes any procurement pathway that 
enables contractor involvement in design (Rahman and Alhassan, 2012), nor ECI as its own 
procurement system, generally referred to a 2S-ECI (Mosey, 2011). This blurring of ECI 
definition potentially confuses research findings. The contractual obligations required of 
contractors in a design and build contract are quite different to a 2-stage construction-only 
contract, or where clients employ trade contractors directly and a consultant to manage them, 
under the CM pathway (also a form of ECI). Worse, previous studies have failed to agree on 
what even constitutes a procurement pathway, with attempts to prescribe procurement into a 
‘system’, or ‘model’.  
 
Construction procurement is the acquisition of resources required to realise a construction 
project across all stages of the procurement process (NZCIC, 2006). There exists a multitude 
of variables to consider in terms of the possible pathways to acquiring such resources over 
the project lifecycle. A procurement system or model describes the process of engaging the 
various parties to the project and establishing the temporary project organisation and setting 
out each parties’ responsibilities obligations and liabilities and mechanism for compensation 
(Toolanen, 2008). Systems or models are not contracts. A useful distinction is drawn by 
Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p19) who distinguish between a standard form of contract as a 
document which should rarely, if ever, be amended, versus a model which only provides a 
starting point for more detailed negotiations. Attempts to categorise procurement pathways 
into ‘systems’ or ‘models’ have been criticised. The National Economic Development Office’s 
NEDO (1983) categorised procurement into traditional, design and build, design and manage, 
management contracting, and construction management. Franks (1990) later categorised 
procurement into designer-led competitive tender, designer-led construction works managed 
for a fee, package deal, and project manager/client’s representative led, have subsequently 
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been criticized. Hibberd (1991) argued that the term ‘model’ or ‘system’ is inappropriate 
because there exists no formal structure or even general agreement in terminology and that 
the terms procurement ‘paths’ or approaches’ are more appropriate. Rowlinson and 
McDermott (1999, p12) described how such attempts have been referred to as ‘virtually 
meaningless’, and that the pathways that have been categorised into different systems may 
actually be more similar than they are different. They argued (on p35) the need for a set of 
key variables to define the contract strategy. In comparing the pros and cons of traditional 
versus alternative procurement pathways, Ashworth (2012, p94) concluded that ‘if a single 
method was able to be devised which addressed all of the problems then the remaining 
methods would quickly fall into disuse.’  
 
Despite the growth of 2S-ECI the optimal contract provisions remain largely unknown. The 
ECI pathway is generally referred to as a ‘two-stage’ procurement processes, often referred 
to as ‘two-stage tendering’ or ‘fast-tracking’ in reference to the ability to over-lap design and 
construction activities when contractors are employed during the design stage. The most 
focused and comprehensive research into ECI as a system was by Mosey (2011). Mosey 
proposed a two-stage procurement process where a head contractor is first employed during 
the design stage under what he describes as a ‘conditional’ construction contract. The 
contractor then works with the client’s design team, providing planning and design buildability 
advice, and works toward establishing a construction budget, typically in the form of a target 
value. If the developed design and budget price are to the client’s satisfaction, the contractor 
secures the unconditional construction contract. This provided a starting point for 2S-ECI. 
Subsequently, standard form contract documentation has evolved to support 2S-ECI, such as 
the launch of the first edition of the JCT Pre-Construction Services Agreement (PCSA) in 2011. 
These PCSAs still leave parties to decide a number of key variables. These include the timing 
of contractor involvement, scope of pre-construction services, whether or how the contractor 
is paid for early involvement, whether the construction stage contract is construction-only or 
design and build, whether the contractor subcontracts all trade packages or carries out 
carpentry and concrete works using their own employees and if so how this work is priced. 
Turner and Riding (2015) explored ECI processes of a large Australian operations and 
maintenance contractor, Transfield Services. They found that, in public sector procurement, 
procedures vary across countries including the United Kingdom, USA, Australia, and New 
Zealand. In the United Kingdom, ECI is typically considered a form of partnering (Rahman and 
Alhassan 2012; Mosey, 2011). In Australia, hybrid models have been developed for 
infrastructure projects where the first-stage is a form of partnering and the second-stage is 
often a design and build contract (Whitehead, 2009). Examples include; South Australia’s 
Department for Transport Energy and Infrastructure (DTEI) and Queensland’s Department of 
Transport and Main Roads (TMR). To date, there appears to be little or no research into the 
optimal contractual provisions for 2S-ECI, i.e., a lack of contractual framework.   
 
Only the word ‘procurement’ appears clearly defined. Construction procurement is the 
acquisition of resources required to realise a construction project across all stages of the 
procurement process (NZCIC, 2006). The procurement strategy sets out how parties 
employed, their responsibilities, and the structure of the temporary project organisation, 
typically comprising a project manager (PM), designers and contractors (Toolanen, 2008). 
Thomas, Luu and Chen (2002, p79) describe the selection and use of an appropriate 
procurement system as ‘crucial to project success’. The effectiveness of procurement 
strategies and contractual arrangements have been linked to productivity (Durdyev and 
Mbachu, 2011; Wilkinson and Scofield, 2010; The Building and Construction Productivity 
Partnership, 2012), levels of innovation (Loosemore, 2014; de Valence, 2010), and have been 
found to influence the potential for conflict and disputes (Jelodar, Yiu and Wilkinson, 2015; 




To begin establishing a contractual framework for 2S-ECI evaluate the key components of 
textbook procurement models, from what is considered ‘traditional’ contacting to the 
‘alternative’ procurement pathways such as design and build, management contracting, and 
construction management. In terms of ECI, these models may be categorised into those that 
involve a head contractor (design and build, management contracting, 2-stage traditional) 
versus those where the client employs the separate trade packages directly and a consultant 
to manage them (CM). 
 
3.2 ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT PATHWAYS 
Literature has generally distinguished procurement traditional and alternative pathways. The 
traditional pathway features single-stage tender process. Where head contracts tender based 
for fully complete designs (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008; Kirkham, 2007). Alternative pathways 
originated when governments began encouraging to help address projects often being 
completed late and over budget, particularly on large and complex projects, both the United 
Kingdom (Franks, 1999) and in the US (Edward, 1997). These alternative pathways feature 
more management-based and contractor design and build procurement. However, here again, 
there exists a lack of clear definition of procurement terminology. Kong and Gray (2006) define 
traditional procurement as where design is completely separate from construction, and the 
contractor has no input into the design. However, design and build f in the United Kingdom 
before traditional design-bid-build (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008). Perhaps this is why some 
authors consider design and build a traditional pathway (Strahorn, Gajendran and Brewer, 
2015; Jaafar and Radzi, 2013), while others such as (Tenah, 2001) categorise design and 
build under as an alternative. 
 
Alternative management-based procurement pathways see managers or contractors moving 
closer to the client (Rowlinson and McDermott, 1999) and the ability to overlap design 
development with construction, typically referred to as ‘fast-tracking’ (Franks, 1998). For 
clients and consultants to make informed design decisions on projects involving OSM, Elnaas, 
Ashton and Gidado (2009) recommend procurement practices should facilitate the sharing of 
cost and buildability knowledge among manufacturers, constructors and designers. Previous 
studies have reported the savings of fast-tracking. A case study by Franks (1998, p38) 
documented that in a project completed over two-years through fast-tracking, while an 
additional cost of $0.5 million was estimated for earlier involvement, a total saving of $2 million 
was achieved over the two-year period compared with traditional procurement. Gil, Tommelein 
and Ballard, (2004) found that through ECI, shop drawings may be produced earlier and faster 
by reducing the time required for freshly appointed contractors to familiarise themselves with 
the project. However, not all research into alterative procurement pathways has produced 
positive findings. Jaafar and Radzi (2013) found that, while alternative procurement pathways, 
such as project management consultancy (PMC), build operate and transfer (BOT), and 
design and construct (D&C) began to feature in Malaysia in the 1990s due to the large volume 
of construction work, subsequent reports eventuated of projects being over budget, completed 
late, and incurring significant defects.  
 
ECI falls under the alternative classification based on previous research. Contractors move 
closer to their clients through their involvement in the design stage planning, rather than 
competitively tendering for fully complete designs, largely eliminating the opportunity for input. 
The key features of individual procurement systems are now explored.  
 
 32 
3.3 TRADITIONAL (GENERAL) CONTRACTING 
As already stated, under traditional contracting construction, head contracts are tendered, 
generally on a lump sum basis, once the design is fully developed (design-bid-build). The head 
contractor may use employees for the carpentry and concrete work and subcontract the 
remaining trade packages, typically in the order of around 80%. 
 
 
Figure 4: Contractual relationships in traditional contracting (MBIE, 2016) 
 
The advantages of this procurement system include; the client enjoys single-point 
accountability for construction work, as the head contractor takes full responsibility for the 
performance of their subcontractors. If the head contractor is late in achieving practical 
completion, the client may claim general or liquidated damages, and the contractor must 
remedy any quality defects at their cost. 
 
However, the client generally pays for the design before receiving the price surety of lump 
sum bids for construction (unlike design and build). There is no opportunity for the contractor 
or construction manager to provide input during design, such as around buildability, risk 
mitigation, or value management (unlike forms of ECI such as management contracting or 
construction management or design and build). Because the contractor competitively bids 
against a design provided by the client, if the design is not fully complete, the contractor may 
look for opportunities to claim variations, and given the short timeframe for contractors to 
become familiar with the design, additional demand is placed on management and 
coordination and on specialist subcontractors associated with complex technologies (Kirkham, 
2007). General contracting is suitable where: 
 
• The construction work is fairly straight forward  
• Design is fully complete 
• The client wants price certainty before construction work commences 
• There is time to fully develop the design, then procure, before construction work starts 
• E.g. a new classroom for a school 
 
Since its introduction in the early 19th century, the traditional procurement route remains very 
popular, accounting for the majority of construction work in the United Kingdom (RICS, 2010; 
Murdoch and Hughes, 2008; Gruneberg and Hughes, 2004) and in New Zealand (Cain, 2016). 
This is despite the arrival of alternative procurement methods, such as construction 
management and management contracting. Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p27) provide an 
historic overview of its introduction. Interestingly, before traditional contracting, procurement 
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was often in the form of design and build or a series of direct contracts between the client and 
the various trade contractors (historic equivalent of today’s CM pathway). Traditional 
contracting evolved in response to the increasing sophisticated of construction technology 
during the Industrial Revolution which saw complex construction sites and coordination issues, 
and more formalised trade contractors, all fuelling the desire for construction companies to 
shoulder the full responsibility for building the project (or buildability risk) and leave architects 
and engineers to focus on designing. ECI processes emerged where a head contractor adopts 
singular responsibility for all construction work such as management contracting, versus 
construction management where the client employs the trade contractors directly and a 
consultant to manage them. This period also saw the introduction of the quantity surveyor to 
produce schedules of quantities (SOQs) to provide consistency across tender bids and control 
costs during the financial contract administration.  
 
The continued dominance of traditional procurement based on competitive lump sum pricing, 
indicates the industries’ risk aversion and preference for singular accountability, competitive 
pricing, and the surety of fixed-price contracts prior to construction work commencing. All of 
these features are available through design and build procurement. Design and build also 
offers the advantages of enabling ECI (with the contractor responsible for both design and 
construction), and providing the client with a price for design and construction before paying 
for design. 
 
3.4 DESIGN AND BUILD  
Under design and build the head contractor, is responsible for both design and construction. 
The contractor’s scope of design liability and payment procedures define the form of design 
and build contract. The design and build contractor may either (i) be responsible for fully 
developing the design from the client’s brief; (ii) develop the design from a preliminary design 
already developed by the client’s design team; or (iii) adopt responsibility for a design which 
is already developed either fully or in part which is then contractually novated to them. Here 
again, previous research demonstrates varying terminology. Where the contractor develops 
the design from the client brief has been called ‘pure DB’ (Turner, 1995; Jansens, 1991), 
‘traditional DB form’ (Akintoye, 1994; Bennet et al, 1996), ‘true DB’ (Caunce, 1995), or 
‘complete DB’ (Turner, 1995). This study will adopt the term ‘traditional DB’. Payment maybe 
through regular monthly payment claims or in package deals or turnkey arrangements (see 
Ling and Leong, 2012) where the contractor finances the project until completion when they 
claim for the works in full.  
 
Design and build continues to prove popular, and research (RICS, 2010; Bennet, et al, 1996) 
shows this continues to accounts for up to around 20 percent of construction work in the United 
Kingdom. Ling and Leong (2012) reported a growing trend towards the use of design and build 
in Singapore and Cain (2016, p30) found through surveying the viewpoint of contractors that 





Figure 5: Contractual relationships in design and build (MBIE, 2016) 
 
Key advantages to the client include the single-point accountability for both design and 
construction (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008; Kirkham, 2007; Katsanis and Davidson, 1998) 
unlike traditional contracting where the contractor is only responsible for construction. Kirkham 
(2007, p128) called this a “significant shift in risk to the contractor compared with the traditional 
route”. The client can also obtain a single lump sum price for design and construction before 
investing in a design. This mitigates the risk of paying for receiving tender bids that are over 
budget, after already paying for the design. Beyond these advantages, it becomes difficult to 
verify research into advantages and disadvantages of design and build again due to 
problematic definitions. For example, Ling and Leong (2012, p43) found that parties perceived 
design and build project costs to be lower noting a likely reason to be the contractor’s ability 
to conduct value engineering. However, this is a feature of any procurement pathway that 
enables ECI (including management contracting, construction management and traditional 
with a two-stage tender), regardless of whether the contractor is responsible for construction 
only or design and build. It is equally difficult to distinguish findings by Ming (2005) - that the 
main predictor of design and build project success is the quality of project management, with 
other predictors including the client's input in the project, working relationships among project 
team, project attractiveness and the use of innovative management approaches – with other 
forms of ECI, if not all forms of procurement.  
 
The advantages of design and build could question the need for other forms of ECI. Previous 
research has identified challenges when the contractor employs the architect, rather than the 
client. The design and build contractor relies on clearly stated client requirements (client brief) 
on which to formulate their design (According to Ling and Leong (2012, p41; Kirkham, 2007, 
p127). As the project complexity increases, so too does the need for sophisticated briefs and 
performance-based specifications, for which the client remains responsible. Converting the 
client’s requirements into legally binding terms can be challenging, and performance-based 
specifications are more difficult to produce than technical specifications (Katsanis and 
Davidson, 1998). Ibbs, et al. (2003) analysed 67 construction projects and found that design 
and build may not provide all the expected benefits to project performance. While time savings 
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were definitive, cost and productivity changes were not convincing. They concluded that the 
contractor’s experience and project management expertise might affect project performance 
outcomes more than solely the project delivery strategy. Interestingly, they found that overall 
(design and construction stages) more construction-only projects incurred cost changes than 
design and build projects, but that the cost changes on traditional projects were more likely to 
be savings while design and build projects incurred more cost increases (p385). Further, 
‘projects that used a combination of two delivery methods had the least cost change’ (p384). 
Traditional projects experienced a higher percentage of cost changes during the construction 
stage, though the real value of cost change was less than that of design and build projects. 
Ibbs, et al. (2003, p385) suggested a possible reason for design and build projects having the 
lowest percentage of changes ‘the contractor has more opportunity to use innovative 
procedures to construct the facility that could result in cost savings for the contractor. Also, 
the improved communication between the contractor and designer allowed for a better and 
positive constructability review that reduced the need for revisions and changes during the 
construction stage.’ They concluded (p387) that design and build projects can result in poor 
performance depending on the time given to the design phase, and that ‘the owner needs to 
be educated and informed about conveying ideas to the contractor in preparing the design 
specifications to ensure success when adopting the DB approach.’ This aligns with other 
literature identifying the need for educated clients when using design and build (Murdoch and 
Hughes, 2008; Kirkham, 2007). It also supports Kings College (2016) findings that alliance 
contracts and ECI require active client involvement.  
 
Another key debate raised across previous studies is the extent that design and build 
contractors may drive cost and time saving at the expensive of aesthetic design quality. 
Whitehead (2009) identified the risk of too many ‘chiefs in the kitchen’ in Australian 
infrastructure projects using 2S-ECI (with the second stage typically design and build), where 
designers pull back as contractors drive buildability efficiencies, and potential problems arising 
from contractors being involved too early. Findings by Ling and Leong (2012) particularly 
highlight the issue. Contractors were more enthusiastic about design and build than clients 
and architects. Contractors felt that workmanship quality is better under design and build, it 
maximises overall client satisfaction, and that design and build projects are aesthetically 
pleasing. While all parties felt that design and build projects are more likely to achieve cost 
and time targets, architects felt that design and build projects may concentrate on time and 
cost at the expense of aesthetics, and clients and architects both felt the reason design and 
build project costs may be lower is because “contractors pursue cheaper design solutions all 
the time.” Fixed price design and build contract incentivise contractors to maximise profits 
through achieving time and cost savings and not to produce and outstanding piece of 
architectural creation at the expense of cost and time, as an architect might. Therefore, for 
large, complex, innovative or creative projects, the client’s desire for single-point accountability 
should be balanced with the potential for contractors to drive cost savings at the expense of 
design. Furthermore, the ability to obtain price surety before paying for design does not apply 
to large complex projects in which case the client still requires separate consultants to develop 
their design brief and to represent their interest in administering the contract and supervising 
the work.  
 
Novated design and build is comparable with 2S-ECI where the contractor adopts 
responsibility for design. Doloi (2008) defines novated design and construct (ND&C) as a 
process where the client first employs a design team to prepare a design to approximately 30-
40%, then contractors bid for the project, and responsibility for the full detailed design is 
novated to the successful contractor. This is similar to 2S-ECI (see figure 1 (2S-DB)) where 
contractors bid a fixed price for P&G and declared margins based on concept design. 
However, under 2S-ECI, the successful contractor then works with the design team toward 
agreeing a fixed price construction contract, which may be construction-only or novated design 
and build. The collaborative involvement toward agreeing a fixed price construction contract 
under 2S-ECI avoids contractors bidding for ND&C projects and making ‘a series of 
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assumptions, allowances or contingencies’ ... which ‘often leads to misinterpretation of the 
design specifications without appropriate input from design consultants in fulfilling both client’s 
and design team’s anticipations’ (p1182). Doloi (2008) identified the following critical attributes 
of novated design and build from surveying 46 respondents (comprising architects, engineers, 
project managers, design managers, and site managers); quality of pre-novation 
documentation, contractor’s responsibility for accepting design errors, contractor’s motivation 
to reduce costs, loyalty of the design team to the contractor post-novation. Doloi (2008, p1194) 
concluded that ‘clear definition of the design brief and early engagement of contractors in the 
novation process are important attributes for driving the contractor’s motive to lower 
construction costs.’ In discussing the critical attributes Doloi (2008, p1191) states that ‘if the 
design is agreed by the client and most of the technical issues are clarified at this stage from 
the constructability perspective, the chances for change of project scope at the post novation 
phase and subsequent design variation greatly reduce’ and that this in-turn reduces the 
likelihood of disputes. This again highlights the advantage of 2S-ECI where contractors 
provide buildability input, rather than competitively bidding for a 30-40% complete design, 
requiring pricing assumptions about the design in a competitive bidding environment.  
 
Design and build can be appropriate for novice clients requiring simple projects (Murdoch and 
Hughes, 2008) and is used extensively in the New Zealand residential sector where building 
companies offer design and build packages. However, as design complexity increases, so 
does the need for client sophistication, a detailed design brief and the input of specialist 
consultants. Design and build is suitable for the following: 
 
• The client wants a clear path for resolving contractual remedies: The head contractor 
is fully responsible for both the design and the construction. 
• The client wants price surety for design and construction before paying for the design. 
This applies for simple projects on the basis that the client can obtain a fixed price for 
say a house without first paying a separate designer to develop a design.  
• The client does not intend to alter the specification during construction. 
• Where the design is straight forward, such as large farm buildings or straightforward 
houses. 
 
If the amount of input and responsibility for accurate and sophisticated design briefs increases 
as project complexity increases, employing a design team separately may become a more 
attractive option. For example, findings by Ling and Leong (2012, p41) that quality is likely to 
be good when the schematic design is developed to an advanced stage before tendering, 
indicate that performance of more complex projects likely depends on greater input and control 
by a client-employed design team.  Another consideration is that as project complexity 
increases so too does the likely amount of contractual administration. There are likely to be 
more instructions and variations dealings with unforeseen circumstances. A challenge with 
design and build procurement is that variations can include costs for both construction and 
design changes. For this reason, Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p51) recommend that ‘a client 
who wishes to reserve the right to alter requirements during the fabrication process should not 
use design and build.’ Therefore, lay-clients of complex builds may require specialist 
consultants to prepare their design brief, and independently administer the contract and 
supervise the quality. Ling and Leong (2012) found participants perceive the overall 
administrative burden of design and build to be about the same as other procurement 
pathways. A form of ECI where contractors provide planning and buildability input during the 
design stage, but client control over the design may be preferable for large, complex, 
innovative or creative design solutions. This may reduce the risk and resource incurred by the 
client to develop sophisticated brief and performance-based specifications and ensure that 
any proposed efficiencies by the contractor do not sacrifice design quality. Furthermore, the 
administrative burned for such projects may be comparable between design and build and 
other forms of ECI.  
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3.5 MANAGEMENT CONTRACTING 
Traditionally head contractor employees tendered fixed price bids for completed designs and 
carried out carpentry and concrete works, subcontracting the remainder. In management 
contracting (MC), the head contractor subcontracts all of the works packages. In practice, 
head contractors subcontracting all packages has become such a regular feature in the 
industry that it is ‘not easily to discern much real difference in practice’ Kirkham (2007, p131).  
 
However, subcontracting all trade packages enables the head contractor employment earlier 
(during the design stage) based on a management fee, thus a form of ECI. This brings the 
advantages of ECI. The head contractor can provide input around buildability, risk 
management, and value management. They can also evaluate subcontractor quotes with the 
client consultants to iron out any issues earlier thus reducing variations (Mosey, 2011). 
According to Ashworth (2012, p114) this ‘should result in the least expensive cost for each of 
the trades and thus for the construction works as a whole.’ 
 
The distinction between management contracting and construction management (CM) is that 
under management contracting a head contractor takes single-point accountability for 
construction, whereas under CM, the client employs all the trade packages directly and a 
consultant to manage them (Ashworth, 2012; Donohoe and Brooks, 2007; Turner, 1997; Male, 
2003; Cox and Champ, 2003). The absolute fitness for purpose duty of a head contractor is a 
higher duty than the reasonable skill and care duty required of a consultant manager. 
Therefore, if the pricing is the same, the reduced risk exposure of MC makes it preferable over 
CM. According to Male (2003, p205): 
 
Management contracting (MC) and Construction Management (CM) are attempts at 
increasing the level of integration within the project delivery process. The allocation of 
risk differs between the two, with the client picking up the work package risks with CM 
whereas they are allocated to the management contractor under MC. 
 
However, under CM the consultant construction manager (CCM) is not without liability. 
Standard forms of CM contracts set out express obligations and responsibilities and the Courts 
have recognised responsibilities such as for; planning, monitoring and controlling activities 
and procuring construction work, including the responsibility for demarcation between trade 
packages (Great Eastern Hotel Company v. John Laing Construction Management, 2005). 
The CCM’s reasonable skill and care obligation is measured what any other reasonably 
competent professional would have done given similar circumstances and taking into account 
required standards of practice. Reasonable skill and care is therefore less strict than the 
commercial liability adopted by head contractors entering fixed price contracts. See Chapter 
5. Both management contracting and CM may increase the client’s risk exposure by 
commencing work with an estimated budget rather than a lump sum price. The 1995 version 
of Hudson’s Building and Engineering (Wallace, 1995, p434) describe the client’s risk 
exposure under management contracting and CM as follows: 
 
Increased exposure to complex disturbance and delay claims brought by numerous 
potential plaintiffs and frequently, under modern contribution legislation involving 
claims between a multiplicity of parties … The budgetary uncertainty of final cost, and 
the lack of control over price which tendering procedures would provide, seems to 




Figure 6: Contractual relationships in management contracting (MC) (MBIE, 2016) 
 
 
The form of management contracting pricing may be similar with 2S-ECI or CM procurement. 
Management contracting and 2S-ECI are the same if the head contractor’s fee comprises 
fixed-price P&G and margins, and then a construction contract is agreed. However, the Joint 
Contracts Tribunal (JCT, 2019) provides a single standard form contract, the MC Management 
Building Contract 2011, which covers both the pre-construction and construction stages (see 
Chapter 4.3.2). Clients may perceive that under CM they save paying a head contractor profit 
margin on their subcontractors. However, Ashworth (2012, p114) describes how under MC, 
the contractor is appointed in a professional capacity for a fee to cover overheads and profit, 
and that ‘the contractor does not, in theory, participate in the profitability of the construction 
work.’ Therefore, the management fee structure of management contracting and construction 
management may be similar. For example, both fees may incorporate a percentage of the 
estimated total project cost. Management contracting is suitable for the following: 
 
• Large or complex projects, such as staged alterations to a hospital 
• Where the design is to be separated from management 
• The client wants the ability to alter the specification during construction 
• Speed from conception to completion is a priority 
• The client does not require price certainty 
 
The use of management contracting fluctuated, after being introduced in the 1980s, to 
between around 5 and 15% and by the early 1990s and remained slightly ahead of CM. 
Ashworth (2012, p87) provides that MC was a procurement method which showed real 
promise in the 1980’s, but peaked in 1989 and has declined ever since. Statistics recorded by 
RICS (2010) found management contracting to account for approximately 1% of projects 
procured in the United Kingdom in 2007 and did not feature at all in 2010.  
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3.6 CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 
Unlike, traditional contracting, design and build, and management contracting, there is no 
head contractor. The client employs the trade contractors directly and a consultant 
construction manager (CCM) to manage them. The consultant price is a management 
consultancy fee. This may avoid paying a head contractor profit margin on their 
subcontractors. However, if the consultant’s fee comprises a percentage of the total works, 
the effect would be the same. It is difficult to compare consultant fees with head contractor 
pricing. Head contractors seldom declare their profit margins in traditional tenders and market 
conditions influence their margins. For example, contactors may bid below cost during 
recessionary markets to maintain resources.  
 
 
Figure 7: Contractual relationships in construction management (CM) (MBIE, 2016) 
 
CM procurement requires client involvement from clients who are experienced in construction 
and is not suitable for those clients who are naïve and inexperienced in construction processes 
(Murdoch and Hughes, 2008; Kirkham, 2007) or where the client is ambiguous, such as 
comprising multiple stakeholders (Kirkham, 2007). Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p71) warn 
that for the CM pathway to operate properly, the client must ‘take an active role in the 
management of the process’ and have familiarity with both the product and the process of 
construction. Construction management is suitable for the following: 
 
• Large complex projects, such as apartment buildings for an experienced developer 
• The client has a good knowledge of the construction process 
• The design is to be separated from management 
• The client wants the ability to alter the specification during construction 
• Speed from conception to completion is a priority 
• The client does not require price certainty of construction work 
 
Use of CM procurement increased to almost 20% by 1991 in the United Kingdom after its 
introduction in 1985, before declining to less than 5% by 1993 and now only features on larger 
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complex projects (Ashworth, 2012). The CM pathway accounted for only 0.3% of contracts by 
number in 2010 in the United Kingdom or 0.1% project value (RICS 2010). 
 
Previous literature has identified challenges with CM procurement. Kirkham (2007, p132-133) 
argued that many of the perceived advantages of CM procurement have not been realised 
and highlights the following difficulties. First CM procurement is only suitable for large 
complicated projects. Second, traditional standard form contracts are well understood and 
tried in case law, unlike the more bespoke forms used in CM. Third, CM procurement still 
relies on satisfactory performance by architects, consulting engineers and the PQS, none of 
whom are under the CCM’s control. Fourth, employment of the specialist contractors remains 
on a lowest price basis, so usual confrontations apply. Loosemore (2014) found such 
confrontations to be worse through CM procurement than traditional contracting when trade 
contractors feel the head contractor, who was a fellow sufferer, becomes isolated from 
adversarial contract tactics. Newcombe (1994) describes how CM provides a more equitable 
‘power paradigm’ than traditional contracting because the specialist trade contractors (who 
would otherwise be subcontractors) are moved closer to the client, and the project manager 
tends to employ charisma and persuasion through modern management concepts to bridge 
the ‘power gap.’ However, Newcombe focused only on theoretical concepts from literature on 
organisational power and ignored the contractual power paradigm. In contrast, Mosey (2011) 
argued that those who portray partnership arrangements as solely requiring a set of values 
and no formal contract fail to recognise the legitimacy of each party’s commercial interests in 
the project. Furthermore, soft skills, persuasion and charisma may improve relationships 
regardless of the procurement pathway. Indeed previous research has suggested that team 
performance and communication can influence project performance more than any particular 
procurement or contractual system (Dissanayaka, 1998; Walker, 1995). Kirkham argued that 
total CM project costs are likely to be higher than for traditional contracting due of the added 
layer of project management. However, this assumes two tiers of manager under CM and one 
under traditional. CM procurement may simply transfer the construction management 
functions from a head contract to a contract for services. In any case, Kirkham (2007, p133) 
concluded that ‘it is probably a mistake to employ management methods on moderately sized 
straightforward jobs which are in no particular hurry.’ Nevertheless, CM procurement seems 
well suited to large developers who have no need to employ a head contractor because their 
core business is designing and constructing buildings. Calder Stewart may be a good example 
in New Zealand.   
 
3.7 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
The primary objective of public private partnerships (PPPs) (also known as private finance 
initiatives (PFIs)) is to encourage private sector investment into major public projects, such as 
hospitals, prisons, schools, and roads. The provider designs, constructions, and provides 
services over a predetermined period (design, construct, manage and finance is a variant) 
(Kirkham, 2007). Procurement procedures are long and complex and contractual relationships 
are complicated. Kirkham (2007, p137) provides a typical example for where a new hospital 
building for public health trust; 
 
• A private consortium pays for a new hospital, where the consortium usually consists of 
a construction company, a bank or financier, a facilities management contractor and 
consultants. 
• The trust then pays the consortium a regular fee for the use of the hospital, which 
covers construction costs, the rent of the building, the cost of support services and the 
risks transferred to the private sector. 
• Thus in essence, most new NHS hospitals will be designed, built, owned and run by a 
consortium or grouping of companies. 
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• The trust will employ some of the staff, mainly doctors and nurses, and will rent the 
building and other facilities from the consortium for at least 25 years. 
• The deal is constructed in such a way that the consortium is guaranteed a full return 
on costs, including interest on the capital borrowed, plus an element of profit. 
 
While PPPs are advocated for reducing government debt and transferring risk to the private 
sector, Kirkham (2007, p135) highlights significant debate around the concept of risk transfer. 
After conducting interviews from two case studies in the US, Jacobson and Choi (2008) found 
ten success factors relating PPPs: specific plan/vision, commitment, open communication and 
trust, willingness to compromise/collaborate, respect, community outreach, political support, 
expert advice and review, risk awareness, and clear roles and responsibilities. Important 
aspects for construction success included:  shared vision between the client, architect, and 
contractor, open communication and trust, and high levels of compromise or collaboration.  
 
PPPs feature large complex projects by governments wanting to transfer initial investment to 
the private sector. Only very large projects can accommodate the costly and highly complex 
contractual arrangements. Therefore, they are not suitable for typical commercial construction 
projects for infrequent clients.  
 
This section has evaluated the key features of traditional and alternative procurement systems 
generally defined in literature. The following sections explore theories relating to construction 
procurement including traditional and relational systems, price-based and value-based 
systems and transaction cost theory, before exploring the specific advantages and challenges 
associated with ECI. 
 
3.8 TRADITIONAL VERSUS RELATIONAL PROCUREMENT PATHWAYS 
Research has categorised procurement relationships into competitive or relational. Traditional 
procurement involves competitive relationships (also called distributive, win-lose, or 
adversarial), parties act in self-interest to maximise profit and secure a larger project share 
(Lee, Seo, Park, Ryu and Kwon, 2009). Relational procurement pathways focus more on 
aligning the right contractor with the right client and their project in order to maximise value 
and reduce conflicts and disputes (Heaphy, 2011a; Heaphy, 2011b; Jelodar, Yiu and 
Wilkinson, 2016; Mosey, 2011). 
 
Traditional procurement based on competitive tender has long been considered adversarial in 
nature (Strahorn, Gajendran and Brewer, 2015; Mosey, 2011; Zuo and Zilante, 2006) and 
criticised for emphasizing cost at the expense of value (Ciobe and Saha, 2009). Based on 
principles of best practice procurement, the NZCIC (2006, p8) provides that, parties should 
‘negotiate the fee on a mutually agreed scope of services with the selected firm’ and avoid 
adversarial selection methods that force fees down to the point where providers ‘cannot afford 
to assign properly qualified staff or for sufficient periods’ should be avoided. They promote 
positive relationships, such as partnering philosophies where parties work together in a team 
environment.  
 
The problems associated with traditional procurement have driven change toward relational 
procurement pathways. Walker and Vines (1997) found the procurement model and 
relationships between contracting parties to influence project time performance. Case study 
research by Eriksson (2010) found partnering strategies with common objectives and target 
value contracts to improve project success. Strahorn, Gajendran and Brewer (2015) 
recommend increased trust; a greater emphasis on project team selection in the initial project 
stages, careful allocation of risks, and clear communication including that of an informal nature 
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to improve project success. They recommend distribution of authority, mutual objectives, and 
individual competence and trust to cultivate collaborative environments.  
 
 
Relational procurement pathways may improve planning and reduce claims and disputes. In 
traditional procurement, approximately 80-90% of construction work is subcontracted by the 
head contractor (Hinze and Tracy, 1994) and clients attempt to leverage savings through 
acquiring competitive pricing from head contractors who in-turn acquire competitive pricing 
from subcontractors. However, the construction sector is project-based. Each project 
comprises its own unique goals, objectives, and constraints and requires far more planning 
and management than manufacturing processes (Pinto, 2015). Schmid (2010) categorized 
four main types of project risk, (i) performance risk, (ii) default risk, (iii) delay in permits and 
approvals and (iv) environmental and unforeseen conditions. Pursuing the lowest price over 
the best quality planning and management may negatively affect project performance. 
Contractors running at a loss may take shortcuts, or worse, exit the market without completing 
the project. Reasons for payment problems may arise through ability (cannot pay) or attitudinal 
(would not pay) (Hughes, Hillebrant and Murdoch, 1998). The increased trust and 
collaboration of relational procurement pathways should therefore help reduce attitudinal 
payment problems. However, this relies on parties clearly understanding of their contractual 
obligations. 
 
The open-book pricing used in 2S-ECI can provide a contractual framework to support supply 
chain integration (Kings College, 2016). However, researchers have not focused on the 
contractual and pricing mechanisms to support relational procurement, instead focusing on 
relationships. Supply chain integration features parties working together on repeat projects. 
Parties develop better understanding of each other’s operations. This improves trust, reduces 
the distance between organisations and improves communication, and providing early 
collaborative involvement (Ross, 2011). Interest in supply chain integration arose around the 
same time as the Latham Report (Latham, 1994). Multiple government reports in the United 
Kingdom, including the Latham Report, followed by the Egan Report (1998) and restated by 
Egan (2002) recommended more relational approaches such as supply chain integration and 
serial tendering. Strategic partnerships feature common goal setting and longer-term 
relationships. Advantages of relational procurement include; better planning and coordination; 
economies of scale, reducing unit prices; and improving quality through head contractors 
partnering with subcontractors and including them in their employee training workshops (Lee, 
Seo, Park, Ryu and Kwon, 2009). Effective project team relationships is prerequisite to 
meeting client requirements, while industry fragmentation is one of the most cited reasons for 
barriers to performance improvements (Ross, 2011). Through supply chain integration, 
contractors can close the loop on continuous improvement by collecting lessons learnt from 
project to project, enabling them to plan projects in a more meaningful way and add greater 
value (Song, Mohamed and AbouRizk, 2009). Therefore, long-term relationships improve 
project-to-project efficiencies, over appointing a new contractor each time. Song, Mohamed 
and AbouRizk (2009, p14) defined value-based supplier integration as delivering ‘continuous 
value improvement and cost reduction for both the owner and its suppliers.’ Continuous 
improvement is an iterative process, which is only possible when the same parties are involved 
in repeating the process. Contractors can benefit from long term relationships through a 
‘relatively constant’ workload and a reduced learning curve (Song, Mohamed and AbouRizk 
(2009) thus improving certainty of forward work and reducing business risk. They also avoid 
the cost and uncertainty of pricing work on the tender market.  
 
Despite the advantages relational procurement, there are challenges to its use. Menches and 
Chen (2012) provide that while integrated project delivery (IPD) systems may improve 
collaboration and early decision-making, their implementation may not be as effective as 
envisioned. Barriers may include public bodies statutorily prohibited from entering into such 
risk-sharing agreements, and countless others remaining sceptical of their practicality. 
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Building inter-organisational long-term relationships may be time-consuming and costly and 
may not actually ensure better project performance. Lee, Seo, Park, Ryu and Kwon (2009) 
challenged the assumed advantages of strategic partnership arrangements between head 
contractors and subcontractors using theoretical transaction cost modelling. They found that 
partnership relations are only superior when head contractors incur a low ‘shirking’ cost of 
subcontractor opportunistic behaviour, the advantages of partnerships decrease as the 
proportion of labour increases because partnerships require more head contractor effort to 
manage subcontracted work; and in partnerships the higher the coordination costs, the lower 
the transaction costs incurred by the head contractor. However, their modelling was based 
artificial cost values, the assumption that head contractors are able to choose the 
subcontractor’s performance level in competitive relationships, and that head contractors 
prefer competitive relationships over relational. Clients not contractors (Ross, 2011) generally 
drive strategic partnerships. It is therefore difficult to see how head contractors are able to 
choose their subcontractor’s performance level when driven to accept the lowest prices in 
competitive tender situations. In negotiated procurement, head contractors have more ability 
to select reliable subcontractors (thus subcontractor performance is not a constant variable 
across traditional and relational procurement). Moreover, supply chain integration can 
incentivise parties through long-term relationships over short-term opportunism. Improved 
reliability should theoretically reduce the amount of effort involved in managing subcontractor 
work.  
 
Some research has found that the quality of relationships (particularly the relationship with 
client representative) can influence project success more than the particular procurement 
model or form of contract (Masterman, 2002; Dissanayaka, 1998; Walker, 1995). Menches 
and Chen (2012, p1044) argue that collaborative principles may be into traditional contracting 
‘and thus harness the strength of teamwork and collaboration to produce a positive outcome.’ 
Toolanen (2008) found trust to be the basic pillar of any procurement model and governance 
structure and Strahorn, Brewer and Gajendran (2015) found that individual personalities and 
risk apportionment influenced trust more than the degree of relational versus transactional 
procurement. Bresnen (1991) found that parties' aims and incentives could have a greater 
impact on project success than the procurement and contractual framework. In a case study 
of an early construction management at risk (CM@R) project (US equivalent of management 
contracting), despite late budget cuts, late appointment of the head contractor, design 
management problems, and lack of familiarity with a new procurement process, project 
completion was within time and budget. Bresnen (1991) concluded that CM@R might have 
been the best strategy for the project, but that the contractor’s late involvement in the design 
process meant the procurement system was not the sole reason for project success. Rather, 
the shared incentives between the contractor and design team were greater influences. The 
designers and contractor were both eager to please the client with the lure of forward working 
and formation of long-term client relationships. Bresnen (1991, p261) argued that ‘the 
organization which is able to use dependant suppliers, present a united front and clearly 
specify contractual terms and conditions is more likely to be at an advantage when it comes 
to controlling work on a large-scale, complex project.’ However, not all clients can offer the 
incentive of large volumes of return work. It is however important of align each parties’ roles 
with their respective interests and liabilities. An example of a potential miss-alignment between 
parties’ incentives is budget advice. A consultant may provide an intentionally high budget so 
that the project finishes within budget, making themselves look good without actually 
improving efficiencies (Kirkham, 2007). According to Sidwell (1983), ‘even cost and time are 
not totally reliable indicators since expression in terms of cost and time over-run must be 
weighed against the accuracy and robustness of the forecast.’ Again, it is difficult to evaluate 
the effect of procurement pathways on project success without clearly understanding the 
contractual framework through with the parties engage.  
 
Studies show the importance of client involvement and common objectives in relational 
procurement. Ma and Xin (2011) case studied $100 million complex project involving a new 
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tram system and associated roading and bridge works, by interviewing the project manager, 
and found a key feature was client commitment toward establishing cooperative relationships, 
and involving members of their own staff in project leadership team. Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy (2005, p370) found interviewees strongly recommended that clients should 
lead relational contracting through teamwork, but that this requires all the contracting parties 
to share the same perceptions and attitudes. This aligns with other assertions that relational 
contracting requires active client leadership (Kings College, 2016; Ibbs, et al., 2003). Specific 
recommendations for integrated project teams from interviewees about contracting practices 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005, p370) included ‘knowledgeable clients, fairer risk 
allocation, risk sharing, [and] whether the parties are properly paid’. Research has not focused 
on the contractual provisions for managing risk or pricing and payment.   
 
It seems generally agreed that different procurement strategies may provide successful 
outcomes so long as all other aspects of the project have been handled correctly and the 
project team performs well (Masterman, 2002, p186) (the contingency theory). Therefore, if 
levels of trust and communication are equal, then the procurement strategy should influence 
project success. If the choice of procurement strategy is not important, then all construction 
work could simply be performed using one strategy, such as design and build. Ultimately, the 
procurement strategy establishes project team appointment, parties’ responsibilities, and the 
allocation of risks and incentives. Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2005, p368) found the top 13 
(of 25) ranked items for successful relational contracting were: 
1. Mutual trust 
2. Open communication among parties 
3. Understanding each other’s objectives 
4. Equitable and clear allocation of foreseeable and quantifiable risks 
5. Attitude of the project participants 
6. Readiness to compromise on unclear issues 
7. Awareness of risks and rewards 
8. Effective co-ordination 
9. Collective responsibility instead of individual responsibility 
10. Alignment of objectives  
11. Professional ethics 
12. Agreed process for dispute resolution 
13. Frequent and informal meetings 
What is not yet clear is the contractual framework to support 2S-ECI procurement in NZ. 
Previous research has studied the perceptive effects of relational approaches to project 
success, largely without considering the contractual systems used to employ the consultants 
and contractors. For example, whether competitive fixed pricing or negotiated open-book. 
Cost reimbursement contracts enable negotiated agreement prior to full design and may be 
preferable for dealing with uncertainty, however more auditing work is required and there is 
less cost certainty than lump sum contracts (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). A procurement 
pathway that combines partnering collaboration and transparency of cost reimbursement with 
competitive fixed-pricing across the supply chain and avoid time-consuming auditing seems 
optimal.   
 
3.9 PRICE-BASED VERSUS VALUE-BASED ENVIRONMENT 
A classic problem in construction is the adversarial environment and extensive use of lowest 
price tendering. In recessionary markets, contractors may price below costs to remain in 
business. Low prices may seem attractive. However, appointing a contractor at a loss can 
have disastrous consequences if they become insolvent midway through the project (Heaphy, 
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2011a). The construction sector is sensitive to boom-bust cycles and economic recessions 
(Allan and Yin, 2010) and features high rates of business failure (MBIE, 2015; Dikmen and 
Birgonul, 2010) particularly amongst smaller enterprises (Caulfield; 2008). Low entry barriers 
add to industry competiveness (Ramachandra and Rotimi, 2015), and procurement is highly 
fragmented (Dikmen and Birgonul, 2010), typically employing five times more independent 
contractors than other industries (Loosemore, 2014). 
 
Researchers, industry bodies, and government reports (NZIA, 2013; Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi, 
Savicky, 2009; NZCIC, 2006; Latham, 1994) have proposed moving toward value-based 
procurement. In their 2013 response to the New Zealand Ministry of Business Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE) (2013b) about government procurement practices, the New Zealand 
Institute of Architects (NZIA) (2013) called for ‘best value to be the goal when procuring 
consultancy services.’ The NZIA defined best value as; purchasing a service that delivers the 
optimal outcome, and is cost-efficient, after taking in to account the following non-financial 
attributes: 
 
• Quality  
• Impact on communities and the environment 
• Design integrity  
• Innovation 
• Whole-of-life considerations such as maintenance 
• Training and development opportunities  
• Excellent health and safety practices, and  
• Capital invested  
 
This appears to have been taken from the NZCIC (2006, p2) definition of ‘best value’, which 
adds an equitable focus; ‘it provides a fair return on capital and efforts for all parties, and is 
the result of a process that is mutually satisfying to all parties involved.’ Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi, 
Savicky (2009) argue that lowest price procurement forces providers to allocate their cheapest 
staff on projects, because they cannot compete based on value services. In contrast, 
negotiating fair and reasonable profits enables contractors to invest in resource and reduces 
their exposure to the boom-bust cycles of the sector (Zuo, Wilkinson and Seadon, 2013). The 
NZCIC (2006, p7) recommend that selection processes: 
 
do not force fees down to the point where service providers cannot afford to assign 
properly qualified staff for sufficient periods of time. Inadequate fees can lead to the 
reduction of the scope and quality of the work, by spending less time on the project, 
assigning sub-standard materials, or assigning lower paid (usually less qualified) 
personnel.  
 
Recent studies have demonstrated a move toward value-based procurement. Zuo, Wilkinson 
and Seadon (2013) found that procurement practices between clients and contractors in post-
earthquake Christchurch had largely u-turned from selecting lowest price conforming bids to 
more relational negotiated procurement strategies. Demand exceeding supply was a main 
driver, meaning competitive pricing would no longer provide best value for money. Whitehead 
(2009) described the same driver for two-stage ECI in Australian infrastructure.  
 
Value-based criteria can form the basis of contractor selection in any procurement pathway.  
Research has struggled to establish the optimal pricing procedures to support value-based 
procurement. Edward (1997) describes how enabling US authorities to procure on quality 
attributes enabled designers and contractors to work as a single entity in design and build 
projects, encouraging innovation and avoiding conflict. Contractors were short-listed through 
a two-stage tender. After shortlisting, the contractors’ detailed proposals were evaluated 
against weighted criterions for ‘best value’ not just lowest price. Alternatively, tenderers bid on 
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performance based specifications. However, Edward (1997) acknowledges that evaluating 
value-based proposals is not as simple as lowest price selection and that value-based 
procurement is as much an art as a science, as suggested by the term used to describe the 
approach ‘competitive negotiation.’ Contractor experience and expertise is clearly important 
for providing planning input during the design stage. 2S-ECI may provide the balance between 
competitive fixed-pricing and relational collaboration through competitive fixed-price P&G and 
margins, and then a fixed-price construction contract.  
 
3.10 TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
Williamson (1981) who applied economic theory to the structure of firms introduced transaction 
cost economics (TCE). Transaction costs are based on; bounded rationality, opportunism, 
uncertainty, frequency of transactions, and asset specificity (Lee, Seo, Park, Ryu and Kwon, 
2009). Bounded rationality refers to people’s limitations in memory and cognitive processing 
and inability to consider all possible alternatives. Opportunism recognises people acting with 
self-interest and their potential to exploit another party by taking advantage of unforeseen 
circumstances. Frequency refers to the frequency of transactions. Firms who use services 
frequently may decide to perform them in-house. Uncertainty recognises the difficulty in 
forecasting possibilities during the transaction. Bounded rationality and opportunism can 
influence uncertainty. Asset specificity refers to investments in transaction specific assets that 
may improve efficiency, but that the other party may jeopardise value by threatening to walk 
away from the relationship. When outsourcing goods, transaction costs include the costs of 
procuring contractors, contract management, performance measurement and dispute 
resolution, including variables that result in unexpected cost overruns (Lee, Seo, Park, Ryu 
and Kwon, 2009). Standardising procurement systems should reduce the people’s limitations 
in learning and remembering bespoke processes, reduce opportunism and exploitation, cater 
for clients employing frequently and infrequently, and mitigate each parties’ risk of early-
termination by the other.   
 
The effect of 2S—ECI on transaction cost has not been established. Mohammed et, al. (2015) 
developed and tested a theoretical model in order to compare the transaction costs (TCs) 
between traditional procurement and design and build. The framework (p247-9) aligns 11 
indicators (constructs) with four latent variables (pre and post-contract TCs). The latent 
variables include Pre-Contract TCs; information cost (INFO), procurement cost (PROC), and 
Post-Contract TCs; administration cost (ADMIN), and enforcement cost (ENFO). Mohammed 
et, al. (2015, p261) used the model to ground the following hypothesis:  
• H1. Procurement system has a positive effect on information cost. Project complexity 
and certainty is the main contributor, regardless of whether procured through 
traditional or design and build. 
• H2. Procurement system has a positive effect on project procurement cost. Both 
human and environmental uncertainties were the greatest contributors to procurement 
cost. 
• H3. Procurement system has a positive effect on contract administration cost. Conflict, 
disputes, and decision-making are the main contributing factors influencing contract 
administration cost. 
• H4. Procurement system has a positive effect on contract enforcement cost. Conflict, 
disputes, and decision-making are the main contributing factors influencing contract 
enforcement cost. 
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• H5. Transaction costs are higher in the traditional systems than in design and build 
systems. Based on a case study comparing a project manager’s time-spent on 
procurement activities as a surrogate for cost, TCs represent 18.5 percent of a project 
manager’s annual salary in the traditional system, and 14.5 percent in the DB system.  
Given the above, it follows that a procurement system that reduces the following variables and 
constructs (see Mohammed, et, al. 2015, Table 1, p249) should reduce the pre- and post-
contract transaction costs: 
• Information cost (information gathering) 
• Project procurement cost (attending meetings, translation of client’s needs, training, 
project preliminary design, transition observation, site visits) 
• Administration cost (contract administration, decision-making, conflict resolution) 
• Enforcement cost (contract enforcement, verifying compliances) 
Research has found that 2S-ECI can reduce uncertainty, contractor claims, and disputes 
(Mosey, 2011; Whitehead, 2009) (ADMIN and ENFO costs). Therefore, if the information cost 
and project procurement costs remain constant, then 2S-ECI should reduce the TCs 
compared with traditional systems. However, the effect of 2S-ECI on procurement costs 
depends on such factors as how or whether payment to the contractor for their early 
involvement, the scope of their pre-construction services and the extent of real value added. 
The level of client involvement and an agreed pre-construction programme are further drivers 
of ECI success (Kings College, 2016) and so likely influence project procurement costs. 
Administration costs may reduce through 2S-ECI by ironing out issues to reduce claims and 
disputes (Mosey, 2011). However, the form of construction contract and pricing influences 
administration. For example, a cost reimbursement contract will require substantially more 
payment auditing (Menches and Chen, 2012, p1046) than monthly claims against a fixed price 
contract. It is therefore difficult to compare the effect of 2S-ECI on procurement costs with 
traditional procurement pathways without a clear contractual framework of 2S-ECI to form the 
basis of comparison.  
 
3.11 ADVANTAGES OF ECI 
Previous studies identified a range of benefits through ECI over traditional procurement 
generally linked to the contractor’s buildability input to design. The contractor is responsible 
for ‘how’ the design is constructed. Combining the designer and constructor’s knowledge can 
improve design buildability. Traditional procurement systems often rely on the architect as a 
third party supervisor to assure quality. However, architects may lack expertise in buildability 
issues or sufficient resources to make timely responses to problems onsite (Hardie and Saha, 
2009). Mosey (2011, p10) warns of the temptation in single-stage tendering for consultants to 
develop construction programmes that meet the client’s needs without input from those 
actually performing the work. The Chartered Institute of Building similarly found problems with 
construction programmes prepared by programmers in isolation from those doing the work 
(Pickavance, 2009). The increased size, complexity and specialisation within the construction 
industry has contributed to the need for early involvement of head contractors and specialist 
subcontractors in order to achieve structures which were previously unimaginable (Song, et 
al., 2006). In modern construction more work is being designed by subcontractors (RIBA, 
2009; Tommelein, Kirkendall and Ballard 2001). This necessitates a method of employing 
contractors during the design phase for both design and construction obligations. Contractors 
design evaluation can include resource availability, costs and performance, access, and site 
conditions (Song, et al., 2009, p13). Song, Mohamed and AbouRizk (2009) observed savings 
on actual projects where contractors were involved in design, including; reduced design errors, 
more standardisation, and prefabrication delivered on schedule. Steel Construction New 
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Zealand (SCNZ, 2017) provided a market update to August 2017 showing strong commitment, 
but significant spare capacity of steel. They conclude that: 
 
Additionally, fabricators report a significant upturn in demand but not, as yet, committed 
workload. Early contractor involvement (ECI) adds value to projects and the practice 
is growing – ECI allows lead contractors to ensure adequate resources are assigned 
to maintain their excellent performance in a rising market. 
 
Turner and Riding (2015) provide an example of buildability input through ECI where a 
ventilation system for a new road project in 2000 reduced the specified three-monthly 
maintenance times down to 20 minutes instead of hours. They also provided an example of a 
design error in the absence of ECI, involving two gas-processing units constructed too closely 
to enable a crane to operate between them.  
 
Research has found that ECI can improve cost and time certainty (Francis and Kiroff, 2015). 
ECI can maximise the amount of change when the cost of change is least. Once detailed 
design is complete, the opportunity to make value-adding changes decreases and the cost of 
change becomes more expensive (Kirkham, 2007). Mosey (2011, p4) argues that the single-
stage approach excludes the contractor and their subcontractors and suppliers from making 
meaningful contributions to design, risk management, programming or achieving cost savings. 
Relying on competitive bidding is inefficient for procuring customized products in Lean 
Construction (Elfving, Tommelein and Ballard, 2005). Ma and Xin (2011) highlight how in 
traditional tendering, contractors typically have perhaps a one-in-three chance of winning the 
contract, making it a waste to invest their own significant resources on investigation and design 
analysis. Involving contractors during design development, in a collaborative project team 
environment, reduces the risk of contractor’s bidding low in a single-stage tender with a view 
to maximise profits through aggressive claiming (Heaphy, 2011a). If fixed-price offers are 
based on incomplete information, the client may receive a false sense of security as the 
contractor may exploit errors and omissions through claiming variations, the client has no way 
of knowing whether their consultants may have made such errors or omissions when they 
appoint the contractor (Mosey, 2011). Vidogah and Ndekugri (1998) argue that disputes 
reduce through developing relationships with contractors who adopt sound claim management 
practices and by agreeing costs that are usually in contention within the contract. They found 
the most contentious costs relate to; the cost of preparing claims, overhead costs, and time-
related preliminary costs. To do this, they recommend (i) placing greater emphasis on the 
contractor’s quality of claim management practice and information systems, (ii) requiring that 
contractors provide a schedule of preliminaries to provide transparency around overheads and 
time-related costs (iii) implementation of electronic documentation management systems by 
contractors, and (iv) stricter contract provisions around programmes, timesheet and content 
of claims. 2S-ECI may support this, particularly (i) and (ii). Contractor reliability and 
performance are prominent in 2S-ECI. Contractors could provide a P&G schedule for the pre-
construction stage pricing for transparently calculating costs relating to claims for delay or 
disruption.  
 
2S-ECI may improve certainty of project outcomes through more equitable planning and risk 
management. Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2005, p367) found that the majority of 92 industry 
respondents across 17 countries (62 from Hong Kong and 30 from other countries, including 
12 from Europe and five from the USA) recommended involving consultants and head 
contractors and (to a lesser extent) specialist subcontractors and suppliers during the early 
project stages to jointly manage risks effectively. All parties benefit from well-planned projects 
with fewer risks and from the early collaboration, which can build relationships, iron out issues, 
and reduce disputes throughout the project (Mosey, 2011, p15). Contractors can provide 
specialist buildability knowledge to foresee and manage risks and maximise value (Laryea 
and Watermeyer, 2016; Pheng, Gao and Lin, 2015; Mosey, 2011; Rahmani, Khalfan and 
Maqsood, 2014; Song, et al., 2006). 
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2S-ECI may duplication in tendering costs across the construction sector. The Project 
Procurement and Delivery Guidance Using Two Stage Open Book and Supply Chain 
Collaboration (King’s College London, 2014) provides that ‘the two—stage open book model 
reduces industry bidding costs.’ When tendering for the pre-construction stage, contractors 
only need to price P&G. Then only the successfully contractor works with the integrated project 
team toward selecting the subcontractors and suppliers and establishing a construction stage 
price. This suggests that greater use of 2S-ECI could reduce tendering costs across the 
sector.  
 
Contractors can also benefit from ECI. Through providing more services, achieve sound profit 
margins, and improve client satisfaction, helping toward establishing long-term relationships 
with clients and designers, thus increasing their capability for securing future contracts 
(Rahman and Alhassan, 2012; Song, et al., 2006). Rahman and Alhassan (2012) found the 
following advantages from a head contractor’s perspective in order of descending importance; 
potential to improve relationships, collaborative risk management, enabling contractor 
expertise in design buildability, overall improved project delivery, more opportunity for 
innovation, less adversarial relationships, increased customer satisfaction, increased 
understanding of parties, risk exposure, reduced over-runs/time/cost/conflict, and sound profit 
margins. Francis and Kiroff (2015) found the following perceptions of ECI from designer's and 
contractor's perspectives in the Auckland commercial construction market based on the 
enhanced design and build model (which they asserted is the most commonly used model in 
New Zealand commercial construction). Designers reported higher profits due to working 
through design options collaboratively. However, contractors reported that design and build 
either had no effect on profitability or potentially less profitable due to greater risks. Most 
respondents agreed that project completion was more likely to be within time and budget, 
design and build provides earlier cost certainty, and that designs are likely to be cost effective. 
All generally perceived contractor’s design input as a positive aspect. There was little 
consensus about the effect on quality due to the difficulties in measuring and defining quality. 
Contractors found they could better manage risk. However, these findings relate to design and 
build procurement, under which the contractor is responsible for both design and construction. 
Under 2S-ECI, the contractor may only be responsible for construction only. Design and build 
features early cost certainty because the client can obtain a quote for design and build without 
first paying for the design. The form of contract and pricing may also influence findings, for 
example, whether the construction price is fixed lump sum, target value or a guaranteed 
maximum price.  
 
Whitehead (2009, p23-24) provides the following benefits of 2S-ECI (paraphrased): 
 
• Reduced pre-tender costs: The detailed design is not required prior to the tendering 
process. In an overheated market, this also helps reduce demand on resources and 
duplications of roles.  
 
• A team approach: The collaboration between client, contractor and consultants can 
help to build working relations and communications and improve staff retention. 
 
• Experienced harnessed early: The experience of both the client and the contractor is 
harnessed during the design development stages of the project at which time it can 
achieve the greatest impact.  
 
• Increased opportunity for innovation: There is greater flexibility and opportunity for 
innovation because the design has not fully developed. 
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• Increased decision-making: The early cooperation between the parties enables 
effective decision-making and approvals. 
 
• Earlier procurement of materials: The early collaborative planning and faster decision 
making enables earlier procurement of materials. This is particularly beneficial for 
materials with long lead delivery times. 
 
• Shortened delivery times: Work can commence on stages while the design and 
documentation for later trade packages is developed.  
 
• Better integration of construction methods: The collaboration between all parties 
provides for the integration of construction methods with the design. 
 
• Sustainability: The early collaboration of the project team can enable parties to develop 
new ways of working across the client organisation and to ensure fulfilment of 
sustainability goals.  
 
• Reduced risk of ‘surprise’: Risks can be reduced through improved communications 
and understanding by all parties about the project and its requirements and costs. 
 
• Fewer variations during construction: The greater understanding about the project by 
all parties and reduced risks reduces the number and cost of variations during the 
project. 
 
• Realistic price: The contract price should be realistic, without an excessive 
contingency, but not so low as to lead the contractor focus on pursuing claims 
throughout the project. 
 
Kumaraswamy (1997) identified through data collection and questionnaires the following top 
ten causes of claims in the Hong Kong construction as perceived by contractors, clients and 
consultants, in descending order of significance: 
 
• Inaccurate design information; 
• Inadequate design information; 
• Inadequate site investigations; 
• Slow client responses; 
• Poor communications; 
• Unrealistic time targets; 
• Inadequate contract administration; 
• Uncontrollable external events; 
• Incomplete tender information; and 
• Unclear risk allocation. 
 
These causes of claims may reduce through the benefits identified by Whitehead (2009) 
around early planning, design buildability input, and more collaborative decision-making and 
risk management. Mosey (2011, p6) also argued that many of these causes would be less 
likely if the client entered into an early relationship with the head contractor (and consultants, 
subcontractors and suppliers as appropriate). This would enable the following to occur during 
the pre-construction stage: 
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• Joint design review and development, whereby there is an opportunity for the main 
contractor and its specialists to comment on buildability and affordability and to offer 
alternative solutions (causes 1 and 2); 
• Second-stage supply chain tendering to encourage the main contractor, after first-
stage selection, to price or re-price works packages by means of subcontractor or 
supplier tenders, working jointly with the client so as to iron out errors or omissions in 
the brief and achieve accuracy in the flow-down of risk (cause 9); 
• Joint risk management, whereby the main contractor can make proposals for early risk 
reduction actions rather than just quoting risk contingencies (causes 3, 8 and 10); 
• Advance agreement of a construction phase programme, identifying contractual 
deadlines for key client, consultant and contractor activities (causes 4 and 6); 
• Development and implementation of a communications strategy during the pre-
construction phase, with clear delegated authority, early warning mechanisms and 
advance notification of the cost of variations (cause 5); 
• Closer client involvement with its project team, for example by attendance at key 
meetings, commencing during the pre-construction phase to ensure access to 
information other than only via the contract administrator (cause 7).  
 
A pre-construction services agreement (PCSA) to support 2S-ECI overcomes more bespoke 
contractual agreements, such as letters of intent. Mosey (2011, p7) provides that a 
‘conditional’ (pre-construction) contract can provide a contractually robust alternative to a letter 
of intent when a contractor can be appointed before full project documentation is complete. 
The conditional contract can recognise outstanding matters which prevent the parties from 
concluding the contract unconditionally, providing contractual machinery to move the contract 
from the conditional to unconditional, and express a clear contractually enforceable timetable. 
However, the PCSA can specific the scope of pre-construction services, parties’ obligations 
and pricing provisions. A standard form PCSA reduces the need for parties to draft or learn 
new documentation for each project. See benefits of standard form contracts in Chapter 3.20. 
 
3.12 LEAN CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES  
Integrating design and production has been a principle of lean design and construction 
inspired from Toyota Production System. Lean Construction principles focus on creating 
efficiencies through removing wastage from all stages of the supply chain. A key focus is 
cooperative and partnering relationships, combining various individuals’ competencies into 
joint-problem-solving (Jorgensen and Emmitt, 2008) and involving specialist contractors in the 
design process (Gil, et al., 2004, p496). Jorgensen and Emmitt (2007) found through 
ethnographic case studies that crucial factors influencing effective lean integration include; 
identifying client values, project team and planning process, transparent decision-making, 
management and leadership, continuous learning, and establishing an appropriate project 
delivery framework. Delivery frameworks are defined by Jorgensen and Emmitt (2007) as the 
incentives, agreements, resources (incl. time, financial means, and human and organizational 
resources), contracts etc. supporting design/construction integration and an overall lean 
approach.  
 
Prior research has correlated the benefits of ECI and Lean. Pheng, Gao and Lin (2015, p831) 
concluded that ECI may help improve productivity through Lean Construction. They correlated 
the benefits of ECI with the 11 Lean principles that focus on process design flow and 
improvement; reducing the share of non-value adding activities; increasing output value 
through systematic consideration of customer requirements, reducing variability, reducing the 
cycle time; simplifying by minimizing the number of steps and parts, increasing output 
flexibility, and increasing process transparency. ECI had particular potential for reducing 
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variability and cycle time, minimizing steps, and increasing output flexibility. However, they 
concluded that this requires raising building professionals’ awareness of both Lean and ECI. 
One potential benefit of ECI not mentioned by Pheng, Gao and Lin (2015) is the reduction in 
non-value-adding activities because only the one head contractor already employed for the 
pre-construction stage, prices the second-stage construction works. This reduces duplication 
of multiple contractors bidding through the tender market. This supports (Elfving, Tommelein 
and Ballard, 2005)’ argument that competitive bidding is inefficient for procuring customized 
products in Lean Construction (Elfving, Tommelein and Ballard, 2005). 
 
3.13 PROJECT TYPES SUITABLE FOR ECI 
Prior research has linked ECI application to high-risk projects that benefit from buildability 
input, but not actual project types or what ‘buildability’ input actually means. According to 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2005, p370) non-traditional procurement systems are needed 
on projects where contractor’s inputs are needed ‘on buildability, construction methods and 
risk management at earlier project stages’. Ma and Xin (2011, p83) concluded that ECI is best 
suited to projects with uncertainty (where tender prices would otherwise be high to reflect the 
uncertainty), but smaller than a typical alliance projects, featuring ongoing relationships or 
pain/gain share pricing. The New Zealand Transport Agency (2018) recommends ECI for 
projects featuring scope uncertainty, that may benefit, from fast-tracking, constructability input, 
and engaging work packages during the design stage.  
 
ECI open-book negotiation can support ongoing client and contractor relationships. The open-
book pricing of 2S-ECI may be suitable for securing resources in boom markets where 
contractors may either bid high prices in competitive tenders, or not bid at all. Zuo, Wilkinson 
and Seadon (2013) found procurement practices between clients and contractors in post-
earthquake Christchurch largely u-turned from selecting lowest price conforming bids to more 
relational negotiated procurement strategies. A key driver was demand exceeding supply, 
meaning competitive pricing would no longer provide best value for money. Whitehead (2009) 
described the same driver for two-stage ECI in Australian infrastructure. However, the actual 
effect of ECI is yet to be determined. Relational and open-book procurement may provide 
lower pricing during boom markets (Zuo, Wilkinson and Seadon, 2013; Whitehead, 2009). 
However, recessionary conditions may drive contractors’ pricing to break-even point or even 
below. Heaphy (2011a) found that even when contractors price below cost during recessions, 
the final project might cost more than target-value reimbursement contracts, due to contractor 
aggressive variation claiming. However, Ross (2011) challenged the assumed benefits of 
supply chain management during economic recession, and called for further research in this 
area, highlighting the lack of empirical evidence. McDermott and Khalfan (2006 p50) argued 
that procurement strategies such as partnerships and strategic alliances are best reserved for 
large public clients who can leverage better pricing, whereas, most lay private clients are 
unlikely to be in such a position of dominance over the supply chain due to their ‘adhoc 
construction profile and limited understanding of the marketplace’.  
 
3.14 PRICING PROVISIONS 
The Department of Building and Housing (DBH) Building and Construction Taskforce 
(Constructing Excellence in New Zealand, 2009 p16) recommended two-stage ECI for; 
providing price quality, allowing a target price, being quality-based, while also enabling lowest 
conforming pricing. They recommended that stage 1 pricing should be quality based. In their 
evaluation of delivery models, two-stage ECI and negotiated tender (preferred list) are the only 
two models recommended against all four criterions of model selection. Negotiated tender 
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(preferred list) (also known as selective tendering) is used where the tenderers are known to 
the client and have been pre-qualified and proven to be equally capable of delivering the 
project. 
 
Based on the author’s ethnographic experience working as a Contracts Manager for a tier 1 
head contractor in New Zealand (2003 – 2009), the first-stage pricing of 2S-ECI commonly 
comprises the following:   
 
I. A lump sum price for the preliminaries works for the whole project where construction 
work is staged;  
II. A lump sum price for the construction of any first stage for which design is already 
developed (for example where the project is released in stages);  
III. Percentages to be applied for onsite and offsite overheads and profit to be applied to 
variations and subcontractors to be procured;  
IV. Negotiated rates for any direct construction works (for example carpentry and 
concrete) based on conceptual design;  
V. Non-price attributes such as a base construction program, methodology, and history 
of similar past projects. 
Lump sum contracts provide price surety before work commences. The contractor has narrow 
grounds under which the contractor can claim additional costs or time. In cost reimbursement 
contracts, contractors are reimbursed for actual time and materials incurred, typically based 
on agreed rates and percentages applied to materials and subcontractors. However, this may 
incentivize the contractor to overspend (Turner, 2004). A target value or guaranteed maximum 
price can help align goals through gain-share / pain-share provisions. However, cost 
reimbursement contracts require extensive payment auditing (Menches and Chen, 2012, 
p1046). Using case study interviews and questionnaires, Menches and Chen (2012, p1047) 
found that clients adopt substantially more risk under cost reimbursable contracts, but that in 
return, clients (i) receive more information and cooperation from the contractor and (ii) greater 
involvement in decision-making and control over progress and productivity. 
 
One argument for partnering with open-book pricing is that the lack of defined scope at the 
time of early involvement prohibits competitive pricing (Alhassan, 2012, p218). Ma and Xin 
(2011) provide how, in Australia, contractor selection for the first-stage is a non-price selection 
process based on capability of the project team. They identified that a key challenge can be 
developing the scope and a cost estimate when the contractor appointment is very early in the 
design stage, and without any competitive pricing. The project manager interviewed felt that 
given the uncertainty, ECI is not suited to all projects. The most difficult part of the process 
was the transition between stage 1 and stage 2. However, lump sum pricing can be 
determined for preliminary and general works so long as sufficient concept design exists to 
establish such requirements such as management, supervision, insurances, and temporary 
works. Head contractors declare margins for profit and overheads to apply to subcontractors 
and variations and a lump sum construction price for any first-stage work already designed or 
fixed rates for carpentry and concrete works against a provisional schedule of quantities. Once 
the design is developed, provisional quantities are re-measured to produce a bill of quantities 
applying the rates of the original tender (see Pheng, Gao and Lin, 2015) and arrive at a lump 
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sum construction price. This may increase the work of the PQS to measure provisional 
quantities and negotiate contractor rates. However the provisional quantities could be 
measured by a consultant PQS or the contractor. The client or consultant will need to check 
the accuracy of the contractor’s final quantities. Indeed, Ma and Xin (2011) found that 
engaging an independent estimator was an important feature of ensuring a realistic price by 
the contractor. What is not yet clear is the perceptions of 2S-ECI pricing arrangements in New 
Zealand. 
 
3.15 PRE-CONSTRUCTION SERVICES 
Through 2S-ECI, contractors provide a range of pre-construction services before agreeing a 
construction contract for the construction stage. Table 1 presents a list of pre-construction 
services coded from literature review. Services have been categorised under design 
management, planning and scheduling, financial, and supply chain procurement.  
 
 
Table 1: Pre-construction services 
Pre-construction services  Sources  
Design management Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007); Sidwell (1983) 
Plan and co-ordinate design Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007) 
Stakeholder management and communications 
strategy 
Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007); Mosey (2009); Education 
(2016); Berends (2006) 
Develop design brief Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007); Education.govt.nz (2017) 
Construction planning  
Planning and sequencing construction activities El-sayegh (2009); Mosey (2009); Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi and 
Savicky (2009); Sidwell (1983) 
Buildability evaluation Laryea and Watermeyer, (2016); Pheng, Gao and Lin (2015); 
Rahman and Alhassan (2012); Mosey, (2011); Rahmani, 
Khalfan and Maqsood (2014); Whitehead (2009); Song, et al. 
(2006); Jergeas and Put (2001); Sidwell (1983) 
Financial  
Budget advice Kirkham (2007); Laryea (2010); Sidwell (1983) 
Value management Mosey (2011); Kirkham (2007); Whitehead (2009); Jergeas and 
Put (2001); Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi and Savicky (2009) 
Risk management Rahman and Alhassan (2012); Mosey (2009); 
Education.govt.nz (2017); Jergeas and Put (2001); Kashiwagi, 
Kashiwagi and Savicky (2009) 
Supply chain  
Subcontractor and supplier procurement El-sayegh (2009); Whitehead (2009); Mosey (2009) ; Sidwell 
(1983) 
 
El-sayegh (2009) conducted an extensive literature review, including research papers, 
guidelines from professional societies and several requests for proposals, to identify selection 
factors when evaluating firms for construction management at-risk (CM@R) (the US 
equivalent of management contracting or 2S-ECI) then construction professionals ranked the 
factors. Table 2 categorises the 20 factors identified by El-sayegh (2009) into 12 general 
factors that could apply to all procurement models and eight factors that are more specific to 
ECI. The values beside each factor represent the priority weighting relative to the whole 
selection criteria.  
 
Table 2: Selection factors relative to ECI 





Firm experience (0.05) Firm organization (0.04) 
Technical ability (ability to add innovation) 
(0.06) 
Classification and reputation (0.04) 
 Financial standing (0.04) 
  
Commercial and technical bid 
 
Shortest completion time (0.06) Financial bid-lowest price (0.02) 
Ability to meet schedule (0.05) Ability to meet price (0.04) 
Technical bid (0.04)  
  
Construction management services 
 
Construction management methodology 
(0.07) 
Construction phase experience (0.06) 
Pre-construction phase experience (0.06)  
CM key staff (0.07)  
Performance on previous projects (0.08)  
  
General contracting services 
 
Proposed construction methods (0.04) Key staff and personnel (0.04) 
Subcontracting strategies (0.03) General contracting experience (0.05) 
 Proposed construction resources (0.05) 
 
From Table 2, the important pre-construction services from a head contractor are; time 
planning, providing technical solutions, developing construction methodologies; and procuring 
subcontractors. While not stated, examples of providing innovative technical solutions could 
include analysing design alternatives and proposing alternative solutions. This would form part 
of the value management process and buildability evaluation. When considering head 
contractors for ECI, the firm’s experience and quality of key project staff are important 
attributes.  
 
Some of the specific factors could also apply generally, such as firm experience. However, 
the context of the research by El-sayegh (2009) was selection criteria using CM@R. 
Therefore, clients and consultants found that employing a firm with experience in CM@R was 
important. Unsurprising, construction professionals generally ranked ECI specific factors 
higher than general factors when asked to score the most important factors when evaluating 
firms for CM@R.  
 
The buildability and value management input through 2S- ECI require a different skillset to 
traditional building companies. Opportunity may exist for construction companies to develop 
planning and management skills in order to demonstrate value during the design stage. 
Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p74) warns that: 
 
The intention to split design from management requires the construction manager to 
be a specialist in management. This calls for skills quite different from those of a 
general contractor and probably different from those of a management contractor. The 
wise employer should steer clear of firms who claim to be specialists in all these things. 
In any event, the employer should always be wary of contractors using the appellation 
as a marketing tool, rather than as an accurate description of the services offered. 
Construction management firms in the UK estimate that it can take at least 18 months 




Khalfan and McDermott (2007) describe how a construction company in the United Kingdom 
developed a new Pre-construction department with a team of people who look at project 
management, financial and productivity issues at the inception phase of projects. This relies 
on buy-in from clients and across the integrated supply chain. Since developing the new 
department, the company found that clients approach them for integrated services including 
at pre-construction, with some clients even using them solely for their pre-construction 
services. One council uses the company for their pre-construction services for projects up to 
a certain value, and then assigns a small regional contractor for construction. For larger 
projects, the council contracts them to deliver the whole project including pre-construction 
services. The potential advantages to clients include; single point accountability, faster project 
delivery, improved quality, and improved trust through developing long-term relationships.  
 
3.16 DESIGN MANAGEMENT 
 
A designer, a project manager or a contractor may perform design management. Debate 
centres on design skills being different to design management skills. However, the two 
disciplines may not be mutually exclusive. Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p18) argue that the 
most valuable architects are those who can design and manage. Improvement in project 
performance was expected through the introduction of management-based procurement 
systems that introduced project management principles to overcome time and budget 
blowouts. However, concerns have emerged about the quality of design management 
(Tzortzopoulos and Cooper, 2007) raising serious questions about whether anyone other than 
the architect or engineer should manage the design process. Tzortzopoulos and Cooper 
(2007) found the role of design management poorly defined, contractors lack design 
management processes, contractor’s design managers originate from various professional 
backgrounds without design qualifications or experience, and approaches vary. They also 
found that under design and build contracts, contractors struggle to interface between the 
client and their subcontracted designers; contractors struggle to bargain with clients and 
designers, poor contractor management of client requirements and design decisions still made 
by architects without considering the effects on time and cost. Architects may feel intruded on 
when someone else manages the design (Tzortzopoulos and Cooper, 2007; Brensen, 1991) 
leaving architects struggling to find their place (Whitehead, 2009). In management-based 
procurement, project managers may add value through challenging the Architects’ design. An 
example of this is value management (VM). VM facilitators may be project managers, 
professional quantity surveyors (PQSs), architects, or contactors. This again highlights design 
versus design management. A project manager may have facilitating skills for harnessing input 
through brainstorming sessions, while the PQS and contractors may have access to detailed 
pricing, subcontractors and suppliers.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the increase of procurement models such as design and build, and 
public private partnerships (PPPs) has seen design management shift from the traditional role 
of the architect to contractors and PM consultants. Two major construction companies in the 
United Kingdom report that 60 percent of work undertaken involves managing the design and 
construction processes, and both consider design management to be of strategic importance 
(Tzortzopoulos and Cooper, 2007, p20). One of the companies perceived design management 
as a significant risk because poorly managed designs can result in increased construction 
costs, time delays, rework, and bidding failure, and therefore impacting on their 
competitiveness.  
 
Architects have sometimes fought to hold onto their traditional dual role of lead designer and 
project manager. In a response to the New Zealand Ministry of Business Innovation and 
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Employment (MBIE) (MBIE, 2013’s proposed all-of-Government solution for the provision of 
consultancy services, the New Zealand Institute of Architects (NZIA) (NZIA, 2013) criticized 
the default separation of project management from design services and the use of consultant 
project managers. The NZIA argued that a Registered Architect could design and manage the 
project and achieve cost savings by otherwise employing two separate consultants: 
 
The training and expertise of Architects enables them to lead and deliver projects from 
project conception and design to post occupancy. This is an important point given that 
no other profession can be involved in a building and construction project in this way. 
The separation of ‘Project Management’ services by default assumes that this service 
is needed for a building and construction project, when in effect, a Registered Architect 
could undertake all of this work. Any procurement process should recognise this 
opportunity – as it has the potential to deliver cost savings, time efficiencies and 
innovation across the project. 
 
The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) (RIBA, 2007) found a strong feeling amongst 
its members that architects should develop management skills earlier in their education. 
However, only a limited number of architects expressed an interest in working in roles such 
as developers or project managers.  
 
3.17 POTENTIAL CHALLENGES WITH ECI 
The majority of literature about ECI has identified advantages and no clear disadvantages 
(Pheng, Gao, and Lin, 2015). Potential issues tend to relate to the use of two-stage ECI as a 
form of relational partnering with open-book pricing. Rahman and Alhassan (2012) found the 
following potential issues in order of descending importance; lack of ‘win-win’ attitude, lack of 
commitment to common objectives, lack of team member empowerment, extent of trust, lack 
of a clear boundary, lack of continuous open and honest communication, non-inclusion of 
consultants in pain-share/ gain-share arrangements, lack of pro-active problem solving, 
unwillingness to compromise, failure to develop combined ownership of the works and 
commercial pressures compromising common benefits. These focus on potential partnering 
and relational aspects, such as trust, collaboration and common goals. However, the form of 
construction price need not be target-value a pain share/ gain share as the researched model 
was. Trust and collaboration become more important in target-value contracts, than fixed price 
construction contracts. The, non-inclusion of consultants in pain-share/gain-share, also would 
not feature in fixed price contracts. According to Rahman and Alhassan (2012, p218), ECI 
requires ‘open book accounting, and open and honest communication between client, 
consultant and contractor, including sharing any sensitive information....’ However, this 
assumes ECI as a partnering model, where ‘contractors in ECI approaches are selected on 
the basis of their track records, not on the lowest bid, since there is not yet a design to bid for.’ 
However, 2S-ECI can use competitive fixed-pricing. Pheng, Gao and Lin (2015, p835) provide 
that large developers may feel they have sufficient buying power to obtain the best bids from 
both consultants and contractors and that the pre-construction activities of value management, 
risk management, buildability analysis and construction planning are unnecessary. However, 
such a focus appears to place lowest cost ahead of other drivers such as quality.  
 
A common theme about ECI is the need for collaboration. Laryea and Watermeyer (2016) 
provide that the advantages of ECI are; collaboration between project participants, integration 
of design and construction, value for money and utilisation of market capacity, but warn that 
success relies upon; an intelligent client, a framework agreement, collaborative contracts, 
cost-based pricing strategies, the professional team’s flexibility, and a committed contractor.  
Whitehead (2009, p24-25) provides that in the United Kingdom, the generally held view is that 
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there have been no peculiar disadvantages of the concept, however provides the following 
issues to bear in mind: 
 
• Tender costs: The client may pay the contractor to develop their risk-adjusted price 
(RAP) as part of stage 1. Whereas, clients do not directly pay contractors to prepare 
tender bids.  
 
• Involvement of senior staff: Senior staff are likely to be involved for longer periods in 
the early project stages. However, this should be balanced with the costs saved during 
the tender processes.  
 
• Potential loss of innovation: This may result if the team does not work well, and the 
designers step back from the design as the contractor pursues buildability and cost 
savings as an early stage.  
 
• Going too early: While early involvement of the contractor can provide greater scope 
for adding value, if the contractor is appointed too early they may not be not be 
motivated to provide their best staff.  
 
• Too many cooks: If the client has very specific ideas about the finished product, the 
input from a contractor may lead to unnecessary additional costs. Alternatively, if the 
client lacks any a grasp of what it wants, the contractor may waste time developing 
proposals. The type of project should dictate the timing of the contractor’s involvement.  
 
• Potentially higher prices: One concern with ECI is that the risk-adjusted price (RAP) is 
built-up in the absence of competitive pressure, which may lead to an artificially high 
RAP. Appropriate controls may include open-book pricing, or third party audit.  
 
• Finance: The owner may face an increased difficulty in obtaining finance at the 
commencement of the works without confirmed total costs.  
 
• Uncertainty: Once criticism about the NEC contract is that it is entirely new and does 
not have the benefit of familiarity and of being tried and tested for many years. The 
Australian models adopt language consistent with existing standard contracts, or by 
using existing standard contracts as the base for the stage 2 contract.   
 
The first two points (tender costs passed onto client) assumes the head contractor is paid for 
their pre-construction involvement. However, this need not be the case. Laryea and 
Watermeyer (2016) provide a case study of two construction projects, which used early-
contractor involvement for the Wits University in South Africa. Once concept designs and 
elemental cost estimates were prepared, the contractor was engaged to assist with value 
management and design development. The found that the ECI pathway achieved a 12% cost 
savings in one project and 32% in the other. The contractor received ‘no remuneration for the 
involvement in design development, they value the benefits of developing early cost models 
and production plans.’ The author of this thesis also worked on a $9 million NZD project in 
2016-2017 procured through 2S-ECI in which the contractor did not charge for their early 
involvement. Under single-stage procurement, contractors incur the costs of preparing tenders 
and only earn profit on the construction stage if they win. 2S-ECI is attractive because 
contractors only need price P&G for the first stage. Then only the successful contractor prices 
the construction stage. One pricing option is no payment for early involvement, unless no 
construction contract agreed through no fault of the contractor. 
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Timing of contractor involvement is a key issue. Some argue that contractors should be 
involved from ‘day one’ of the design process in order to maximise value (Jergeas and Put, 
2001, p283). According to Ma and Xin (2011, p78), the contractor can be engaged after a 
business case has been prepared. Others contend that a concept design is needed first 
because if the client has very specific ideas about the finished product, the contractor may 
have nothing to add, or may waste time developing proposals for a client who does not know 
what they want (Francis and Kiroff, 2015). If contractor appointment is too early, the contractor 
might lack motivation to appoint their best staff and there can be a loss of design creativity if 
the team does not work well together and the designer steps back as the contractor pursues 
buildability and cost saving efficiencies (Whitehead, 2009). Designers may also prefer to work 
solely with their client to develop concept design (Francis and Kiroff, 2015).  
 
The open book pricing of 2S-ECI may require an independent cost consultant. This is 
supported by New Zealand Transport (2018) who recommend that when selecting a projects’ 
suitability for ECI that, ‘as this is a quality based procurement method to ensure value for 
money is achieved you will need to engage with an independent parallel estimate peer review 
and conduct a reconciliation process.’ Ma and Xin (2011) also describe how in the 2S-ECI 
process for $100 million Australian infrastructure and construction project, the contractor 
developed a cost estimate on a confidential open-book basis, based on other projects. The 
client engaged an independent estimator to prepare a cost estimate. The parties could then 
negotiate the design and costs.  
 
3.18 HEAD CONTRACTOR VERSUS CONSULTANT ECI 
Prior research offers differing perspectives around whether the best form of contract to employ 
the entity responsible for construction planning and management is a head construction 
contract or a consultancy contract for services (or construction management agreement 
(CMA)). Jergeas and Put (2001, p284) recommend that constructability expertise be provided 
by the contractor responsible for the actual construction of the works, and not through a 
construction consultant. They found that traditional procurement gets in the way of enabling 
any meaningful constructability input into the design ‘even when construction expertise is 
brought in early in the project through the owner’s own construction experts or through a third-
party construction management consultant’. They argue, ‘the benefits are often limited 
because these will typically not be the people ultimately responsible for the actual construction 
of the facilities.’  
 
A major problem is the lack of consensus around pricing between management contracting 
head contractors and construction management consultants. This is likely due to the difficulty 
in accurately and objectively comparing costs on projects between too different procurement 
pathways given the uniqueness and complexities of each project and lack of clear contractual 
frameworks. Tenah (2001, p33) argues that the construction management ‘offers potential 
reduction in the contractor’s overhead by elimination of the general contractor.’ This is 
supported by Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p77) who provides that ‘experienced developer-
clients report savings of between 5% and 30% when trade contractors realize the full 
implications of being in direct contract with the employer.’ However, if a consultant’s price 
includes a margin on the total project value then the effect would be the same as a head 
contractor’s margin on subcontractors. Loosemore (2014) found that some Australian 
subcontractors would price lower to a client’s consultant manager than to a head contractor 
because they felt a head contractor was likely to bid shop so subcontractors held back their 
best price. Tenah (2001, p33) similarly argued that construction management consultants 
increase fairness in the bidding because specialist contractors can bid directly to the client, 
‘thus eliminating bid shopping, auctioning, and other unethical practices.’ However, this 
assumes that head contractors participate in bid shopping and that consultant managers do 
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not. Moreover, in a competitive market, head contractors may submit very low price to the 
client (possibly even below cost) and then try to recoup profit through bid shopping their 
subcontractors. Therefore, clients could pay more through construction management 
agreements not less. It is difficult to make any accurate comparisons without transparent 
pricing.  Tenah (2001, p34) further argued that construction management procurement may 
reduce or eliminate adversarial relationships by emphasizing teamwork and encouraging 
participants to work with rather than against each other, thus ‘creating a harmonious team.’ 
However, Tenah’ (2001, p33)’s comments actually suggest that head contractors may have a 
better relationships with subcontractors than consultants ‘since the head contractor may work 
with these subcontractors in the future, she tends to side with them in claims.’ IN relation to 
management contracting (head contractor), Kirkham (2007, p131) provides that ‘usually, 
competitive tendering is used to obtain a percentage or fixed fee bid for management and 
sometimes a GMP.’ New Zealand Government Procurement (2015, p29) provides that under 
both management contracting and construction management ‘the work is bid for on the basis 
of a percentage management fee’ and that, ‘the management contractor takes more risk (and 
therefore fees) under management contracting, therefore the fees tend to be higher than those 
for construction management.’ This refers to the fact that the head contractor adopts single 
point accountability for construction, whereas, clients must establish negligence by 
consultants to claim damages for a breach. However, this all ignores such factors as market 
conditions, access to plant and equipment, and preferential pricing from subcontractors and 
suppliers. 
 
One challenge with construction management procurement is the lack of clarity around 
administrative responsibilities. Under traditional procurement, the client typically employs a 
head contractor and a contract administrator who certifies the contractor’s claims. The contract 
administrator may be a project manager, architect or engineer. Under construction 
management procurement, design is separate from construction and the client shares 
responsibilities with their consultant construction manager for administrating the various trade 
contracts employed directly by the client. Murdoch and Hughes (2008, p74) warn that ‘an 
inherent problem with such separation is the question of who signs certificates.’ They further 
warn that funders and insurers insist upon designers signing certificates so that, despite the 
split between design and management, ‘it is almost inevitable that both designer and 
construction manager have a central role to play in certification and, by implication, other 
aspects of contract administration.’ Add to this the requirement for clients to take a more active 
role in management (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008 p71) and it becomes evident that the 
certification procedures are more complex under construction management than other 
procurement pathways.  
 
There appears a clear absence of contractual risk evaluation between head contract and 
consultancy contract amongst construction research. Prior research has largely focused on 
perceptions using social sciences methods, which can all be prone to the quality of the people 
and organisations involved in the specific project, rather than contractual obligations. This 
indicates disconnect between legal research and construction research. A head contractor 
takes absolute liability for construction of the product. This includes procuring all 
subcontractors and carrying out all work required even if not specified on the drawings. This 
is the inclusive contact principle (Dennys and Clay, 2015). Great Eastern Hotel v John Laing 
Construction Management Ltd [2005] established that a consultant construction manager 
incurs a similar duty when procuring individual trade packages to avoid gaps. However, it 
remains unclear whether the client should pay where, for example, a roofing contractor claims 
$800.00 NZD for additional flashings at a new and existing roof junction. This reinforces the 
need for experienced clients using construction procurement. Certifying or challenging such 
costs is likely to be a difficult proposition for a client's employee who has no experience 
managing construction projects. See Chapter 5 for a legal comparison between head 
contractor and consultant in 2S-ECI.  
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3.19 CHALLENGES IN PROCUREMENT DECISION-MAKING 
A key focus arising over recent decades is the need to understand client’s needs (Masterman, 
2002). The client’s key drivers may not be a new building at all, but rather for example a 
change in their product distribution methods (Kirkham (2007, p136). The procurement 
pathway best align with the project type and client requirements (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008, 
Kirkham, 2007). For example, it might be pointless to invest in preparing a schedule of 
quantities (SOQ) to enable better cost control for clients, whose main drivers are time and 
quality, not cost. 
 
The consensus is generally that no one perfect procurement solution exists; instead, a strategy 
should be developed using sensible judgement and based on client’s needs (Murdoch and 
Hughes, 2008; Thomas, Luu and Swee, 2002). Important prerequisites to consider include; 
the type of project, the market situation for bidding, the lead-time for the project, and 
uncertainties causing risks of variations during the execution phase (Murdoch and Hughes, 
2008; Toolman 2008) and accepted criteria to consider include:  
 
• Level of client involvement   
• Ability of client to make changes 
• Separation of design from management 
• Clarity of client’s contractual remedies 
• Complexity of the project 
• Speed from inception to completion 
• Certainty of price and time 
• Need for value for money;  
• Need for lowest price. 
 
Procurement decisions have become increasingly complex over recent decades due to the 
growing range of procurement systems and their variants (Masterman, 2002). Procurement 
considerations can include whether to employ specialist trade contractors directly and a 
consultant to manage them (construction management) or employ a head contractor, whether 
design and build or construction only, whether ECI or single-stage tender, whether competitive 
pricing or negotiation; and whether fixed price or cost reimbursement. Clients and their needs 
have also become more complex. Clients’ core business is generally something other than 
construction, such as manufacturing or retail (Rowlinson and McDermott, 1999). Masterman 
(2002, p171) describes how the process of selecting between procurement decisions have;  
 
…become increasingly complex, mainly as a result of the continuing proliferation of 
different methods of procuring building projects, the projects’ ever-increasing technical 
complexity and the client’s need for speedy commencement and completion, which 
has led to a demand for more sophisticated and systematic methods of selection to be 
devised.  
 
Bowen, Pearl, Nkado and Edwards (1997) found that clients often lack understanding about 
procurement systems despite often perceiving their own understanding as better than the 
industry perceives them. According to Masterman (2002, px) clients perceive construction 
work as expensive and risky, and some are increasingly reluctant to become directly involved 
in their construction projects, while others, particularly inexperienced clients, want to be 
involved, but ‘in the most inappropriate way.’ They may rely on the advice of a single appointed 
representative to co-ordinate their interests, often called a project manager. Every 
construction project needs a project manager. Masterman (2002, p53) categorises three types 
of project manager as follows. First, an employee of the client organisation with no 
construction knowledge who acts as a coordinator and single point of contact for the design 
team who will have day-to-day responsibility for the project management. Second, an 
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experienced construction professional, permanently employed by the client who is the single 
point of contact, and is responsible for the financial, technical and administrative project 
management. Third, an external consultant project manager appointed for a specific project, 
typically on a percentage fee for the same duties as the ‘in-house’ project manager. The 1998 
NEDO report: Faster Building for Commerce (NEDO, 1998) identifies the need for 
inexperienced clients to appoint a ‘customer representative’ with experience in working with 
the construction industry, and recommended that such a representative may be found among 
architects, engineers, project managers, surveyors or construction companies who have the 
management or design skills as well as construction. However, developing procurement 
strategies to align with their client’s may not the core business of such entities.  
 
An effective procurement strategy should satisfy the specific needs of the client and their 
particular project (Masterman, 2002: 10). However, Cain (2015) found that the New Zealand 
construction industry still provides procurement strategies based on the provider’s preferences 
and not their clients wants or needs. According to Rowlinson and McDermott (1999, p33) the 
initial strategic decisions including the procurement strategy is one area where the industry 
has been ‘particularly weak in the past’ and Masterman (2002: 27) provides that the selection 
of the most appropriate strategy ‘is often carried out in a haphazard manner.’ A study in the 
United Kingdom (Hibberd and Djebarni, 1996) found that 89% of respondents were dissatisfied 
with the procurement model they had adopted. Masterman (2002: 199) concluded that ‘a 
substantial proportion of all clients are likely to be adopting an incorrect approach to the 
selection of procurement systems and that their satisfaction is thus very often unknowingly 
based upon the acceptance of lower levels of success than are really necessary.’ The 
Chartered Institute of Building (2010) concluded that ‘clients should have a greater 
understanding of the procurement process in the construction industry – the CIOB recognises 
that, in order to facilitate this, accessible information and guidance is necessary. 77% of 
respondents have indicated that clients do not have a sufficient understanding of construction 
procurement.’ 
 
In the absence of a clear contractual framework, procurement decisions may largely come 
down to the client’s or their consultant’s experience. Once appointed, consultants are likely to 
recommend pathways that they are familiar with and that suite their interests. Caine (2015) 
found procurement decisions in New Zealand largely based on industry preferences over 
clients’ needs or wants. Masterman (2002) categorizes clients in terms of whether they are; 
public or private, experienced or inexperienced, and whether their primary business is that of 
construction or property development or whether the need for a new building facility is 
something secondary to their core business which may something such as retail or 
manufacturing. Inexperienced secondary clients are at greater risk than those experienced 
clients who have in-house capabilities or those whose core-business is in construction 
development. Large public clients may be able to leverage better pricing through relational 
contracting and strategic alliances, whereas, most lay private clients are unlikely to be in such 
a position of dominance over the supply chain due to their ‘adhoc construction profile and 
limited understanding of the marketplace’ (McDermott and Khalfan, 2006, p50). Ashworth 
(2012, p96) asserted that consultants’ advice is usually sound, but may be ‘tainted with self-
interest’ and decisions often come down to ‘who gets to the client first.’ The potential for bias 
is something also argued by Masterman (2002: 90), ‘there is a remarkable lack of independent 
authoritative advice available to clients on how to provide a satisfactory brief and generally 
commission a design and build project…’ Masterman (2002, p187) recommends that the 
procurement path be selected sufficiently early so that no individuals or organisations are 
appointed ‘other than perhaps an independent advisor, who might be prone to giving 
subjective advice on the choice.’ Masterman also describes the effect on clients who leave 
the procurement selection too late, when detailed design is under way and ‘…any possibility 
of unbiased choice had been removed by the appointment of design consultants.’ Section 3.6 
of Latham (1994) warned about the potential bias of consultant procurement advice. 
Consultants help their clients decide whether projects are necessary, therefore, if the 
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‘Professional Adviser’ has been retained in the expectation of becoming the lead consultant 
for the project, it will be difficult to advise the client that the project is not needed or, if it is, that 
it could be so small as to require no further consultant advice. Section 3.7 of Latham (1994) 
provides that procurement strategies should precede design development and should focus 
on the evaluation of project risks:  
 
Once a client is satisfied about real need and feasibility within overall budgetary 
constraints, the instinctive reaction is to retain a consultant to design the project - the 
“ring up an architect/engineer” syndrome. That takes a crucial step too quickly, and 
closes off potential procurement options. The next step should be the use of internal 
risk assessment to devise a contract strategy. The client should decide how much risk 
to accept. No construction project is risk free. Risk can be managed, minimised, 
shared, transferred or accepted. It cannot be ignored. The client who wishes to accept 
little or no risk should take different routes for procuring advice from the client who 
places importance on detailed, hands-on control.  
 
3.8 The basic decision on the procurement route should precede the preparation of 
the outline (project) brief, since it necessarily affects who shall assist with the design 
brief as well. That choice of route must be determined by the nature of the project and 
the clients’ wishes over acceptance of risk. Such decisions are difficult. Inexperienced 
clients need advice. There are a number of publications which can assist.  
 
Interestingly, the consultant architects surveyed by Bowen, et al. (1997) appeared to favour 
the idea of a ‘briefing consultant’ who would have a clearly defined role for developing and 
formulating the brief. In the current context, client’s project managers often decide the 
procurement strategies. The value added by project managers comes down to the quality of 
the PM employed. According to Franks (1998, p9) employing a project manager incurs an 
additional cost for the project manager’s fee, which may be offset to some extent by savings 
through their management involvement. Bowen, et al. (1997) found that in traditional 
procurement, the most frequent participants in the briefing process are clients, architects and 
QSs, and that same are most likely to adopt the temporary leadership role of the process. 
Project managers perceived their involvement as ‘significantly greater than perceived by the 
other procurement team members.’ Masterman (2002, p59-61) concluded that data; 
‘...appears to support the widely held belief that the use of the conventional procurement 
system results in a final project cost which is lower than any other methods (with the exception 
of design and build) subject of course to the tender documentation being based upon a fully 
completed design’. Masterman further concluded that the significant pressure exerted by large 
property developers over the 1990s was sufficient to change procurement procedures, but 
that the pressure actually resulted in the inappropriate use of alternative methods, and the 
unnecessary discarding of traditional procurement. 
 
What is not yet clear is the effect of 2S-ECI on the project governance structure. The 
involvement of contractor’s project managers in the design stage planning may raise questions 
around who should do what, and who for example should project manage design and 
construction. Historically architects provided a dual role of client’s agent and designer. 
Alternative – management-based - procurement pathways evolved largely on the criticism that 
architects where not the best project managers. If construction companies took up the 
challenge of client project management, 2S-ECI may provide a procurement model to marry 
the contractor’s project management abilities with the architect’s design skills and the 
independence of a PQS, and potentially reducing an additional separate consultant’s fees. 
The author worked on a construction project, extensions to a hospital, procured in that way. 
However, the client’s in-house representative had experience and qualifications in project 
management in the health sector. The NEDO report (NEDO, 1998) identifies that construction 
companies who have the management capabilities may act as the client’s project manager. 
With regards to design and build, Ashworth (2012, p92) says ‘the arguments for engaging a 
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consultant rather than a contractor as the main employer’s advisor are inconclusive’ and 
summarizes the advantages of employing a contractor as; better time management, single-
point accountability, inherent buildability, certainty of price, teamwork, inclusive design fees. 
He also highlights the potential disadvantages in relation to; problems of contractor proposals 
matching with employer requirements, payment clauses, emphasis may be away from design 
towards other factors, employers may still need to retain consultants for payments, 
inspections, etc.  
 
Ultimately, project specifics and client preferences for acceptance of risk should form the basis 
for procurement decisions (Franks, 1998). For inexperienced clients, a single externally 
appointed representative to co-ordinate the client’s interests (such as a project manager) may 
be particularly beneficial for large complex projects. This is also when ECI may add most 
value. Construction management research into procurement has generally focused on 
identifying client needs and correlating these to different procurement models based on criteria 
such as those identified by (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008; Toolman 2008):  
 
• Level of client involvement   
• Ability of client to make changes 
• Separation of design from management 
• Clarity of client’s contractual remedies 
• Complexity of the project 
• Speed from inception to completion 
• Certainty of price and time 
• Need for value for money;  
• Need for lowest price. 
 
However, procurement pathways are like contracts. Parameters include parties’ 
responsibilities, obligations and liabilities, and timing of involvement. This makes accurately 
comparing between procurement pathways difficult without fully evaluating the client’s legal 
risks under each method. A doctoral thesis by Ismail (2007) found risk aversion to be the 
predominant factor for private client procurement selection. The thesis questionnaire only 
included four owner-occupier residential clients out of 50 responses. Unsurprisingly, the 
overall findings show single-stage traditional as the most used procurement system whereas 
design and build dominates residential housing in New Zealand. The thesis concluded that 
construction management procurement is preferable for private clients, because it allows more 
client involvement, even though the findings show most private clients want to transfer risks 
(time, cost, quality) to a head contractor. Unlike legal research, construction management 
research often fails to evaluate the contractual risks of construction management. The thesis 
(p67) asserts that construction management is riskier because: 
 
the system is incapable of offering price certainty and places more risks on the client 
due to lack of established standards benchmarking quality of workmanship and 
outputs’.  Overall, the system is incapable of addressing with the New Zealand private 
sector clients' needs preference of paying someone to take the risk of cost and time 
slippage from them. It should be noted that the New Zealand private sector clients 
cannot desire to have control over the project and at the same time desire to shift the 
risks to the contractor. They should choose between both conflicting preferences 
(underling by author). 
 
However, from a legal perspective, under construction management procurement, the client 
employs all the trade packages and a consultant to manage them. This means for example, 
the client may be legally responsible for the health and safety of all the trade workers onsite 
because they employ them directly. Unlike head contractors’ stricter commercial liabilities, 
(see Chapter 5) client must establish a negligent breach to pursue damages against a 
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consultant. Therefore, a 2S-ECI procurement pathway that enables partnership and 
collaboration through a pre-construction services agreement, and then a fixed price 
construction contract seems preferable. 2S-ECI also provides some flexibility. The client and 
their project manager could decide whether to novate design liability to the contractor and the 
form of the construction-stage price after deciding to use 2S-ECI, with the default being 
traditional fixed lump sum construction-only. However, clients and project managers need a 
clear contractual framework and contract documentation. A starting point would be whether 
the project is suitable for 2S-ECI. Then a standard form pre-construction agreement (PCSA) 
would provide ease and familiarity, helping to overcome the complexities of procurement 
decision-making or drafting bespoke contract agreements.   
 
3.20 ADVANTAGES OF A STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 
Standard form construction contracts are single contracts that used repeatedly across 
projects, rather than individual parties developing their own bespoke contracts. The 
advantages of standard form contracts have been well documented. Standard form contracts 
increase clarity, transparency, and consistency, reducing complexity and potential for bias in 
decision-making processes. Once a client has identified the need for a new building, the 
process begins with developing a project strategy framework to establish their needs, project 
objectives, risks, environment, and the method of procuring the project (Masterman, 2002, 
p1).  Standard form contracts are well understood and having a significant body of case law 
on their interpretation (Bajari Tadelis, 2001). They should deal with foreseeable situations in 
construction projects (Ashworth, 2012; Ramus, Birchall and Griffiths, 2006) to provide greater 
predictability and certainty in legal relations (Richards, Bowen, Root and Akintoye, 2005) and 
minimising avoidable transactions leading to overall efficiencies in procurement (Sharkey, 
Bell, Jocic and Magineer, 2014). In terms of transaction cost theory, this should reduce risks 
associated with uncertainty, bounded rationality and opportunism.  
 
The construction industry typically favours familiar procedures and forms of contract (Kirkham, 
2007, p133). Most standard forms of construction contract only provide for single-stage 
procurement and the industry at large may therefore feel uncomfortable adopting unfamiliar 
contracts that are untried and tested in the courts (Pheng, Gao and Lin, 2015, p835). Public 
clients can face additional requirements around transparency through government rules for 
procuring products and services. Some inter-jurisdictional agreements require transparency 
and consistency, such as the World Trade Organisation (2016) plurilateral 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). New Zealand belongs to the GPA and to the 
Australia and New Zealand Government Procurement Agreement (New Zealand Government, 
2014). Murray and Langford (2003, p21) describe how in the United Kingdom, reports as early 
as the Simon Report (1944) recommended abolishing open tendering for public sector clients, 
but that such practices continued at least into the 1970s until registers of preferred tenderers 
were compiled and selective tendering took over. However, even using selective tendering, 
the number of bidders was too high, often more than 12 resulting in unnecessarily high cost 
of obtaining a successful bid. According to Murray and Langford (2003, p21) it was decades 
before the National Joint Consultative Committee (NJJCC) recommended sensible numbers. 
In single-stage procurement, clients typically do not pay the contractor’s tendering costs 
directly. Although, contractor tendering costs must be recovered somewhere, so clients may 
pay indirectly through contractor overheads on projects.   
 
Previous research suggests that the lack of standard form pre-construction services 
agreement (PCSA) may hinder the uptake and effective use of 2S-ECI in New Zealand 
commercial construction. The lack of standard form contracts has been a source of frustration. 
Sharkey et al (2014) found broad support for standard form contracts in Australia. However, 
Varmalis (2008, p19) found that, despite state government influences in Australia, a lack of 
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consistent tendering procedures across local councils remained the greatest source of 
frustration to civil contractors. The differences between tender documentation and practices 
required greater time for contractors to digest, and when contractors were pushed for time, 
they may simply load their price to allow for the risk. Turner and Riding (2015) provide 
examples of poor ECI practices where three or more contractors provide ideas during the early 
design stages without payment. Sometimes clients selected the best ideas from each provider 
to create a scope then put out to tender. Such processes, they argue, act as a barrier to 
sharing knowledge and stem the growth of ECI.  
 
3.21 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
Clearly, research is needed to establish a clear contractual framework for 2S-ECI in New 
Zealand construction, ideally integrating legal scholar research with social sciences methods 
to establish user perceptions based on clear contractual obligations. Prior research has 
focused on the benefits associated with integrating those responsible for design and 
construction. However, gauging the perceptions of 2S-ECI without first establishing any clear 
contractual framework renders findings largely subjective particularly in areas such as risk 
transfer and market pricing. Theoretical modelling of cost and time means less than evaluating 
actual outcomes based on real industry contracting practice. Equally, perceptions of 2S-ECI 
using social science methods means little unless the contractual framework used is clearly 
established.  
 
Research studies based on literature reviews and survey questionnaire run the risk of 
perpetually looking backwards and not forwards, by asking industry to rate and rank features 
based on procurement ‘models’ defined in textbooks, rather than exploring potential 
opportunities to improve actual industry processes. This is supported by the contrasting 
opinions of researchers. For example, some authors consider lump sum pricing impossible 
under 2S-ECI, while others describe industry practice (similar to that depicted in New Zealand) 
in which competitive lump sum P&G pricing is based on concept design, then subcontractors 
are procured on an open book basis.  The only term that seems clearly defined in procurement 
is the word ‘procurement.’ 
 
Previous research has described early contractor involvement as both a concept, being any 
procurement pathway that involves contractors during the design stage (design and build, 
managing contracting and construction management) and as its own procurement pathway, 
typically referred to as a two-stage process or 2S-ECI. Following the textbook models, 2S-ECI 
is a form of tendering to support the ‘models’ such as design and build, management 
contracting or traditional contracting with a two-stage tender process. However, 2S-ECI as a 
procurement pathway itself means the textbook procurement ‘models’ become variables 




Figure 8: 2S-ECI Process model variants  
 
Integrating the supply chain between those who design and those who construct derives from 
the extensive criticisms of traditional procurement segregation resulting in adversarial 
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relations and project inefficiencies. Recent research, including governmental reports, have 
also heightened the need to move from a purely lowest-price-based procurement to a more 
value-based procurement environment. However, the construction industry continues to 
favour procurement pathways that are familiar, and tried and tested and that provide 
competitive lump sum pricing prior to construction work commencing, with clear recourse for 
breaches in project performance. This supports the need to establish a contractual framework 
for 2S-ECI toward potentially developing a standard form PCSA. 
 
2S-ECI appears to harness the collaboration and transparency of partnering philosophies, with 
provisions for competitive fixed-pricing across the supply chain. Transaction cost theory 
suggests that opportunism risk reduces through more transparent pricing and bounded reality 
risk reduces through using a standard contractual framework with advantages largely 
independent of the transaction frequency. While design and build appears the optimal form of 
integrating design and construction, research highlights the need for sophisticated design 
briefs particularly on large projects, with similar administrative burdens to traditional 
procurement. In traditional design and build procurement (where the contractor develops the 
design from the client’s brief), it may be difficult to accurately compare competitive lump sum 
prices (to compare apples with apples) in the absence of any design from which to tender 
construction costs. The design and build contractor may also drive cost and time savings at 
the expense of design aesthetics, making this an unattractive option where clients want to 
retain control over design decisions. Conversely, the design and build contractor may risk 
incurring substantial losses if they enter a fixed price contract in the absence of detailed 
design. Target value contracts with pain share/ gain share more commonly feature in 
infrastructure projects with high risks. Given the commercial construction market desire for 
fixed price contracts, this may again be unattractive. Target value contracts also substantially 
increase the administrative burden. 2S-ECI supports contractor design input, but for client or 
their project manager’s approval. 2S-ECI is suitable for novated design and build contracts 
where a contractor provides input during design development then design responsibly is 
contractually novated to the contractor through a design and build construction contract.  
 
There is clearly a need to explore how 2S-ECI is conducted in commercial construction 
projects in New Zealand and user perceptions of challenges and potential improvements to 
improve practices and expand its uptake. Key areas include the composition of the project 
team using 2S-ECI, the scope of services provided by each party, particularly the contractors 
and the project manager, the timing of involvement, pricing arrangements, provisions for not 
agreeing a construction contract, liabilities for providing design input. Establishing the 
contractual framework will enable evaluations about the effect of 2S-ECI on risk transfer and 









Chapter 4: Existing ECI procedures and standard form 
contracts 
This chapter provides an overview of contractual developments toward ECI. ECI first emerged 
in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the Highways Authority 
developed an ECI approach toward contracting in pursuit of establishing long-term supply 
chain relationships and creating integrated project teams (see Whitehead, 2009, p21). The 
Authority utilised a two-stage tendering process using the New Engineering Contract (NEC) 
with a target value contract price. In Australia, the Queensland’s Department of Main Roads 
(DMR) and Department of Public Works (DPW) both use ECI (Ma and Xin, 2011; Whitehead, 
2009). The DMR reported great success including projects completed earlier, reduced costs, 
improved design, and simplified construction (Whitehead, 2009). The Department of Public 
Works (DPW) in Queensland subsequently adopted ECI concepts for its Managing Contractor 
Contract and released a new version of the Managing Contractor Contract in 2007 specifically 
for use on large complex projects. Transit New Zealand has also shown interest in following 
the DMR model contract. 
 
4.1 UK GOVERNMENT FOCUS ON ECI 
In 2014, King’s College London Centre of Construction Law and Dispute Resolution analysed 
the United Kingdom Government Trial Projects and found that the procurement and delivery 
model named; Two Stage Open Book and Supply Chain Collaboration generated cost savings 
and improved project value. As a result, the Project Procurement and Delivery Guidance Using 
Two Stage Open Book and Supply Chain Collaboration (King’s College London, 2014) was 
published under the United Kingdom Government Open Source Licence. The document 
provides that: 
 
The processes, activities and outcomes described in this Guidance reflect strong 
evidence that Two Stage Open Book and Supply Chain Collaboration, implemented 
separately or together, can have a significant, positive impact on project costs and 
other outcomes if led by a Client committed to creating an Integrated Team and if 
supported by clear contractual processes for the early conditional appointment of Tier 
1 Contractors and Tier 2/3 Subcontractors and Suppliers.  
 
Three public construction and infrastructure projects and programmes of work were analysed 
using the United Kingdom government cost reduction validation method, measuring project 
costs against benchmark cost data (Cabinet Office, 2012) and reported 14 – 20% savings. 
This supports the GOV.UK (2011) Government Construction Strategy aim to achieve savings 
in construction procurement of up to 20%.  
 
The Project Procurement and Delivery Guidance Using Two Stage Open Book and Supply 
Chain Collaboration provides a flowchart of two stage open book – integration, information 












Figure 9: Process model for 2-stage open book (Kings College, 2016)
 
The model typifies the two-stage process parameters outlined in this thesis including: 
 
• Head contractor appointment after concept design; 
 
• Head contractor pricing for pre-construction stage based on a schedule of P&G and a 
schedule of rates for construction items where appropriate. Enabling works can also 
be priced in advanced or negotiated at the time;  
 
• Head contractor pricing for construction stage can be fixed price or open book with 
target value; 
 
• Two-stage ECI enables competitive pricing across all tiers of the contractor supply 
chain (referred to as contractor tiers 1, 2, and 3); 
 
• Integrated project team allowing collaborative planning, risk management and 
subcontractor selection; 
 
• Head contractor obligations can be for construction only or for design and build;   
 
• Emphasis on pre-construction services such as; an agreed pre-construction 
programme, collaborative risk and value management, and subcontractor selection.  
 
The guide also adds the following:  
 
• The head contractor prohibited from receiving pricing discounts from subcontractors 
or suppliers. 
 
Some parameters not considered in the guidance document include: 
  
• The types of projects best suited to 2S-ECI; 
 
• Scope of pre-construction services and how these should best be distributed across 
the integrated project team in order to best utilise parties’ strengths and avoid 
duplication;  
 
• Whether and how the head contractor should be paid for their pre-construction 
contributions;  
 
• Key risks to consider during the pre-construction stage; 
 
• The contractor’s contractual liability for providing design input the pre-construction 
stage; 
 
• When the client might consider transferring design obligations to the head contractor 
for the construction stage (novated design and build); 
 
• The intended application of the guidance document is for the United Kingdom public 
sector. Such clients may have the advantage of strong buying power through large 
construction or infrastructure programmes. Continuous learning and ongoing 
relationships are key features of supply chain integration. However, the document 
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concluded that ‘two Stage Open Book and Supply Chain Collaboration, implemented 
separately or together, can have a significant, positive impact on project costs and 
other outcomes if led by a Client committed to creating an Integrated Team and if 
supported by clear contractual processes for the early conditional appointment of Tier 
1 Contractors and Tier 2/3 Subcontractors and Suppliers.’  
 
It is difficult objectively compare project costs and quality given the uniqueness and 
complexities of each individual construction project. However, the work done by Kings College 
(2014) provides a useful framework for comparing projects costs procured through ECI with 
average benchmark costs. In New Zealand, the QV Cost Builder (Quotable Value Limited, 
2019) provides average benchmark costs of various projects costs. This could provide useful 
further research once a clear contractual framework for 2S-ECI in New Zealand is established.  
 
4.2 NEW ZEALAND INDUSTRY TRANSFORMATION AGENDA (ITA) FRAMEWORK   
National and international strategies toward improving productivity in construction have 
promoted ECI. The Industry Transformation Agenda (ITA) is a project led by the Building 
Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ) and based on the World Vision Economic 
Forum on Shaping the Future of Construction: A Breakthrough in Mindset and Technology 
(World Economic Forum, 2017). The forum report provides a framework (figure 13) which 
categories measures of productivity into the following eight topical areas:  
 
• Technology, materials and tools  
• Processes and operations  
• Strategy and business model innovation  
• People, organization and culture  
• Industry collaboration  
• Joint industry marketing  
• Regulation and policies  
• Public procurement 
 
Productivity in the construction sector has generally remained static and lagged behind other 
industries with the US productivity actually falling between 1964 and 2012 (The World 
Economic Forum, 2017, p9 and 15). Page16 of the report highlights the following barriers to 
productivity reform; conservative clients, complexity of contracts and dispute resolution, over-




Figure 13: Industry Transformation Framework (World Economic Forum, 2017, p17) 
 
 
There are parallels between the ITA and the potential use of 2S-ECI. The ITA promotes 
standardisation, modularisation or prefabrication as a means to substantially boosting 
productivity through production in factory-like environments, improving process sequencing, 
and reducing weather-delays and construction timeframes. 2S-ECI provides a contractual 
system to involve contractors during the design stage. This is necessary for contracting pre-
fabricated modules or units for early ordering. Steel Construction New Zealand (2017) 
highlighted this as a key advantage of ECI. Improving efficiencies through collaboration is a 
key focus of the forum: ‘collaboration is, or should be, a hallmark of the construction industry 
itself: the industry’s future success will rely heavily on effective collaboration among all 
stakeholders.’ A primary feature of ECI is the integration of those who design and those who 
construct into an integrated project team, as a relational procurement system.  
 
4.3 STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS FOR ECI 
The following sections provide overviews of the standard form contracts that enable contractor 
involvement in the design stage. These include the new form of design and build contract by 
the Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB) and contracts for management contracting and 
construction management produced by the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) and the New 
Engineering Contract (NEC). The evaluation of each contract establishes that only the JCT 
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PCSA and the NEC ECI Clause support the 2S-ECI pathway. They provide contract 
agreements for engaging contractors during the pre-construction stage, ahead of agreeing a 
construction contract as recommended by Mosey (2011) and Kings College (2014). The JCT 
PCSA also supports lump sum construction contracts and the flexibility for either construction-
only or novated design and build. The JCT PCSA and NEC ECI Clause are compared with 
three bespoke contract agreements used in New Zealand construction in Chapter 6.  
 
 
4.3.1 Integrated Design & Construction – Single Responsibility (IDCSR) 
The Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB) supported the released of the IDCSR A Code of 
Practice (Harding, 2015). The intent is to integrate the responsibilities for design and 
construction into a single team. The aims and objectives of the code are set out in the 
foreword: 
 
The code of practice for Integrating Design and Construction-Single Responsibility 
(IDCsr) integrates within a single team all the key participants involved in the process 
of designing and constructing a successful project. The objective of the team is a focus 
on delivering the end product within the pre-defined parameters. This marks the final 
extension of the paradigm shift initiated by Sir Michael Latham almost two decades 
ago and then further developed by Sir John Egan. 
 
Key features include: 
 
(i) the thorough effort in developing the design and managing risk at the pre-
construction stage with a strong focus on minimising variations, producing 
defect free handover and proactively and collaboratively managing risk and not 
pushing risks down the supply chain. 
 
(ii) the focus on an efficient and empowered client project team, comprising those 
empowered to make decisions, who remain actively involved from establishing 
a clear design brief through to completion and building use.  
 
The IDCSR goes a step further than design and build by developing a single business entity 
for all members of the project including designers, constructors and suppliers. Like design and 
build, performance relies on the quality of the design brief, and cost and time efficiencies may 
remain driven at the expense of design aesthetics. Page xiii provides that: 
 
Client need, particularly cost certainty, will take precedence over design-centric 
aspirations. 
 
A Client Team Manager (project manager) is required to develop the client brief, establish 
feasibility and represent the client's interests across the project design and delivery. Success 
of the system is dependent on having 'like-minded' participants and 'trust and collaboration'. 
 
P18 provides that achieving best results, depends on a 'well-structured, integrated Client 
Team in place, all committed to integrative working with the IDCC Team and following the 
guidelines and processes set out in this Code of Practice.' An effective integrated project team 
is likely to enhance project performance in any ECI procurement pathway regardless of the 
single business entity model. The composition of the IDCC can change from project to project 
as different consultants, constructors and suppliers are selected. While the Code of Practice 
suggests that entities may choose to establish a consortium, this is a feature of supply chain 
integration, not specific to the IDCC system. Proactively managing risks at the pre-construction 
stage and ironing out subcontractor tags collaboratively between the contractor, designer and 
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client, is a key feature of ECI, as is the contractor evaluating buildability risk. These need not 
be specific to the IDCC single business entity model.  
 
Quality and risk management functions are integrated, with the quality manager is responsible 
for planning and overseeing both functions. P18 provides that 'instead of passing it down the 
supply chain, risk is managed by the whole IDCC's integrated team working with the Quality 
Manager:  educating, encouraging and, where necessary, advising team members on how to 
achieve consistently high-quality results.' 
 
A key feature of the IDCSR is its insurance provisions. Rather than traditionally separate 
insurances for design and construction, a single insurance policy covers all the forms of loss 
including late completion, negligence and product failure. This covers all members of the 
project including the client, designers, constructors, and suppliers.  
 
The model sale terms and conditions are introduced in the Code on p31. The key 
feature is that; 'As the IDCC accepts total, single responsibility for the entire design 
and construction process as well as the finished product, all the mechanisms within 
traditional construction contract forms designed to apportion authority, responsibility 
and blame are inappropriate and redundant.'  
 
It is difficult not to include some provision for defence at least between the client and the 
IDCSR construction team. Clause 4 grants the client exclusive possession until satisfactory 
completion or until they breach the contract, 'say in not proceeding and so forth.' Clauses 20 
and 21 dealing with breach and dispute resolution provide for a pre-agreed Mediator. Disputes 
still unresolved are referred to adjudication. 
 
The contract provides that terms are required for force majeure, delays, and liquidated and 
ascertained damages, and clauses to set out the types, delivery mode, and procedures for 
signing off notices.  
 
This contract appears less suitable for client who wish to retain the right to make changes, a 
restriction of design and build (see Murdoch and Hughes, 2008). The design is frozen before 
the construction stage. Then no variations permitted, except those deemed essential. These 
become separate smaller IDCSR. Under clause 8, the contractor is not obliged to accept any 
variations after the signing the agreement. Any variations must be agreed through mutual 
consent based on pre-agreed fixed price, and are carried out under separate IDCSR sales 
agreements. This is a substantial shift from other procurement pathways. However, clause 9 
does enable parties to agree minor changes in specifications that have no financial or 
completion date consequences (The implied common law position). 
 
 
4.3.2 Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) MC and CMA 
The Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT, 2019) suite of contracts includes the MC Management 
Building Contract 2011, updated since its first edition in 1998. However, studies suggest that 
its uptake has been limited.  Glover (2013) provides that the JCT MC: 2011 remains ‘one of 
the least used forms of contract, produced by JCT’. Glover concludes that, while management 
contracting provides advantages, particularly for larger projects, the provisions of the MC 2011 
contract are ‘clearly unsatisfactory, especially for a Management Contractor, and do create a 
very serious risk both for the Works Contractor and the Management Contractor.’ Unlike 2S-
ECI, where parties first agree a pre-construction services agreement (PCSA), and then work 
toward agreeing a construction price and enter a standard form construction contract, the JCT 
MC contract spans both the pre-construction and construction stages.  This creates a more 
complex approach to pricing. Under clause 4.2.1 of the JCT MC contract, the Management 
Contractor is paid a Pre-Construction Fee and a provisional Construction Period Fee. These 
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fees can either be a fixed sum or calculated by other means, such as a target value contract. 
Clause 4.2 provides that where the Construction Period Fee is a fixed sum, it can be adjusted 
up or down where the Prime Cost (project cost) exceeds or is less than the Project Cost Plan 
by more than five percent or other percentage stipulated. Schedule 2 provides a formula for 
calculating the adjustment. This may be off-putting to a construction sector that tends to favour 
familiar, and tried and tested contracts and traditional competitive fixed pricing.  
 
The JCT suite also includes a Construction Management contract, (CM/A 2011). Under 
clauses 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.2.3, the client employs trade contractors directly and a consultant 
construction manager to manage them on the client’s behalf. This approach fits the general 
interpretation of construction management procurement in the United Kingdom (Gruneberg 
and Hughes, 2004). The contract defines a Trade Contract as; ‘the contract between the 
Employer and a Trade Contractor as referred to in clause 3.3.’; and a Special Trade Contract 
as; ‘a trade contract prepared by the Construction Manager for a Trade Contract where the 
trade contract CM/TC is not to be used.’ 
 
The additional requirements for the client to issue instructions and scope changes and ensure 
the Principal Contractor carries out their duties and obligations highlights that the need for 
experienced clients using construction management procurement (Murdoch and Hughes, 
2008; Kirkham, 2007). Section 2 sets out the Construction Manager's obligations in relation to 
procurement. These include managing the procurement of the project and providing services 
required in accordance with the Project brief, Project Cost Plan and the Construction Phase 
Plan. Clause 3 highlights the need for the client to take an active role under the construction 
management procurement process, and the need for clear administration between the client 
and the consultant construction manager. For example, the following provisions set out client 
responsibilities for issuing instructions and scope changes.  
 
3.2.1 The Employer shall issue to the Construction Manager such instructions as are 
reasonably necessary to enable the Construction Manager properly to discharge his 
obligations under this Contract.  
 
3.2.2 If instructions are issued by the Employer other than in writing they shall within 7 
days of issue be confirmed in writing by the Employer to the Construction Manager 
and vice versa.  
 
3.2.3 The Employer may issue instructions to alter or modify the design, quality, 
quantity, duration or sequences of the Project.  
 
At common law, varying contracts requires agreement between the parties. Construction 
contracts commonly contain provisions enabling the contract administrator to instruct contract 
variations. Otherwise, the contractor could potentially renegotiate terms of the whole contract 
(Murdoch and Hughes, 2008). The CM/A Clause 3.2.3 enables the client to vary the contract 
by instructing scope changes to their construction manager. Under procurement obligations, 
Clause 2.1.4 requires the construction manager to ‘as agent for the Employer fulfil all the 
duties required of the Construction Manager as such agent under each Trade 
Contract.’ However, there appears to be no provision for the construction manager to issue 
variations to the trade contractors (only to issue completion certificates clauses 2.5 and 2.6 
and certificates of making good clause 2.4). The client also incurs duty under United Kingdom 
safety regulations:  
 
3.5.1 Where the Construction Manager is not the CDM Co-ordinator, the Employer 
shall ensure that the CDM Co-ordinator carries out all his duties and, where the 
Construction Manager is not the Principal Contractor, shall ensure that the Principal 
Contractor carries out all his duties under those regulations.  
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The consultant construction manager’s duty is less strict than that of a head contractor (see 
chapter 5). Clause 2.7 of the JCT CM/A defines the construction manager’s duty of care 
similarly to any other consultant in the project team:  
 
2.7 The Construction Manager in the discharge of his obligations under this Contract 
shall exercise the degree of skill, care and diligence to be expected of a reasonably 
competent construction manager experienced in carrying out projects of a similar size, 
scope and complexity.   
 
Clause 2.8 limits the construction manager’s liability for design errors:  
 
2.8 Subject to the indemnities to the Employer given in clauses 6.1 and 6.2, and 
notwithstanding any liability for design placed on a Trade Contractor under a Trade 
Contract, the Construction Manager shall not be liable to the Employer in respect of 
any defect or insufficiency in the design of the Project.  
 
Clause 2.9.2 limits the construction manager from any liability when hindered by an act or 
omission of the Consultant Team, provided the construction manager takes all reasonable 
efforts to avoid or mitigate the effect of the act or omission.  
 
2.9.2 The Construction Manager shall not be liable under this Contract to the extent 
that the discharge of his obligations is prevented or delayed by any act or omission of 
the Consultant Team or any member of it, provided that all reasonable efforts have 
been made by the Construction Manager to avoid or mitigate the effect of any such act 
or omission on the discharge of his obligations.  
 
Neither the JCT MC nor CM/A contracts support a two-stage procurement process where the 
second stage is a standard form construction contract.  
 
 
4.3.3 JCT Pre-Construction Services Agreement (PCSA) 
In 2011 the JCT released, and subsequently updated, standard Pre-Construction Services 
Agreements (PCSA) for engaging head contractors and subcontractors; Pre-Construction 
Services Agreement (General Contractor) (PCSA); and Pre-Construction Services Agreement 
(Specialist) (PCSA/SP). The JCT CSA is for appointing a contractor to carry out pre-
construction services under a two-stage tender process, and supplement the JCT standard 
contracts for building works only or for design and build. JCT state that the PCSA is not 
suitable for use with the Management Building Contract, but is suitable with the Construction 
Management Contract with minor amendment (JCT, 2017). The JCT provide the following 
description:   
 
JCT’s Pre-Construction Services Agreement (General Contractor) is designed for 
appointing a contractor to carry out pre-construction services under a two-stage tender 
process. 
The Pre-Construction Services Agreement enables the contractor to collaborate 
with the employer or their team of consultants to develop detailed designs, to develop 
the main contract works, or to compile specialist tender documents. 
The contractor’s involvement at the pre-construction stage is valuable and often 
essential in the final design process of a project, as well as making preparations for 
the construction phase, such as the programme, cost plans, buildability and any 
specialist procurement. 
The agreement covers the period from the submission of first stage tenders up to the 




The JCT PCSA provides standard and specific terms that enable parties to agree such 
provisions as the scope of pre-construction services, payment provisions, insurances and 
liabilities for providing design input, ahead of agreeing a construction contract.  
 
 
4.3.4 New Engineering Contract (NEC) MC and ECI Clause 
The New Engineering Contract (NEC) suite includes a management contract option, the 
NEC3: Engineering and Construction Contract Option F: management contract. However, the 
client adopts more risk through construction management procurement, and pricing is cost 
reimbursement, rather than a fixed-price. NEC (2014a) provide the following: 
 
Option F is a cost reimbursable management contract where the financial risk is taken 
largely by the client.  This document contains all the core clauses and secondary option 
clauses the schedules of cost components, and contract data, relevant to an option F 
contract. 
 
In November 2015, NEC released a supplementary ECI clause for use with NEC contract 
options C (target contract with activity schedule) and E (cost reimbursable contract) (NEC, 
2014b). The clause is for contractors to assist the client’s consultant or to provide design 
proposals. The clause is five pages long plus three pages of guidance notes. It provides basic 
ingredients for the pre-construction stage, such as; provisions around updating the contract 
budget; the contactor’s first-stage pricing (rates, resources, overheads and profit, preliminaries 
and fee percentages); contractor responsibility for obtaining consents and approvals; client 
and contractor ownership of intellectual property; the client’s right not to proceed with 
construction; the contractor’s liability for any design. The clause assumes the contractor is 
paid for their early-involvement with the contractor submitting regular cost forecasts of stage 
1 costs. However, the ECI clause is not suitable for use with lump sum contracts (NEC, 2014c).  
 
Only the JCT PCSA and NEC ECI Clause support a 2S-ECI process where parties enter a 
pre-construction services agreement, then work toward agreeing a traditional standard form 
construction contract. No standard form PCSAs exist for New Zealand construction market, 
leaving clients to draft their own bespoke agreements. Chapter 6 compares the JCT PCSA 
and NEC ECI Clause with three bespoke agreements used in New Zealand, after a contractual 
framework of contractor’s obligations for design buildability are first established in chapter 5.  
 
 
Chapter 5: Contractor design buildability obligations 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out to establish who pays for detailed design development once a fixed-price 
construction contract has been entered into under NZS 3910:2013, ‘Conditions of contract for 
building and civil engineering construction’ (SNZ, 2013). Consider this scenario: a head 
contractor is employed through a fixed-price construction contract to build a new university 
block. During construction, they submit a request for information requesting further drawing 
details for particularly complex areas on the basis that they cannot otherwise build what has 
been designed. The contract administrator (called an engineer under NZS 3910:2013) issues 
drawing details. The head contractor then submits a variation claim for the detailed work, 
including timber blocking, bolt fixings, flashings and seals. Research objectives include 
establishing 
 
• when the variation claim may be accepted 
• the effect of contractor involvement in design development 
• the effect if claimed from a building subcontractor to a consultant construction manager 
(CCM) (i.e. no head contractor).  
 
A following journal article has been accepted for publication based on this chapter (issue and 
number to be confirmed at the time of writing): 
 
• Finnie D, Ameer Ali N and Park K (2019) Design development post contract signing: 
client’s or contractor’s cost New Zealand?. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers – Management, Procurement and Law XXXX (XXXX): 1–XX, 
https://doi.org/10.1680/jmapl.18.00044 
 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The implied liabilities of contractors entering fixed-price contracts are examined in terms of 
how they may influence the interpretation of NZS 3910:2013 when deciding claims for design 
development post contract signing. A flow chart for aiding claim entitlement decisions is 
provided. Then, the head contractor’s and consultant manager’s liabilities are compared at 
common law, with a tabulated comparison of the two. 
 
While design buildability obligations have been considered for ground conditions and 
foundations (Bailey, 2007; Dennys and Clay, 2015; Rosenberg, 2012; Walton, 2007), there is 
an absence of literature specific to detailed design development. Few legal precedents exist, 
with disputes generally negotiated or referred to adjudication or arbitration where outcomes 
remain private. 
 
Similarly, few precedents exist specifically relating to the construction management 
procurement pathways where the client employs a CCM. Therefore, cases related to a 
contractor’s liability for design buildability are applied through analogy. Similarly, cases related 
to PMs and contract administrators are considered for CCMs. Legal commentary is also 
applied from respected textbooks and published papers. According to Chynoweth (2008), 
analogy is the common tool of legal scholar research and legal scholarship involves 
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developing ‘scholastic arguments for subsequent criticism and reworking by other scholars, 
rather than any attempt to deliver results which purport to be definitive and final’ (Chynoweth, 
2008: p. 30). This study is not intended as legal advice. 
5.3 CONTRACTOR CLAIM ENTITLEMENT 
5.3.1 Common law position: absolute liability and the inclusive-price principle 
New Zealand courts have so far followed the United Kingdom in holding building contractors 
strictly liable for design buildability. According to Walton (2007: p. 3), a New Zealand barrister, 
‘the common law position is that, without an express provision to the contrary, ground condition 
risk rests with the contractor like any other physical condition or buildability issue’. The contract 
administrator must decide whether the contractor should have allowed sufficient costs for the 
newly detailed work within their fixed price or whether the detailed work is sufficiently different 
to constitute a variation to the contract. The distinguishing point is that the contractor should 
have included for all costs necessary to complete the works, even if not specified on the 
drawings. This is the ‘inclusive-price’ principle. If the drawing is considered within the 
contractor’s inclusive price, it may be instructed as a variation ‘for the contractor’s 
convenience’ without additional time or cost (see the book by Dennys and Clay (2015, p. 402)). 
However, the extent of application ultimately depends on the interpretation of the contract and 
specified scope (see the book by Dennys and Clay (2015: p. 391)). Therefore, the contractor 
may not automatically be entitled to costs of additional materials shown in detailed drawings 
instructed after contract signing. The contractor’s absolute liability is not necessarily reduced 
by the client providing a schedule of quantities. While the contractor may rely on the accuracy 
of the SOQ aligning with the drawings (unless the SOQ disclaims liability), this may not reduce 
the contractor’s absolute liability for unforeseen circumstances. In Worksop Tarmacadam Co 
Ltd v. Hannaby (CA) (1995), a contractor’s claim for additional quantities due to encountering 
hard rock was rejected, despite the contract containing a remeasurement clause. Russell LJ 
said it would have been the ‘easiest thing in the world’ for the plaintiffs to make a specific 
provision for dealing with ‘unforeseen conditions being encountered’, had they chosen to. The 
main relief at common law is if the contract becomes impossible or radically different 
(frustrated). 
 
The case of Wilkins and Davies Construction Co Ltd v. Geraldine Borough (1958) provides an 
example of a building contractor being held liable for both the original and redesign of a 
concrete tank chamber after the original design was abandoned midway through construction. 
The contractor argued that a contract for sinking a sewage tank became wholly inapplicable 
after uncovering ground conditions that made excavation impossible and the designed pump 
system (44 gallons (200 litres) or even 400-gallon drum) unworkable due to the volume of 
groundwater, so not buildable as designed. However, the High Court in Wellington followed 
the United Kingdom case of Tharsis Sulphur & Copper Company v. McElroy & Sons (1878) in 
finding that the contract was not frustrated because performance remained possible. The tank 
could still be constructed albeit using a different design methodology involving craning precast 
rings under water with a diver. The contractor was therefore held to their contract obligations. 
In Tharsis Sulphur & Copper Company v. McElroy & Sons (1878), the contract specified girder 
dimensions, and without written instruction to make the girders of thicker metal, the contractor 
could not recover extra costs. Lord Blackburn stated that ‘When in this case, the contractor 
says “We cannot do the works as we have promised to do it unless you permit us to make it 
thicker than we undertook to make it” and the engineer on behalf of the company says “I will 
not object to your making it thicker if you cannot do it otherwise”, I think there is nothing in that 
to imply that there was to be payment for the additional thickness’ (Tharsis Sulphur & Copper 
Company v. McElroy & Sons (1878)). 
 
Other examples of New Zealand courts applying a strict liability include Slowey v. Lodder 
(1900) and Gore District Council v. Power Co Ltd (1997). In Slowey v. Lodder (1900), the 
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Court of Appeal followed Thorn v. London City Council (1876) in finding that a local council 
owed no implied warranty against known latent defects, after a previous contractor packed 
above a tunnel with brushwood and logs following a previous slip. This led to a tunnel collapse 
when the new contractor carried out work. Instead, contractors should make their own 
inquiries. Gore District Council v. Power Co Ltd (1997) demonstrates parties’ freedom to agree 
contractually their own risk allocations. A contract for supplying power to the council for 1 
penny per unit for time hereafter was upheld on the basis that contracts are not frustrated just 
because they turn out to be bad bargains. 
 
The long-established principle is that the client who provides drawings to the tenderer does 
not warrant that the design is buildable (Bailey, 2007). Rather, it is the contractor who, by 
submitting a fixed price, legally warrants that they can build what has been designed and do 
so for their price, even if unforeseen events make performance more difficult, including 
buildability problems arising from the engineer’s negligent design (Rosenberg, 2012: p. 16). 
Thorn v. London City Council (1876) is another early United Kingdom case where the 
contractor was held to an absolute liability for design buildability when caissons failed to 
support the water pressure. Rosenberg (2012) confirmed that both Thorn v. London City 
Council (1876) and Tharsis Sulphur & Copper Company v. McElroy & Sons (1878) remain 
good case law. 
 
Building contractors align with product manufacturers in that both must deliver a fit-for-
purpose, defect-free product (Burrows et al., 2012). The principle of absolute liability, first 
established in Paradine v. Jane (1647), dictates that by entering a contract to do something 
absolutely, the provider must do that thing regardless of anything making the task more difficult 
(as opposed to a mere promise). As an absolute liability, the client does not first have to 
establish negligence as they might with a contract for services. For design development, the 
contract administrator must decide to what extent the contractor should have allowed for within 
their fixed price to compensate for incomplete drawings (inclusive price principle). While no 
clear legal definition of design buildability exists (see Benaim (UK) Ltd v. Davies Middleton & 
Davies Ltd (2005)), Rosenberg (2012: p. 2) suggests the following definition of ‘buildability 
design risk’ incurred by contractors, being the allocation of 
 
deficiencies in the permanent works design which make it more time consuming or 
costly (or even impossible) during the construction phase to build to the specifications 
and drawings. (italics by the authors) 
 
This suggests that the contractor must include sufficient costs to complete the works, including 
those for the permanent building works. NZS 3910:2013 clearly requires contractors to allow 
for costs both temporary and permanent, whether specified or ‘inferred’ from the contract. 
 
NZS 3910:2013 clause 5.1.1, ‘General responsibilities’, states the following. 
 
In carrying out the Contract Works the Contractor shall complete, handover to the 
Principal, and remedy defects in the Contract Works and provide all services, labour, 
Materials, Plant, Temporary Works, transport, and everything whether of a temporary 
or permanent nature required so far as the necessity for the same is specified in, or is 
to be inferred from the contract. (italics by the authors) 
 
Under NZS 3910:2013, contractors may be entitled to costs for drawings when they are 
instructed to resolve matters relating to clause 9.5, ‘Unforeseen physical conditions’ or clause 
5.13, ‘Underground and above-ground utilities’. However, additional costs may be deemed 
within the contractor’s inclusive price when the drawings are instructed in response to the 
contractor’s request for greater detail or a change to suit their methods. 
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Scenario: under NZS 3910:2013 clause 5.1.1, the contractor is deemed to have included all 
costs required to complete the works, both of a temporary and a permanent nature, including 
work specified in, and inferred from, the contract. Including for all works of a ‘permanent’ 
nature indicates that contractors must allow sufficient costs to compensate where details may 
be lacking. Ultimately, the contract administrator must consider whether the instructed detail 
is sufficiently similar in nature to be deemed included in the contractor’s fixed price or different 
enough to constitute a contract variation. 
 
5.3.2 Extent of the contractor’s ‘inclusive’ fixed price: work similar or wholly different 
 
The contract administrator may consider the extent of the contractor’s inclusive fixed price 
under three main categories. 
 
• No entitlement for instructions sufficiently similar in nature to the original scope that 
the contractor should have allowed for all necessary costs, even if not specifically 
shown. 
• Instructions sufficiently different to enable variation claims. According to Dennys and 
Clay (2015: p. 403), absolute liability ‘will extend to variations, such as extra work, 
which can be shown to be similar in general character to the contract work but may not 
extend to unforeseeable variations which are different in character or location’. 
• Instructions wholly outside the contract itself, which could be refused or performed for 
rates outside the contract (quantum meruit). Dennys and Clay (2015: pp. 649–650) 
provide how for a single house, the addition of a garage might be 
• acceptable, but a variation to build a second house might not, whereas in a contract 
for 300 houses, instruction for another 20 houses might not vitiate the original contract. 
 
The first two categories may apply where the contractor requests further details, whereas the 
third category is more likely client instructed scope changes. 
 
Scenario: the contract administrator must decide whether the details are sufficiently similar in 
nature that the contractor should have included the costs within their fixed price or are different 
enough to constitute a variation. In any case, the administrator might ask the contractor what 
they allowed for to produce a fit-for-purpose product. 
 
5.3.3 Whether the contractor can claim work outside the contract: frustration and 
restitution 
 
At common law, the main relief from absolute liability is when unforeseen circumstances 
render performance impossible or radically different from the original contract. The contract 
may then be deemed frustrated, relieving parties of their contractual obligations irrespective 
of the elect of either party (Burrows et al., 2012; Dennys and Clay, 2015). However, the 
threshold for frustration is generally high, and contractors may suffer great loss arising from 
unforeseen circumstance, such as ground conditions (Burrows et al., 2012). 
 
If an instruction was deemed a necessary solution to overcome circumstances that would 
otherwise frustrated the contract, the contractor may be entitled to claim costs for the work 
outside the contract rates under the doctrine of restitution based on unjust enrichment. 
However, restitution claims are available only when no other avenue exists through contract 
or tort and where enrichment of the benefited party at the expense of the other would be unjust 
(Davenport and Harris, 1997). Restitution is still an evolving doctrine in Australasia. New 
Zealand courts have not yet ‘accorded it the status of a cause of action’ (Burrows et al., 2012: 
p. 27), and Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v. Paul (1987) was the first Australian case to apply 
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unjust enrichment formally. In Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v. Paul (1987), a client refused to 
pay for residential building work on the basis that no contract existed. The work was performed 
on an oral contract when the Builders Licensing Act 1971 (New South Wales) required that 
residential contracts be in writing. While this case may have provided clear application of the 
doctrine, Dean J in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v. Paul (1987) cautioned that future judges 
should not use ‘judicial discretion to do whatever idiosyncratic notions of what is fair and just 
might dictate’. The following scenarios theorise where restitution might apply in construction 
claims. 
 
Example 1 (Davenport and Durham, 2013: p. 37): ground conditions 
 
… the principal or superintendent refuses to order a variation to overcome some 
obstacle, eg a defect in the design or a latent site condition. Assume that it is 
impossible to continue the work specified until the obstacle is overcome. An example 
may be where the principal has provided a design for footings of a building but the 
subsoil conditions prove to be such that the design of the footings must be amended 
or the buildings will be unstable. 
 
Example 2 (Davenport and Durham, 2013: p. 87): latent structural defects 
 
The specification requires the contractor to replace the tiles on an existing building. 
When the contractor starts work, the contractor finds some rotten beams that need to 
be replaced before the tiles can be safely laid. Assume that replacement of beams is 
not part of the work prescribed by the contract. The owner refuses to direct a variation 
and tells the contractor that it is the contractor’s problem. A contractor must not perform 
unsafe work so the contractor has the choice of replacing the rotten beams or not 
proceeding with the work. If the contractor replaces the beams, that additional work is 
not a variation. It is not work under the contract. (italics by the authors) 
 
Both examples involve work required to fulfil the contract. In the absence of express contract 
provisions, by offering fixed-price contracts, contractors adopt the risk of unforeseen 
circumstances that render performance more difficult but not impossible or wholly different. 
This restricts restitution to where the contract becomes frustrated. According to Burrows et al. 
(2012: p. 815), the threshold for frustration is high (italics by the authors). 
 
Performance must have become impossible of performance or ‘totally different’; the 
obligation must have been fundamentally altered. Anything less will not do. This, as 
seen, even drastic fluctuations in currency over a period of time do not normally 
frustrate contracts; nor do very substantial obstructions to the progress of building 
contracts. Some of this can be justified on the basis of the acceptance of risk by one 
of the parties. Nevertheless, the hardship caused can be very real and out of proportion 
to what was envisaged. 
 
If the contract does provide for such events, then the work is handled within the contract. For 
example, NZS 3910:2013 clause 5.13, ‘Underground and above-ground utilities’, treats 
locating, altering or protecting latent utilities as a contract variation. Similarly, clause 9.5, 
‘Unforeseen physical conditions’, treats reasonably unforeseeable physical conditions 
including artificial obstructions as variations. Davenport and Durham (2013) recommend a 
catch-all contract clause to avoid restitution claims (such as NZS 3910:2013 clause 5.1.1, 
‘General responsibilities’). 
 
In example 2, the contract might be frustrated if replacing roof beams is impossible or 
represents a wholly different scope. If the contract specified replacing a dozen tiles, then 
replacing most of the roof structure may constitute frustration, whereas if the contract involved 
replacing the whole roof, then replacing two rotten roof beams might not. 
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Scenario: it is unlikely that the instructed detail could constitute something wholly outside the 
contract scope. NZS 3910:2013 contains provisions for variations, including a change in type 
or quantity or materials (clause 9.1), for underground and aboveground utilities (clause 5.13) 
and unforeseen physical conditions (clause 9.5). 
 
5.3.4 Duty to warn 
At common law, contractors must warn of design issues that are reasonably foreseeable to 
contractors similar to that employed. Warning of issues early allows for solutions before costs 
escalate. NZS 3910:2013 clause 5.21, ‘Advance notification’, was introduced in the 2013 
version to require the following (SNZ, 2013: p. 37). 
 
5.21.1 
The Contractor and the Engineer shall each notify the other in writing as soon as either 
of them becomes aware of any matter which is likely 
to: 
(a) Materially alter the Contract Price; 
(b) Materially delay completion of the Contract Works; or 
(c) Result in a breach of a statutory duty in connection with the Contract Works. 
 
Clause 5.21.3 provides that ‘if the Contractor does not notify of a matter which it reasonably 
ought to have …’ (SNZ, 2013: p. 37), then any variation will be calculated on the basis that 
they had and accounting for the impact being avoided or reduced. 
 
According to Dennys and Clay (2015: p. 430), the test of reasonable foreseeability is a matter 
of fact. Contractors will not be expected to vet design details of experts, and it will ‘only be 
relatively glaring or obvious design deficiencies judged in the light of the knowledge to be 
expected from a Contractor of the type employed which will give rise to the duty to warn’ (italics 
by the authors). Example cases include the following. 
 
• Failing to warn of serious design faults and safety dangers. In Plant Construction Plc 
v. Clive Adams Associates and JMH Construction Services Ltd (2000), the court held 
that the subcontractors should exercise appropriate skill, protest vigorously and even 
walk off-site unless a safe design was produced. 
• Failing to warn of increased costs: A builder in New Zealand was found liable for failing 
to warn of increases to their estimate after being repeatedly asked to firm their price 
by the client (J & JC Abrams v. Ancliffe (1978)). Cook J held that any reasonably careful 
builder would have warned the client earlier of cost inflation. 
 
 
While these cases centre on safety and costs, Craig (1999) commented that the duty imposed 
in J & JC Abrams v. Ancliffe (1978) could be likened to a duty to warn of design defects. 
 
Scenario: ECI could influence the extent of what is reasonably foreseeable. For example, the 
contract administrator may take a stricter stance on contractors claiming variations for 
requested details if the contractor had greater opportunity to evaluate the design through ECI 
and if their ECI team included qualified architects and engineers (being the ‘knowledge to be 
expected from a contractor of the type employed’). 
 
5.3.5 Accuracy and clarity of contract documents 
The contractor may be entitled to claim costs for the detail if it is issued to resolve ambiguities 
in the original documents. The contra proferentem principle implies that ambiguities in contract 
documentation err against the provider of the document. In construction, the principle 
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generally applies to drawings, specifications and specific terms or exclusions, rather than 
standard terms (drafted with representation across clients, engineers and contractors). 
 
Recent cases relating to exclusion clauses suggest that courts are taking a practical approach 
when considering what constitutes ambiguity and balancing the intended purpose and natural 
interpretation of the clause, commercial bargaining power of the parties and their freedom to 
agree risk apportionment contractually, leaving contra proferentem as a last resort where 
ambiguity remains (Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v. Providence Resources plc [2016]). New 
Zealand appears to be adopting this approach, in that only where the natural and ordinary 
meaning cannot be ascertained due to genuine ambiguity will contra proferentem apply 
(Lumley General Insurance (NZ) Ltd v. Body Corporate No 205963 [2010]; Persimmon Homes 
Ltd v. Ove Arup and Partners Ltd [2017]). 
 
NZS 3910: 2013 clause 2.7.4 allows variation claims for reasonably unforeseen ambiguities 
that, after clarification from the engineer result, in additional time or cost. In relation to 2S-ECI, 
the Joint Contracts Tribunal’s pre-construction services agreement (JCT, 2019) requires 
contractors to warn of document inconsistencies and ambiguities ahead of agreeing to the 
construction contract. 
 
Scenario: contractors may be able to claim the difference in costs between conflicting details 
across drawings. However, if the contractor installs materials based on ambiguous drawings, 
they may be entitled to the difference in cost between materials but not the cost of removing 
what has been already installed if it is deemed that they should have notified in advance. If 
the contractor was involved in design development through ECI, the threshold of what is 
considered reasonably foreseeable may be higher. The contractor’s bargaining power may 
also be considered higher when negotiating through open-book pricing than through 
competitive tender. 
 
5.3.6 Designer negligence for buildability 
Designers have been found negligent for their designs lacking buildability on the basis that 
designs should not rely on exceptional levels of workmanship in order to comply with codes 
unless the level of workmanship is specified, such as for a prestigious hotel (Dennys and Clay, 
2015: p.289; Department of National Heritage v. Steensen Varming Mulcahy (1998)), and that 
the quality of documentation should be sufficiently detailed and legible to enable construction 
without further clarification. While this appears at odds with the contractors’ strict liability, there 
is no evidence that this changes the contractor’s commercial liabilities when offering fixed-
price construction contracts for client supplied design. 
 
Three further cases provide examples. 
 
• Roof lap tolerances were found unlikely to be achieved by ordinary standards of 
workmanship, and ordinary supervision suffices in less extreme conditions. Judge 
Hicks QC held the designer negligent for not considering trade literature warning about 
low-pitched roofs and the client’s representative negligent for failing to supervise 
(George Fischer Holding Ltd v. Multi Design Consultants Ltd (1998)). 
• A front-sealed cladding system was held to lack buildability because it relied on a level 
of ‘exceptional skill’ – above the ‘care and skill ordinarily to be expected’, including 
working in windy conditions and partly from scaffold (Equitable Debenture Assets 
Corporation Ltd v. Moss (William) Group Ltd (1984, 9.16)). It was similarly held that 
designs may be defective if they incur very difficult supervision and may be described 
as lacking ‘supervisability’. The contractor was also found liable for breaching an 
implied term to warn of design buildability issues (Equitable Debenture Assets 
Corporation Ltd v. Moss (William) Group Ltd (1984)). An adhesive-fixed tile cladding 
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resulted in difficulties achieving concrete tolerances to receive the tiles (Victoria 
University of Manchester v. Hugh Wilson Lewis Womersley (a firm) and Pochin 
Contractors (1984)). Judge Hewey held that the architects failed to heed tiling literature 
or properly consider junctions and movement joints and in specifying very small gaps 
between tiles ‘did not have proper regard for buildability’ (Victoria University of 
Manchester v. Hugh Q29 Wilson Lewis Womersley (a firm) and Pochin Contractors 
(1984)). 
 
The above cases involved completed buildings that leaked. They did not involve contractors 
requesting design changes on the basis they could not otherwise build what was designed. 
Also, both Equitable Debenture Assets Corporation Ltd v. Moss (William) Group Ltd (1984) 
and George Fischer Holding Ltd v. Multi Design Consultants Ltd (1988) involved design and 
build contractors, meaning the client did not provide the contractor with the design. Instead, 
the clients sued the designers, who in both cases had provided collateral warranties directly 
to the clients. In George Fischer Holding Ltd v. Multi Design Consultants Ltd (1988), the design 
and build contractor went into liquidation at the start of the trial. 
 
Interestingly, in New Zealand, Building Amendment Act 2013 section 362 (I) requires that 
materials for residential building work be ‘suitable for the purpose’ and workmanship be 
performed using ‘reasonable skill and care’. However, this applies only to residential building 
contracts over NZD $30 000·00 for household units, whereas NZS 3910:2013 is typically used 
for commercial or infrastructure works. 
 
A designer in New Zealand was found negligent for, among other things, their design lacking 
buildability (MBIE, 2016) under the LBP scheme, which came into effect in 2007 and requires 
that all designers and residential building practitioners be licensed. The board cancelled the 
designer’s licence and ordered them to pay costs for incompetence and disrepute after the 
designer failed to carry out adequate site investigations and varied a producer statement from 
a previous project and their design was found to be incomplete with hand-drawn notes that 
were deemed illegible and lacking sufficient detail to prescribe how the building was to comply 
with the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) (MBIE, 2019). The board (MBIE, 2016) noted 
that 
 
… a designer’s plans should be able to stand by themselves, should not require 
clarification, and should document how the building work is to be undertaken so that 
code compliance is achieved. The Board has also consistently conveyed in previous 
decisions the message that it is not appropriate for licensed building practitioner 
designers to use the building consent process as a peer review or quality assurance 
mechanism and/or rely on the building consent authority to pick up any anomalies in 
the design documents. 
 
The senior technical advisor agreed that contractors may incur a strict commercial liability for 
buildability when tendering fixed-price contracts but clarified that the LBP board take a holistic 
approach to ‘accountability’ based on the reasonable standard that they expect of licensed 
designers. This, therefore, differs from ‘an implied guarantee of buildability and the subsequent 
liability to compensate for the problems experienced – of which the Board would have no 
comment’ (personal e-mail communication, 15 December 2016). 
 
Based on the above, contractors remain liable for the costs of design solutions when they 
request these after entering a fixed-price contract for design supplied by the client. Separately, 
licensed designers may be accountable to the LBP board (and possibly ordered to pay costs) 
if their design is deemed negligence based on such breaches as insufficient investigations or 
illegible and inadequately detailed drawings. Courts may also deem designers negligent if their 
designs rely on exceptional levels of workmanship in order to comply with the building code, 
 87 
as supported by the Building Amendment Act 2013 requirements for residential building 
contracts over NZD $30 000·00 for work involving household units. 
 
5.3.7 Claim-entitlement flow chart 
Figure 1 provides a decision flow chart summarising the key considerations when evaluating 
claims related to design buildability. Decision gateways are referenced to the authoritative 
Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts (Dennys and Clay, 2015). This demonstrates 
two main grounds for claims 
 
• instructed details sufficiently different in character from the original scope to constitute 
a contract variation, so long as the contractor has not breached their implied duty to 
warn 
• instructions wholly different from the original scope or the contract is frustrated when 
unforeseen events render 








5.4. EFFECT IF CONSULTANT MANAGER (NO HEAD CONTRACTOR) 
CCMs are employed under the construction management procurement model. The client 
employs the CCM to act as their representative in planning and administering the works under 
a contract for services, sometimes called a construction management agreement (CMA), with 
the client employing the trade packages directly (no head contractor). 
 
5.4.1 Duty of care 
CCMs have a lesser duty than head contractors. CCMs provide professional services, unlike 
contractors, who are deemed to deliver a product. As such, CCMs do not guarantee project 
outcomes, only that they will take reasonable skill and care. For example, head contractors 
may incur damages for delay by their subcontractors, whereas clients might rely on their CCM 
to apportion damages to individual trade contractors or otherwise establish that late 
completion was resultant of the CCM’s negligence. The test of professional conduct was 
established in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) and extended to other 
professionals who, like doctors, cannot guarantee successful operations. The test of what is 
reasonable skill and care is measured in terms of what any other reasonably competent 
professional would have done given similar circumstances; anything less may be deemed 
negligent (Monastiriotis and Bodnar, 2013). 
 
5.4.2 Procuring trade packages 
However, what is considered ‘reasonable’ of CCMs is yet to be fully tested in terms of scope 
and strictness. For example, Great Eastern Hotel Company Ltd v. John Laing Construction Ltd 
(2005), the first case involving a CMA (Keating Chambers, 2018), held that CCMs must avoid 
gaps when procuring sub-trades. The strict outcome has been compared with a contractor’s 
fitness-for-purpose warranty (O’Carroll, 2006). 
 
5.4.3 Duty to warn 
CCMs provide services like PMs, architects or engineers in representing their clients and 
administering projects. A key duty is keeping their client informed and protected from 
foreseeable risks, such as warning about the following: non-performance by others in the 
project team (Chesham Properties v. Bucknall Austin (1996)); tendering packages of 
substantially incomplete design (Plymouth & South West Co-operative Society Ltd v. 
Architecture, Structure & Management Ltd (2006)); recommending that clients obtain 
adequate insurances to cover potential damages sufficiently (William Tomkinson and Sons 
Ltd v. the Parochial Church Council of St Michael and Others (1990)); ensuring that 
contractors have adequate insurances in place (Pozzolanic Lytag Limited v. Bryan Hobson 
Associates (1999)); ensuring that the scope of works is not underestimated (Ralphs v. Francis 
Horner & Sons (1987)); budgeting for inflation costs (Nye Saunders and Partners v. Alan E. 
Bristow (1987)); advising about contractor reliability (Pratt v. George J Hill Associates (1987)); 
and serving notice on contractors in serious breach of their obligations to maintain progress 
(West Faulkner Associates v. London Borough of Newham (1995)). In doing so, they must act 
persuasively. It insufficient to act simply as a ‘postbox’ (Gould, 2011; Royal Brompton Hospital 
NHS Trust v. Hammond (2001)). 
 
The extent that PMs or CCMs should warn of design documentation problems is less clear. 
PMs should ensure that other team members satisfy their obligations. However, this may not 
extend to ensuring the correctness of their decisions (Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v. 
Hammond (2001)). Otherwise, PMs would effectively be doing everyone else’s work (Gould, 
2011). This indicates a lower-level duty to warn about detailed drawing matters than 
contractors, engineers or architects, who are likely more intimately involved in the drawings. 
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5.4.4 Application of CCM obligations 
Both contractors and consultants typically provide services in the first stage of 2S-ECI. Then, 
CCMs provide services through the construction stage, while head contractors adopt a strict 
liability for project outcomes when they enter fixed-price construction contracts. Contractors’ 
strict liability includes the work of their subcontractors and coordination and connectivity 
between trades, whereas CCMs may instruct individual trade contractors to manage 
connectivity, on the client’s behalf. Instructions for extra blocking, fixings, flashings and 
sealants may involve, say, three different subcontractors (carpentry, cladding and sealants). 
Table 1 summarises key comparisons. 
 
Scenario: a carpentry subcontractor is unlikely responsible for integration with the cladding 
system, instead relying on the head contractor’s methodology. For example, in Aurum 
Investments Limited v. Avonforce (in liquidation) [2001], a subcontractor was deemed not 
liable for a partial excavation collapse, because they could not know the design and build 
contractor’s method of work. CCMs could argue the inclusive-price principle against individual 
subcontractor claims, such as the carpentry contractor requesting details of fixings, although 
calling an instruction that details extra work a ‘variation for the contractor’s convenience’ could 
be a hard sell. The client may claim negligence of the CCM if they can demonstrate that the 
instruction resulted from the CCM failing to procure trade packages or that they failed to warn 
of foreseeable 
design problems, unlikely for a construction detail. 
 
Table 3: Summary comparison of head contractor and CCM obligations 
Obligation  Head contractor Consultant manager 
Construction   Absolute liability and fitness for purpose. 
NZ Building Amendment Act 2013 
stipulates reasonable standards of 
workmanship and fit for purpose materials 
for residential work.  
Reasonable skill and care for planning and 
managing construction work on behalf of the 
client who employs trade packages directly. 
(Section 5.4.1 - 2)  
Duty to warn  Duty through tort to warn of design 
compliance issues or cost increases after 
providing a budget. (Section 5.3.4)  
Test of foreseeability based on facts, and 
what any other reasonably competent 
similar contractor would have foreseen. 
(Section 5.3.4) 
ECI may influence foreseeability threshold 
in terms of time afforded and ECI team 
composition. (Section 5.3.4) 
Duty to warn of contractual risk and non-
performance by team members, taking 
reasonable skill and care. (Section 5.4.3) 
 
Procurement   Absolute liability for procuring all 
necessary work (inclusive price principle). 
(Section 5.3.1) 
Procure all works necessary without gaps, so far 
as not negligent. (Section 5.4.2) 
Time  Absolute liability.  
Client can charge liquidated or general 
damages for late completion except for 
extension of time grounds permitted in the 
contract. (Section 5.3.1) 
 
Client relies on consultant apportioning remedial 
work to individual trade packages or must 
demonstrate the defects are a consequence of 
the consultant’s negligence. (Section 5.4.4) 
Quality  Absolute liability. Contractor responsible 
for remedying defects at their expense. 
(Section 5.3.1) 
Contractor may request that instructed 
drawings will comply with the Building 
Client relies on consultant apportioning remedial 
work to individual trade-packages, or must 
demonstrate the defects are consequential of the 
consultant’s. (Section 5.4.4) 
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Code when building using reasonable 
levels of workmanship (Section 5.3.6) 
Cost  Held to fixed price, except for contractual 
compensation events, sufficiently different 
instructions, document ambiguities, or 
frustration. (Sections 5.3.1 – 5.2.5) 
Reasonable skill and care when providing a 
budget. (Section 5.4.1). Must warn of cost 




Contractor incurs absolute liability for 
instructions similar in nature. Contract 
administrator respond to claims for 
instructed drawings by enquiring what the 
contractor allowed within their fixed price 
to produce a fit for purpose product. 
(Section 5.3.1) 
Contractor may claim variation costs for 
instructions sufficiently beyond the original 
scope. (Section 5.3.2)  
Contractor may refuse instructions wholly 
different to the original scope or perform 
work outside contract rates (Section 5.3.2) 
Contractor may claim cost difference for 
ambiguities in drawings under contra 
proferentem. (section 5.2.5), but not the 
cost for removing incorrect materials if 
they reasonably ought to have warned in 
advance (5.4 and NZS3910:2013, 5.21.1) 
May enforce inclusive price principle to individual 
trade-packages, though does not adopt an 
overall absolute liability for connectivity like a 
head contractor. (Section 5.4.4) 
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Key considerations for determining whether instructed detailed drawings vary the contract 
under NZS 3910:2013 when instructed post contract signing were found to include the 
following. 
 
• Whether the detail is within what the contractor should have allowed for within their 
fixed price to compensate for any 
• lacking details, including works of both a temporary and a permanent nature (inclusive-
price principle and NZS 3910:2013, clause 5.1.1). 
• Whether the instruction details work that is different enough to constitute a contract 
variation or so wholly outside the original scope to be considered outside the contract 
itself. 
• Whether the drawing is issued at the contractor’s request to suit their construction 
methodology. Generally, contractors warrant buildability when offering fixed-price 
contracts for client-supplied designs. Such instructions may be issued as variations for 
the contractor’s convenience with no additional time or cost, although NZS 3910:2013 
treats reasonably unforeseeable latent conditions as variations (such as clause 5.13, 
‘Underground and above-ground utilities’, or clause 9.5, ‘Unforeseen physical 
conditions’). 
• Whether the instruction resolves problems that could have been mitigated had the 
contractor provided advanced notification (clause 5.21.1). Any resulting variation 
would be calculated on the basis that the contractor had warned where they reasonably 
ought to. 
 91 
• Whether the instruction resolves drawing ambiguities. The contractor may be paid the 
difference between two products on the basis of contra proferentem. NZS 3910:2013 
clause 2.7.4 treats reasonably unforeseeable ambiguities as variations. The threshold 
for foreseeability may be deemed higher where the contractor was involved in design 
development through ECI. 
 
 
Design buildability responsibilities were also considered for designers through case law and 
the New Zealand LBP scheme. While designers may have responsibilities for ensuring that 
their designs are sufficiently detailed to comply with the building code when built using 
reasonable levels of workmanship, this does not appear to change the commercial liabilities 
that contractors face when entering fixed-price construction contracts. 
 
Implied duties of contractors and CCMs were compared at common law. Both provide services 
in the first stage of 2S-ECI, taking reasonable skill and care. During the construction stage, 
CCMs continue to provide project management and administration services, whereas head 
contractors adopt a more absolute liability to deliver a defect-free product with single point 
responsibility for all work including that of subcontractors and including for connectivity. The 
benefit of single-point accountability should perhaps be balanced in terms of, for example, 
CCMs acting on behalf of their clients to reduce contractor claims rather than head contractors 
claiming against their clients. 
 
In the absence of an implied body of opinion, the actual scope of CCM obligations depends 
on the written service agreement. CMAs should carefully consider the scope of work, such as 
planning and procuring a comprehensive set of trade packages without gaps, administration 
and warning of contractual issues, such as cost increases and insurances, non-performance 
















































Chapter 6: 2S-ECI Contractual application in New 
Zealand 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explores the use of 2S-ECI in New Zealand. This is done by comparing two 
standard form pre-construction service agreements (PCSAs) published in the United Kingdom 
with two bespoke PCSAs used in New Zealand, plus gauging the perceptions from 
construction professionals working in New Zealand about how 2S-ECI is conducted and what 
is working well and what can be improved.  
 
The interviewees all had responsibility or knowledge of project procurement methods for 
projects in their region and typically had communication with other regions nationally, i.e., the 
purposive sample comprised of regional directors, general managers or senior consultants.  
 
The names of ECI contract documents vary. This study adopts the term PCSA for consistency. 
The PCSAs are analysed in terms of; obligations and liabilities, scope of services, price 
formation, payment and termination, and dispute resolution. Findings inform industry about 
contractual procedures and risks associated with 2S-ECI, and help toward drafting of improved 
2S-ECI documentation.  
 
Standard form PCSAs first appeared in 2011 when the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT, 2019) 
and the Institution of Civil Engineers in the United Kingdom released, and subsequently 
revised, standard form pre-construction contracts to support 2S-ECI. The NEC3 
supplementary ECI clause (NEC, 2018) supports NEC target value or cost reimbursement 
contracts, but not competitive fixed price contracts. The JCT Pre-Construction Services 
Agreement (General Contractor) (PCSA); and Pre-Construction Services Agreement 
(Specialist) (PCSA/SP) supplement JCT building works or design and build contracts. Again, 
the approaches of these two standard forms vary (cost reimbursement or target value versus 
fixed lump sum).  
 
The following conference paper has been accepted for publication based on this chapter: 
 
• Finnie D, Ameer Ali N, and Park K (2019, August) Improving 2-stage early contractor 
involvement: lessons from New Zealand. Paper accepted for the 22nd Pacific 
Association of Quantity Surveyors Congress, Kuching Sarawak, Malaysia. 
 
A further paper has been written and ready for submission to a conference or journal. This 
paper was accepted for the PAQS Congress in 2018, but was withdrawn in favour of pursuing 
a journal publication. 
 




6.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data was collected through 21 semi-structured with senior construction professionals to 
explore the contractual application of 2S-ECI in New Zealand and the perceived benefits, 
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project types suitable, challenges, and opportunities. A thematic analysis was done of the 
interview data. This was done manually using an MS Excel spreadsheet comparing interview 
responses. Specialist software was not required since one person interviewed all 21 
participants and recorded the interviews both using audio equipment and hand dictated. 
Findings were coded with a focus on how 2S-ECI is used in New Zealand and benefits, 
challenges and opportunities for improvement. Following is the interview process adopted. 
 
 
Figure 11: Interview process 
 
The purposive interview sample included five senior PQSs; seven senior management staff, 
one project management staff, and one senior QS of head contractors; one senior PM and 
one director of consultant PM firms; three senior staff of large client organizations; two 




Figure 12: Sample distribution by organisation 
 
All interviewees were in management or senior roles within their organisation, making them 
aware of the success or otherwise of projects procured through ECI. All had over 10 years’ 
experience in the construction industry and experience working on ECI projects. All the ECI 
projects involved commercial construction. The demographic spread included Dunedin, 
Queenstown and Auckland (see Figure 13). Most organizations had nationwide coverage, 
meaning interviewees had communications across other divisions. 
 
 
Figure13: Sample geographic distribution 
 
 
Interviews consisted of the following process: 
 
Contractor PQS Clients PM Architects









o the purpose of the interview,  
o why the participant has been chosen, and  
o the expected duration of the interview.  
 
Seek informed consent of the interviewee:  
o use the information sheet, 
o explanation of how the information is confidential, etc., 
o the use of note taking and/or the tape recorder, 
o written or documented oral consent. If the interviewee has consented, conduct the 
interview. 
 
The five-part interview framework consisted of 33 questions, and was adapted and modified 
from a study method used by Gameson and Sher (2009) and subsequently refined after pilot 
interviews. See Appendix 1. Each interview took between approximately one and three hours. 
 
• Section 1: General Questions. Collects general information about the interviewee 
(name, company, role, years of experience) [4 questions]  
• Section 2: Background Information. Collects data about participants’ experience 
with ECI (number of ECI projects, value range, and type) [3 questions] 
• Section 3: Case Study Project Information. Collects data relating to a typical 
facility (facility type, complexity, location, cost, time scale, head contractor or 
consultant, reason for ECI) [7 questions] 
• Section 4: Contractual Issues. Collected data relating to specific contractual 
parameters (timing of contractor involvement, scope of pre-construction services, 
services by client’s PM, formation of contractor pricing, whether contractor paid for 
ECI, form of construction contract price, contractual documentation used and key 
ingredients, risk considerations, lessons learnt) [14 questions] 
• Section 5: Perceptions. Collects data about participants’ overall perceptions of ECI 
(Effect on pricing, timing, quality, clarity of risk, composition of the project team, 
project features suitable for ECI, main barriers and opportunities to improve ECI. [5 
questions] 
 
The following ECI contract documents were compared: 
 
• Contract type A: JCT Pre-Construction Services Agreement,  
• Contract type B: NEC ECI Clause 
• Contract types C and D: pre-construction agreements used by New Zealand public 
employers (both anonymized) 
• Document E: Request for Proposal Early Contractor Involvement used for a tertiary 
education project 
 
A matrix was developed to compare key contract provisions. The content was coded into the 
following key contractual parameters. Each is examined under the following sections by 
incorporating industry perceptions with the contractual terms. 
o Project suitability for 2S-ECI 
o Contract type 
o Scope of pre-construction services 
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o Governing law 
o Project team, composition, communication and cooperation 
o Services liability and design obligations  
o Planning and risk management 
o Insurances 
o Intellectual property and confidentiality 
o Retaining key personnel and assignment 
o Client obligations 
o Price formation and payment 
o Timing of contractor involvement 
o Termination and suspension and whether payment for early involvement  
o Disputes 
 
6.3 PROJECT SUITABILITY FOR 2S-ECI 
Each interviewee described the features of a typical 2S-ECI project they worked on. Twelve 
projects involved alterations or extensions to existing buildings, often maintaining client 
operations. Two projects involved new buildings with substantial site constraints, such as 
neighbouring historic buildings and complex traffic management. Three involved large 
complex new buildings. (The total number of projects is less than number of interviewees 
because some interviewees worked on the same projects.)  
 
Interviewees generally identified four key drivers for 2S-ECI project suitability:  
(i) Projects involving planning logistics around existing operations (all interviewees);  
(ii) 2S-ECI as a means of open-book negotiation to support client/contractor 
relationships, or to secure resources in heated markets (all clients, PMs, architects 
and contractors, and 4 PQSs);  
(iii) Complex design solutions benefiting from contractor input (All PMs, architects and 
clients, 4 PQSs, and 4 contractors), and;  
(iv) Projects requiring fast-tracking (3 contractors, 3 PQSs, and one architect).  
 
These project features can overlap. Clients may employ a preferred contractor who develops 
knowledge of their operations to support future logistical planning and buildability input, 
supporting continuous improvement through lessons learnt (Song, et al, 2009). Securing the 
most reliable contractor may mitigate the risk of disruption, which could far outweigh any 
potential premium paid for early involvement (1 PQS, 1 architect, and 1 contractor). According 
to one PM: 
 
ECI can provide a means of negotiating contracts to maintain client and contractor 
relationships and to retain the knowledge of head contractors and specialist 
subcontractors, e.g., alterations to an existing hospital. 
 
A contractor benefit associated with 2S-ECI is securing ongoing client relationships (Rahman 
and Alhassan, 2012; Song, et al., 2006). This is exemplified by the seven contractors who 
typically do not charge for early involvement. According to one PQS: 
 
Head contractors have not charged for early involvement in my experience. The 
Dunedin construction market is largely based more on ongoing relationships. 
Contractors are incentivized by securing profit through the construction contract, and 
 98 
the prospect of future work with the same client or consultants. Once appointed for 
ECI, the contractor has a very strong chance of being awarded the construction 
contract. 
 
According to two PQSs, the primary driver for 2S-ECI in Auckland is securing resources in the 
heated construction market, where there would otherwise be a lack of contractor appetite (and 
therefore high cost) for competitive tendering. 
 
6.4 CONTRACT TYPE 
The majority of interviewees felt that 2S-ECI could be improved through development of a 
standard form PCSA (60% across disciplines). Over half thought 2S-ECI could be improved 
through clearer obligations, and one thought guidelines for clients would be helpful. The 
recommendations for a standard form PCSA aligns with the benefits of standard form 
contracts identified by (Sharkey et a., 2014; Cunningham, 2013; Ashworth, 2012; Whitehead, 
2009; Ramus et al., 2006; Richards, et al., 2005; Bajari Tadelis, 2001). One client developed 
their own PCSA contract and another client was in the early stages of developing one. Sixteen 
Interviewees (mix of disciplines) described pre-construction agreements being typically based 
on either oral agreements or invitation letters. Five interviewees described large clients 
developing their own pre-construction documentation. One PQS interviewee provided that in 
Auckland sometimes: 
 
Educated clients who have being doing ECI and 2 Stage for a few years like [names 
omitted] have either a solid Pre-Construction Services Agreement with solid KPI’s or 
a Stage 1 Contract in Place ahead of the ECI phase to Stage 2 trade tendering (or 
Stage 3 and 4 and 5!). 
 
Another PQS described a ‘complicated’ client prepared PCSA on a $15 million NZD project 
where ‘no one knew how to handle it’. One complication was integrating the head contractor’s 
ECI contract (and fixed ECI fee) with the construction contract across multiple project stages. 
The client sent the PCSA back to their lawyers, resulting in contractual delay. Inevitably, one 
stage became a contract variation. Five interviewees (all disciplines) felt that ECI 
documentation needs to be flexible in order to accommodate project variables. This aligns with 
recommendations by Turner and Riding (2015).  
 
The lack of clear definition of 2S-ECI (or ECI) and associated contractual documentation was 
an area of concern. In the absence of clear contractual procedures, one architect warned 
(similarly to Murdoch and Hughes, 2008, p74) that 2S-ECI could simply be a marketing ‘buzz-
word’ to describe a process for negotiating construction contracts rather than a genuine 
process to add value. Seventeen interviewees (across disciplines) felt that 2S-ECI could be 
improved with clearer pre-construction agreements, in particular to set out the scope of pre-
construction services and expected obligations of parties. Ten interviewees specifically 
recommended developing a New Zealand standard form pre-construction services agreement 
(PCSA). For clients and consultants looking to use 2S-ECI for the first time, there seems no 
clear avenue for processes or contract documentation, leaving parties to ‘feel their way’, 




Lack of clear procedures can mean that client’s expectations are not met, and parties’ 





No standard ECI documentation. Typical documentation comprises an invitation to 
treat, offer and acceptance. Sometime invitation can be very brief.  Tend to ‘feel our 









No standardised documentation for ECI. Client prepared a complicated ECI contract, 
and ‘no one knew how to handle it.’ 
 
In the absence of clear contract provisions and measurable outcomes, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that 17 interviewees (across disciplines) perceived client and consultant attitudes 
towards 2S-ECI as a barrier to its uptake, with some recommending further education in this 
area. This supports earlier findings (Turner and Riding, 2015; Pheng, et al., 2015; Mosey, 
2011; Whitehead, 2009). 
 
PCSAs should consider construction stage provisions, such as completion dates and 
liquidated damages, and whether construction-only or novated design and build. One PM 
interviewee described the difficulty in negotiating LDs after the contractor was already involved 
in ECI. For example, Doc D (4.4) states that the construction contract completely supersedes 
the pre-construction agreement, and contains no provision for LDs. Regardless of their roles 
and types of organisation, 90% of respondents said that the construction-stage contracts were 
typically for construction only. Only one contractor described a target-value novated design 
and build contract. This contrasts findings by Francis and Kiroff (2015) that design and build 
is the most preferred form of ECI in the Auckland commercial market.  
 
Interestingly, the RFP (Doc E) requires tenderers to provide a construction programme which, 
once agreed ‘will become a Contract Document.’ (Clause 3.11). This is problematic because 
if the client or their consultant’s actions result in changes to the contractor’s methods or 
sequence of works, this may result in a contract variation (Thomas and Wright, 2011). This 
highlights the advantages of a standard form PCSA readily available for clients and their 
consultants to adapt and use for their projects.  
 
Document lengths vary considerable, from 14 to 43 pages. The JCT PCSA has 32 pages with 
15 pages of standard terms, while the NEC ECI Clause has 14 pages with three pages of 
standard terms. Being a RFP, Document E contains provisions for tender communication 
(1.3), submitting the proposal (1.4), validity period (1.6), tender timeline (1.2), scope of 
services and project staging (2.3), preliminary development programme (2.5), tender 
information required (Section 3), and tender evaluation approach (Section 5). These 
provisions have not been included in the tabulated analysis above, as this would form 
additional separate documentation used with the other ECI contracts.  
 
 
Table 4: Document type and length 
Code Title Length Construction contract 
Doc A:  JCT PCSA 32 pages ·         for the supply of pre-construction services by a 
Contractor selected under two-stage tendering 
procedure; and 
·         where the main contract is to be the JCT 
Standard Building Contract, Design and Build 
Contract, Major Project Construction Contract, 
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Intermediate Building Contract or Intermediate 
Building Contract with contractor’s design, 2016 
Edition: 
Doc B:  NEC ECI Clause 14 pages NEC contract options C (target contract with activity 
schedule) and E (cost reimbursable contract) 
Doc C:  Preferred Contractor 
Contract 
43 pages Construction Works Contact (Schedule 5) ‘refer to 
attached draft Construction Works Contracts’. 
Doc D:  Preconstruction 
Services Agreement 
16 pages 4.2 ‘The terms of the Construction Contract shall be 
substantially those attached as the first schedule to 
the RFT.’ 
4.4 ‘The Construction Contract shall, if entered into, 
supersede this agreement. Upon entering into the 
Construction Contract, the Parties shall cease to have 
any powers, duties, rights, obligations or 
responsibilities under this agreement, whether 
accrued or otherwise, and the Construction Contract 
shall constitute the entire agreement between the 
Parties relating to the subject matter of this 
agreement.’ 
Doc E:  Request for Proposal 
Main Contractor Early 
Involvement 
35 pages 3.8 Form of Contract: NZS3910:2013 and listed 




The JCT PCSA and Doc provide for varying the contract. The JCT PCSA enables the client to 
instruct scope changes, and requires the contractor to promptly notify the effect of the 
instruction before proceeding, for agreement with the client. Doc C provides that costs for 
additional services are agreed. Either party may request a variation to the terms of the 
construction contract, and non-agreement is a grounds to dissolve the pre-construction 
contract. Doc E restricts the contractor from adjusting their management fee for any variations 
during construction. The contractor could still claim for the construction costs. It should be 
clear whether this term overrides NZS3910 provisions for valuing on and off-site overheads 
for variations.  Doc B and D are silent, leaving the parties to agree any changes.  
 
6.5 SCOPE OF CONTRACTOR PRE-CONSTRUCTION SERVICES  
The scope of pre-construction services varies across the ECI documents (Table 4). Based on 
interview findings, contractors typically provide; planning and sequencing, buildability advice, 
value management input, procurement of subcontractors and suppliers. Risk management 
was often provided in the context of logistical planning and design buildability.  
 
One third of interviewees (six contractors and one PQS) said 2S-ECI could be improved by 
providing a clearer scope of services.  Two contractors said a checklist of pre-construction 
services might be helpful to clarify the scope of services. None of the documents analysed 
provide a clear schedule of pre-construction services to choose from. Most services are 
specified throughout the standard terms or left for parties to specify themselves. 
 
Four interviewees (two PQSs, one contractor and one client) recommended including clear 
milestones for pre-construction deliverables. This aligns with Kings College (2014) 
recommendation for pre-construction milestones. The JCT PCSA (2.7.1) and Doc D (3.2.6 
and 4.1) specify by when the contractor must submit their construction offer.  
 
The scope of pre-construction services is compared across the documents in Table 5. The 
left-hand column represents pre-construction services identified from the literature review. 
This shows that scope of ECI contracts and literature generally align. 
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Doc C Doc D Doc E (RFP) 
Design 
management 
Tzortzopoulos and Cooper 
(2007); Sidwell (1983) 
     
Stakeholder 
management 
Tzortzopoulos and Cooper 
(2007); Mosey (2009); 







Schedule 1 7.2  
Buildability 
advice 
Turner and Riding (2015); 
Laryea and Watermeyer, 
(2016); Pheng, Gao and 
Lin (2015); Rahman and 
Alhassan (2012); Mosey, 
(2011); Rahmani, Khalfan 
and Maqsood (2014); 
Whitehead (2009); Song, 
et al. (2006); Jergeas and 
Put (2001); Sidwell (1983) 
Annex B  Schedule 1 Verify buildability 




and advice (2.2) 
Advance 
warning  
 2.2   3.2.9  













El-sayegh (2009); Mosey 
(2009); Kashiwagi, 
Kashiwagi and Savicky 
(2009); Sidwell (1983) 







Rahman and Alhassan 
(2012); Mosey (2009); 
Education.govt.nz (2017); 
Jergeas and Put (2001); 
Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi and 
Savicky (2009) 








Turner and Riding (2015); 
Mosey (2011); Kirkham 
(2007); Whitehead (2009); 
Jergeas and Put (2001); 
Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi and 
Savicky (2009) 










effect on cost 
and time (3.1 
– 3.7) 
Schedule 1 Optimise design in 










Whitehead (2009); Mosey 
(2009) ; Sidwell (1983) 
Annex B  14-22, 30 - 39 
 






Turner and Riding (2015); 
Kirkham (2007); Laryea 
(2010); Sidwell (1983) 
Annex B Prepare 
regular 
forecasts of 
stage 1 and 
total costs 
Cost estimates 


















None of the PCSAs analysed included design management as a service by the contractor. 
Although the NEC ECI Clause provides for the contractor to make design proposals (for use 
with the NEC design and build contract).  
 
Projects involving procurement of pre-fabricated modules from overseas require early design 
planning in order to demonstrate compliance with the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) 
and obtain a building consent from local authorities. Local authorities in New Zealand have no 
jurisdiction outside New Zealand.  
 
The scope of pre-construction services identified from literature was presented to at the 
Modular Construction and Pre-Fabrication Conference in Auckland, New Zealand, in 
December 2017. The following pre-construction services were suggested during the 
feedback session: 
 
• liaising with local authorities to obtain compliance for prefabricated components 
• coordinating documentation for building information modelling (BIM). 
 
Doc’s B and C provide for the contractor to obtain approvals and consents, and liaise with 
local authorities, adjacent landowners and service provides respectively. Doc D (3.2.10) 
provides for any other reasonably requested services, and prohibits the contractor to bind the 
client to third parties. The JCT PCSA (Annex B) Particulars section contains an option to 
specify a BIM Protocol.  
 
6.6 QUALITY OF PRE-CONSTRUCTION SERVICES 
Most interviewees (across disciplines) saw benefits in the early collaboration of 2S-ECI. 
However, 11 interviewees perceived a lack of pre-construction skills as a barrier to achieving 
real added value. Fourteen Interviewees (all disciplines) identified upskilling in pre-
construction services as a way to improve 2S-ECI. Specific skills identified include VM, design 
buildability evaluation, and design coordination. Tables 6 and 7 exemplify the comments 
relating to contractors and then consultants.  
 
Table 6: Pre-construction services by contractors 
Contractor services Comments 
Lack of ECI maturity  Theoretically 2S-ECI should reduce claims and disputes. However, in 
practice many contractors don’t understand the ECI process.  The lack 
of contractor maturity with ECI means you don’t get the benefits. 
(Contractor) 
 
Lack of understanding  In practice, the full benefits may not always be realised. Some 
contractors may not properly understand the ECI process and the 
different approach needed. (Contractor) 
 
Real added value added  Theoretically, ECI should reduce administration and disputes, but this 








The contractors ECI advice is often then about how to de-risk it for the 
contractor and make it easier and simpler to build.  Need specialist ECI 
skills (buildability and genuine value management) – absolutely without 
them no genuine ECI. (PQS) 
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The theoretical benefits of ECI may not be realised if the contractor 




Table 7: Pre-construction services by consultants 
Consultant services Comments 
Need more accountability 
for design coordination  
Designers need more accountability for design coordination to reduce 
document inconsistencies and ambiguities. (Client) 
 
Questionable design 
coordination capability of 
designers. ECI could help  
Questionable whether designers are able to coordinate design 
development effectively. Most failings seem to occur here. ECI may 
help if contractors can provide these skills. People able to coordinate 
designs well are ‘worth their weight in gold.’ (Client) 
 





Need resource (across all sides of the table), specifically more skilled 
design managers (many projects don’t have them), more experienced 
site managers giving advice who know how to build (and not fresh 
faced “paper” PM’s out of school). (PQS) 
 
Lack of design 
management capacity 






NZ contractors lack the capacity to manage the design of very large 
projects. There appears to be a growing problem of designers trying to 
transfer more risk to contractors and contractors wanting more design 
work provided for them. Transferring excessive risk to contractors can 
either increase the project cost (as contractor’s price for the risk) or 
create major problems as the contractor incurs large losses. (PM) 
 
Performance-based specifications are being used to transfer more 
design risk to contractors. Over the past 5-10 years, the quality of 
design documentation has reduced. We’re looking at employing our 
own architect. (Contractor) 
 
Diminishing role of the 
Architect with introduction 
of PMs  
 
The architect’s role has been diminished by the introduction of 
consultant PMs and franchise house builders. (Architect in Dunedin) 
 
There is often no longer a lead architect. This can create more design 
coordination issues. (Contractor) 
 
Inclusion of 
subcontractors for design 
and coordination  
Successfully, we are often looking at the bits we need to solve via ECI 
and then actually doing it without the main builder by engaging with the 
sub-contracting market (“subbie ECI”). Facades, Steel, Lifts, Piling are 
some of these. We had a façade contractor in the design team meetings 
before concept design had even been drawn on one job. The fully 
coordinated fully shop drawn steel and façade drawings are proving a 
massive benefit. (PQS) 
 
 
The move away from architect led designs, and questions around design management support 
earlier findings that Architects can feel intruded on when design management is performed by 
another party (Tzortzopoulos and Cooper, 2007; RIBA, 2007; Bresnen, 1991) and that 
architects can struggle to find their place (Whitehead, 2009).  
 
Some contractors are developing their pre-construction services. One contractor employed a 
services manager in one division to evaluate building services designs, and a contractor was 
looking to employ an architect as part of their ECI team to address the declining quality in 
design documentation. This aligns with United Kingdom construction companies investing in 
design capabilities for strategic importance and to reduce design related risks (Tzortzopoulos 
and Cooper, 2007, p20). Similarly, Khalfan and McDermott (2007) described a United 
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Kingdom construction company who developed a pre-construction department for project 
management, financial and productivity issues at inception phases of projects.  
 
There was no evidence of New Zealand contractors being engaged separately for the pre-
construction stage, with the construction stage tendered to others. Indeed, five interviewees 
(across disciplines) highlighted the advantage of communicating pre-construction thinking 
across construction-stage site teams and potential involvement of site managers in the 
contractor’s ECI team.  
 
2S-ECI is a relational procurement strategy. The focus is on employing reliable constructors. 
When the priority of contractor selection is based on the bid price, Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
(2005, p370) argue that contractors may ‘desperately lower their bids to win a contract and 
‘cut corners’ during project execution to recover their money. This frequently leads to conflicts 
and distorts the relationships.’ Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2005) found a combination of 
hard and soft skills was seen as important for the parties, with ‘mutual trust’ in the top of the 
list for ‘building a successful relational contract’ (p367). Almost all 25 interviewees (expert local 
Hong Kong consultants and contractors) felt that lowest price bidding does not assist industry 
development and often results in problems on projects. Interviewees suggested that clients 
should focus on value for money and select parties based on capacity and capability in terms 
of ‘resources; technology and safety; managerial and operational capabilities; and motivation/ 
commitment in terms of teamworking, joint problem-solving and so on’ (p367). Ma and Xin 
(2011, p82) provide the following contractor selection criteria for first-stage of 2S-ECI in 
Australian infrastructure projects: 
• Experience in similar works 
• Management team qualities 
• Appreciation of and approach to tasks 
• Financial viability and insurance 
Document E (RFP document) Section 3: What we require specifies the following tenderer 
attributes: 
 
• Capability (3.2) in delivering the type project, including what percentage of work will 
be done by the tenderer’s own work-force;  
• Proposed Team (3.3), including names, qualifications and experience, roles in the 
project, whether a full-time or part-time employee, experience specifically relevant to 
the project, and their primary location;  
• Team Structure and Availability (3.4) showing how the proposed team will interact 
on the project, and a resource schedule showing the involvement of each member; 
• Sustainability (3.5) systems, procedures and commitment to environmental 
sustainability, both organisational and project specific capability;  
• Knowledge Sharing and Transfer (3.6) outline opportunities to maximise 
involvement with students (educational project);  
• Price (3.7) fixed fee or percentage fee, and include a ‘fixed disbursement fee for all 
local travel to Dunedin as required for the duration of the project, general project 
printing and communications.’ 
• Form of Contract (3.8) details the type of construction contract and lists contract 
documents. The successful tenderer must provide a bond and will be subject to 
liquidated damages; 
• Supply Chain (3.9) commitment that the tenderer will obtain three competitive prices 
for key subcontract trades; 
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• Programme (3.11) tenderers are required to provide a detailed construction delivery 
programme, which will form the basis of the Comprehensive Construction 
Programme; 
• Preliminaries and General (3.12) price to include a Lump Sum Preliminaries and 
General price for the project 
• Pre-Construction Costs (3.13) ‘Tenderers are to submit a Lump Sum Pre-
Construction Services price for the Pre-Construction Services’; 
• Contractor’s Margin (3.14) Tenderers to declare a percentage margin, to be used to 
establish the fixed lump sum across all procurement stages; 
• Tender Pre-Conditions (3.15) confirmation of professional indemnity insurance, 
ability to start the project immediately upon being awarded the contract, confirmation 
of the form of contract listed in 3.8, confirmation of supply chain required listed in 3.9, 
and completion and execution of the tender declaration form in Appendix 1.  
 
The above requirements align with the contractor selection criteria suggested by Ma and Xin 
(2011, p82); experience in similar works (3.3 and 3.4), management team qualities (3.3 and 
3.4), appreciation of and approach to tasks (3.5 and3.6), and financial viability and insurance 
(3.15). However, there is no specific evidence of ‘motivation/ commitment in terms of 
teamworking, joint problem-solving and so on’ as suggested by Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
(2005). 
 
6.7 SCOPE OF PROJECT MANAGER SERVICES 
Interviewees identified the following services typically provided by clients’ PMs: 
 
• Procurement strategy; 
• Overall project programme; 
• Chair design team meetings and record minutes; 
• Contract administration by PM or Architect; 
• Generally, act as client representative. 
 
The PM’s role may be focused at the front-end of the project. If the head contractor becomes 
involved once concept design is developed, stakeholder management and developing the 
design brief must be done by the client’s project manager or architect. The remainder could 
be specified for the contractor. Contract administration may then be done by the PM, the 
architect, or a combination of both. One contractor described how some projects could 
potentially transition to a more traditional architect or engineer model for the construction 
stage.  
 
PM involvement is in the inception and conception stages. Once the construction stage 
commences, their services may reduce (as the contract effectively becomes a 
traditional construction contract following early collaborative planning), depending on 
the scale of the project. 
 
A PQS described the potential for duplication in administration: 
 
Contract administration may be by PM or Architect or Engineer. When PM is the 
contract administrator, the architect becomes a non-contractual administrator, e.g., 
provides architect directions for approval and issue by the PM (like other consultants). 
This can add another layer of complexity and timing. 
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One architect and two contractors described architects project managing and chairing design 
team meetings, with the PM acting as client representative.  
 
A key advantage of PMs over architects appears to be challenging the design. However, some 
interviewees raised concerns over PM performance. According to one architect: ‘Some add 
real value while others tend to “clip the ticket”’, a contractor said ‘Sometimes PMs can tend to 
act as letterboxes’, and a client said they have ‘sometimes struggled with performance of local 
PMs. More recently we are seeing larger PM consultants from outside local area that perform 
well coming into the local market.’ The potential variance in PM performance aligns with Gould 
(2011) who described project management as an emerging discipline, and identified the need 
for PMs to act persuasively in conducting their central role of client representation, and not 
merely act as a ‘post box’. 
 
6.8 GOVERNING LAW 
The JCT PCSA is governed by English law, the NEC ECI Clause is for use ‘in any location’, 
and Docs C and D are governed by the New Zealand law and the non-exclusive jurisdiction of 
the High Court of New Zealand. Interestingly while Docs C and D refer to ‘non-exclusive 
jurisdiction’ of New Zealand Courts, Document E refers to ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ as copied 
from the government’s standard RFP process, terms and conditions. If the JCT PCSA were to 
be adapted and modified to suit New Zealand, it would require the amendments shown in 
Table 8.  
 
Table 8: JCT PCSA adaptions to New Zealand law 
JCT PCSA reference to UK legislation Clause 
Governed by the law of England 1.5 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1.3 
Material recommendations in accordance with Good Practice in the 
Selection of Construction Materials (British Council for Offices) 
2.4 
Joint Fire Code 2.5 
CDM Regulations 3.1 
VAT Tax 6.1 
‘…insurers that have a place in the United Kingdom’ 7.1 
UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) 8.3 
UK Public Contracts Act 10.5, 10.6, 10.8 
 
6.9 PROJECT TEAM, COMPOSITION, COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION 
Over 60% of interviewees (across all disciplines) thought ECI can improve relationships, and 
almost half thought ECI requires quality relationships, in particular trust. This aligns with 
literature that team work is a key driver of successful relational procurement (Kings College, 
2014; Ma and Xin, 2011; Rahman and Kumaraswamy; 2005). 
 
While English law has struggled to define ‘good faith’ as a legal concept, Harvey (2018) 
asserts that 2S-ECI provides a procurement pathway analogous with ‘good faith’, but requires 
clear express for co-operation in terms of; disclosure of information, open-book aligning of 
commercial interests, collective risk management and a duty to warn.  
 
The JCT PCSA and New Zealand contracts contain provisions for cooperation and information 
sharing. The New Zealand contracts also require ‘no surprises’ or ‘prompt problem-solving’. 
 107 
Unlike the other contracts, Doc C’s partnering philosophy is expressly not given contractual 
effect, which seems at odds with Harvey (2018) recommendation for clear express contract 
terms. Doc E (a RFP document) requires the client to act fairly and reasonably in dealing with 
tenderer, as copied from the government’s standard RFP process terms. However it contains 
no provisions for the contractor appointment during the pre-construction stage. 
 
Table 9: Communication and cooperation 
Code Title Communication Cooperation 
Doc A:  JCT PCSA Notices and other 
communication (1.4) 
Co-operation and supply of information 
(2.3) 
Doc B:  NEC ECI Clause No provision No provision 




Attend all appropriate meetings (12.3) 
Liaison with the Project Consultancy 
Team (14) 
Partnering 
Partnering philosophy (100) 
Partnering obligations (101) 
Partnering in the contract (102, 103) 
Doc D:  Preconstruction 
Services Agreement 
No provision Project objectives (2.1) 
Attend and report at weekly (or more 
frequently if requested) meetings (3.2.7 
and 3.2.8) 
Doc E:  Request for Proposal 





Section 6: RFP Process, terms and 
conditions 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
All PCSAs were between the client or their representative (e.g., a project manager) and the 
contractor. Terminology varies. The JCT PCSA uses Employer and a Contractor. The NEC 
Clause refers to a Project Manager, Employer, Employer’s Agent, Principal Designer and 
Contractor. The New Zealand contracts uses Principal and a Contractor.  
 
Most interviewees thought 2S-ECI team composition is generally the same as for traditional 
procurement, except that 2S-ECI typically involves a PQS and contractors providing more 
resource. Six interviewees (across disciplines) described contractors generally providing more 
leadership through 2S-ECI through involving their project managers, site managers and senior 
staff during design development, compared with estimators pricing tender bids. One contractor 
explained: 
 
The expectation is a head contractor appointed through negotiated ECI should provide 
the top team, top programme, top quality, and top safety.                                                                                                               
Contractor’s Site Manager can be involved in the design team meetings. This provides 
better integration between the contractor’s estimating and onsite construction teams.  
An astute contractor with their Site Manager can work with the design team to 
determine construction detail requirements. 
 
The majority of interviewees (14 across disciplines) felt that a PQS was needed for 
independent budget advice and to negotiate contractor rates. This aligns with the New Zealand 
Transport Agency (2018) and Ma and Xin (2011). However three contractors contextualized 
the need for a PQS as dependent on such factors as trust levels between contractor and client, 
the PQS fee relative to the likely benefit of negotiation, and the level of design standardization. 
One contractor described some experienced clients accepting their take-offs without engaging 
a PQS, being comfortable that the contractor provided their open-book workings.  
 
All interviewees felt that 2S-ECI can improve design decisions through faster round-the-table 
decision-making. Most identified trust as crucial for successful 2S-ECI, supporting findings 
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that trust is a central ingredient of relational procurement (Rahman and Alhassan; 2012; Ross, 
2011; Toolanen, 2008; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005). 
 
Three interviewees specifically felt that 2S-ECI can improve levels of trust, though only one 
contractor described specific partnering workshops. Five interviewees said that the quality of 
people were important. According to a PQS trust must operate both ways: 
 
ECI requires trust. There is no sense being too precious about information. Contractors 
cannot conceal information, and the PQS may discuss budget information to the head 
contractor before negotiating the rates. Quality of relationships is paramount to the 
effectiveness of ECI.                          
 
This supports finding by Rahman and Alhassan (2012, p218) that ECI requires ‘open book 
accounting, and open and honest communication between client, consultant and contractor, 
including sharing any sensitive information....’ 
 
Another PQS linked relationship-building with better forward planning: 
 
ECI enabled the contractor to get to know the client and their operations: We were 
‘able to build relationships between client and contractor.’ This helped ‘everyone know 
what was going to happen.’                                                                              
 
It is important for contractors to understand their client and their operations when planning the 
logistics of construction work around ongoing building operations, a project feature identified 
as particularly suited to 2S-ECI. One contractor suggested 2S-ECI could be improved through 
more active client involvement, supporting (Kings College London, 2014; Ma and Xin, 2011; 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy; 2005). 
 
6.10 SERVICES LIABILITY AND DESIGN OBLIGATIONS: 
As discussed, contractors incur an absolute fitness for purpose obligation to produce a product 
as designed, similar to manufacturers (Burrows, Finn and Todd, 2012). However, through ECI, 
the contractor the contractor initially provides pre-construction services, similar to a consultant. 
Accordingly, the JCT PCSA and the New Zealand contracts (C and D) require reasonable skill 
and care, and diligence. The JCT PCSA and Doc D add …of a contractor providing services 
on similar projects. The NEC ECI Insurance clause requires the contractor to insure against 
claims arising out of failure to ‘use the skill and care normally used by professionals providing 
services similar to those required in the Works Information.’  
 
Construction contracts, such as NZS3910:2013 and NZIA SCC, reduce the contractor’s 
design liability to that of reasonable skill and care. However, this does not address the 
contractor’s liability for providing design buildability and value management advice. Only the 
JCT PCSA addresses the contractor’s obligation for design. Clause 2.8 exempts the contract 
from any design contributions (except injury or death) until the construction contract is agreed, 
and those terms then apply.  
 
JCT PCSA  
 
Liability for design work 
2.8 Where the Pre-Construction Services include design work, the Contractor shall 
unless otherwise specifically provide in Annex B have no liability of any kind to the 
Employer under this Agreement for that design work, whether in contract, negligence, 
breach of duty or otherwise (other than any personal injury or death arising from that 
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work), unless and until the Main Contract is entered into by the Parties, upon entry into 
which the Contractor’s obligations and liability in respect of that design work shall be 
the same as if it formed part of the design work undertaken by him under the Main 
Contract and shall be subject to any relevant exclusions or limitations of liability 
contained in that contract.  
 
A contractor interviewee who described recommending an alternative basement design to 
avoid potential leaking highlights this distinction. The alternative was accepted and the 
contractor assumed that the architect and engineer adopted liability for the design and 
therefore saw no need for professional indemnity insurance. However, the contractor was 
threatened with legal action when the basement incurred minor leaking on the basis that the 
construction contract included a weather-tightness guarantee. One PM also said that ‘in ECI 
– Contractors are worried that, by providing design input, they may be taking on design risk.’  
 
The majority of interviewees described the client’s PM chairing the design team meetings 
(managing the design process). Murdoch and Hughes (2008) describe design management 
as a separate but not mutually exclusive function of architects that may be done by a separate 
manager. Only two interviewees described an architect leading design management, and one 
contractor described managing design on a novated design and build project.  
 
With conceptual design typically done before contractor involvement, unsurprisingly, the 
contractor’s duties more typically involved buildability evaluation, services coordination and 
providing detailed input building information modelling (BIM). This is supported by the ECI 
contracts, none of which contained design management as a pre-construction service, 
focusing more on design buildability and value management (though the NEC ECI Clause 
provides for the contractor design proposals, supporting the NEC design and build contract).  
 
Design management and coordination were areas highlighted for improvement in 2S-ECI by 
almost half the interviewees across disciplines. Two of the three clients recommended better 
design coordination skills. One PQS interviewee recommended more skilled design 
managers, saying ‘many projects don’t have them and a Contractor sited problems with design 
coordination with the diminution of lead architects and recommended projects have a lead 
design consultant. A PM questioned whether any New Zealand contractors are capable of 
design management on very large projects, supporting Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007) who 
found contractors often lack design management skills. However, one client interviewee 
questioned whether designers are able to coordinate design development effectively and 
thought ECI may help if contractors can provide these skills, asserting that people able to 
coordinate designs are “worth their weight in gold.” Some head contractors appear to be 
seeing the opportunity to specialize, with two contractors now providing specialist building 
services managers as part of their ECI teams, and another contractor looking to employ an 
architect as part of their ECI team.  
 
The JCT PCSA and Docs C and D contain provisions restricting assignment. The JCT PCSA 
requires both the client and contractor to obtain the written consent of the other before any 
assignment. Doc C and D require the contractor to obtain consent from the client, though Doc 
C allows the client to ‘do so at any time without requiring the consent of the Contractor.’ (16).   
 
6.11 PLANNING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
The JCT PCSA (2.3.1) requires the Contractor to supply re-construction services information 
in accordance with the programme. This aligns with Kings College (2014 p11) 
recommendation for an agreed pre-construction programme with milestones for providing 
information, particularly when BIM is used. 
 110 
 
The majority of interviewees, (67% across all disciplines) thought 2S-ECI can improve risk 
management. One contractor interviewee thought single stage procurement may provide 
clearer risk allocation, but not so well managed. A key theme was that ECI provides more time 
to understand the project. Another contractor said that in single-stage procurement, 
contractors have only weeks to submit their tender for a project with hundreds of drawings. 
Another contractor said that this could lead to pricing assumptions. This aligns with literature 
that identifies fair risk allocation as a key feature of relational procurement (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2005) and that ECI can enable parties to identify and manage risks more 
collaboratively, reducing costly pricing assumptions (Mosey, 2011). The New Zealand 
contracts (C and D) require the contractor to participate in risk management workshops.  
 
There appears a lack of clarity around the extent that early-involvement contractually affects 
the contractor’s ability to claim variations throughout construction. Over 60% of interviewees 
(across all disciplines) thought overall ECI should theoretically reduce the quantum of variation 
claims, however that in reality this depends on factors such as contractors understanding the 
ECI process (one PM and three contractors), completeness and quality of documentation (PM, 
Architect, contractor, and two clients) and clarity of ECI contract documents (PQS). Under the 
legal rule of interpretation - contra proferentem - ambiguities in contract documents err against 
the author. Potentially contractors’ ability to foresee and mitigate issues may improve through 
2S-ECI. Regardless of their disciplines, almost 40% of interviewees perceived a moral 
expectation on contractors not to claim for minor design issues after being involved through 
ECI. However, the contractual affect was less clear. One client thought that a contractor’s 
early involvement might contractually influence the extent that variations were foreseeable. 
One PM interviewee described valuing variations under 2S-ECI on the basis the issue were 
resolved during the design stage. A PQS said ‘one advantage of ECI is that; when evaluating 
contractor variation claims, can balance the contractor’s reason for claiming with their input 
during the design stage and whether they failed to mitigate a foreseeable issue.’   
 
The JCT PCSA and Doc C contain early warning requirements. The JCT PCSA (2.2.2) 
requires the contractor to notify of any instructions that may ‘materially and adversely’ affect 
the project. Clause 2.3 makes the contractor responsible for managing inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies in project documentation, including notifying their suppliers of inconsistencies 
and corrections. Doc D (3.2.9) requires the contractor to notify the client ‘immediately’ of any 
material impediment to achieving the objectives of the agreement. 
 
Over half the interviewees identified the need for contractors to contributing genuine VM and 
design buildability analysis as a key area for improving ECI. Design Buildings Wiki (2018) 
define VM as a collaborative technique used to maximize value for money, with the greatest 
potential to enhance value in the initial stages of a project. All of the ECI contracts provide for 
value management as a pre-construction service in some form. Doc’s C, D and E provide for 
the contractor to participate in VM, though the wording varies. Doc’s C and E use ‘value 
engineering’, while Doc D requires the contractor to optimise design in terms of cost and future 
maintenance. The JCT PCSA (Annex B) includes value engineering as a selectable pre-
construction service. Clause 2.4 requires the contractor to select or recommend materials only 
in accordance with ‘Good Practice in the Selection of Construction Materials (British Council 
for Offices)’ unless authorised in writing. Document B (NEC ECI Clause) requires any 
contractor’s design proposals to include the effect on cost and time (3.1 – 3.7).  
 
PCSAs provide the opportunity to require contractors to warn of risks such as inconsistencies 
or inaccuracies in drawings, and buildability issues such as unavailability of resources, difficult 
access, lack of crane reach, and the like. Only the JCT PCSA expressly makes contractor 
responsible for managing inaccuracies and inconsistencies in project documentation, 





Co-operation and supply of information 
2.3 
.3 promptly notify the Employer’s agent of any inconsistency or divergence (actual or 
prospective) of which he becomes aware in relation to the Employer’s Requirements 
or other documents referred to in clause 2.1 and of any delay or impediment in 
performing the Pre-Construction Services; and 
 
.4 promptly notify those to whom the Contractor has supplied Contractor’s Information 
of any changes to it, and of nay inaccuracies or inconsistencies in it of which he 
becomes aware, together with any necessary corrections, and similarly notify those 
from whom he has received Information if he becomes aware of inaccuracies or 
inconsistencies in the items received. 
 
The JCT PCSA 2.2.2 requires the contractor to notify of any instruction that may adversely 
affect the project. Similarly, the RFP (Doc D) 3.2.9 requires the contractor to notify the client 
‘immediately’ of any material impediment to achieving the objectives of the agreement: 
 
3. SCOPE OF PRE-CONSTRUTION SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED BY THE 
CONTRACTOR 
 
3.2.9 Notifying the Principal immediately in the event that the Contractor becomes 
aware of any material impediment to achieving the Objectives of this agreement. 
 
Doc C requires the contractor to advice of health and safety hazards and assist with solutions.  
 
6.12 INSURANCES: 
During ECI, contractors predominantly provide services, requiring professional indemnity for 
negligence. However, some interviewees highlighted the potential for contractors to carry out 
more in-depth exploratory works than single-stage procurement, potentially requiring public 
liability insurance. All four ECI contracts require the contractor to provide professional 
indemnity and public liability insurances. The JCT PCSA and Doc C address the need to 
maintain professional indemnity beyond the construction period.  
 
JCT PCSA (7.1) and Doc C (72) require the contractor to use ‘reputable insurers’. Doc C also 
requires public liability for motor vehicles. Both also address the need to maintain professional 
indemnity beyond the construction period. Doc C requires the contractor to maintain 
professional indemnity insurance for six years from completion (72). If contractor fails to 
maintain insurance, the client may pay and deduct from contractor’s payment (75). The JCT 
PCSA 7.3 requires that parties (Employer and Contractor) to discuss how best to ‘protect their 
respective positions’ if the insurance ceases to be available at commercially reasonable rates. 
 
6.13 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CONFIDENTIALLY: 
If confidentiality is not considered, clients and contractors risk disclosure of commercially 
sensitive information or intellectual; property. This might include e.g., designs, methods or 
pricing information. Turner and Riding (2015, p181) describe poor ECI processes in Australia 
where multiple contractors are engaged during design to provide ideas for free, then clients 
select the best ideas from each provider to create a scope that is then put out to tender.  
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With the majority of interviewees describing informal ECI contract documentation, most were 
unaware of any provisions for intellectual property.  
 
All four ECI contracts allow client use of contractor’s information for purpose of the project. 
The JCT PCSA and NEC ECI Clause allow the contractor to use their information on other 
projects unless otherwise agreed. Doc D (7.3) restricts contractors’ use of their information, 
with ownership belonging to the client. Presumably, the intent is for design information, not 
pricing. Docs C and E provides non-exclusive ownership of intellectual property between the 
client and contractor. The provisions in Doc E are contained in Section 6 containing the 
government’s standard RFP Process, Terms and Conditions. 
 
 
Table 10: Intellectual property and confidentiality 
Code Title Client use of 
contractor’s 
information  





Doc A:  JCT PCSA Client has use of the 
contractor’s information for 
the execution and use of 
the building (8.1.2) and for 
extensions to the project 
(except reproducing 
contractor’s design (8.1.3).  
The contractor is only liable 
for their information for the 
purpose it was prepared 
(8.1.4). 
 
Contractor must keep 
confidential and only use any 
information from the employer 
for the purpose of the project, 
except when information is 
public or required by law (8.2). 
Both parties acknowledge any 
disclosure requirements under 
the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 (8.3). 
The Employer’s consent shall 
be required to any publication 
relating to the Project, but shall 
not be unreasonably withheld 
(8.2). 
Sole ownership of 
contractor’s information 
with the contractor unless 
otherwise agreed (8.1.1) 
Doc B:  NEC ECI Clause Client has use of the 
contractor’s information for 
the purpose of the works, 
contractor obtains same 
right from subcontractors 
(7.1) 
Contractor has use of client’s 
information only to provide the 
works, contractor may give 
subcontractors same right, 
contractor returns all 
information (7.2) 
7.3 The Contractor may 
use the material provided 
by him under this contract 
for other work unless 
stated otherwise in the 
Works Information. 




exclusive license, benefits 
the client, its agents, 
contractors and 
consultants and any 
subsequent owners, 
occupiers or operators. 
Client can only use of the 
completion, use, 
alterations, extensions and 




Contractor to take ‘all 
reasonable precautions’ to 
keep confidential information 
confidential, and not to 
disclose to  third-parties 
except as required to perform 
the services, contractor not to 
use confidential information in 
a way that may incur loss to 
the client (99).  
Publicity and publication 
8. The Contractor shall not 
release public or media 
statements or publish material 
related to the Services or 
Project without the written 
approval of the Principal. 
Grants non-exclusive 
license to client (76-79) 
Doc D:  Preconstruction 
Services 
Agreement 
Client has ownership of all 
material including provided 
by subcontractors and 
suppliers, subject to any 
construction contract 
provisions (7.3) 
7.6 Except where necessary to 
perform the Services, the 
contractor shall not without the 
prior written consent of the 
Principal disclose or make 
public any matter in 
No provision 
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Contractor must deliver all 
material to client if 
agreement is terminated 
early (7.4) 
7.5 If the Parties do not 
enter into a Construction 
Contract, any sub-trade 
packages will be novated 
to the Principal or other 
third party as directed by 
the Principal. 
connection with the agreement 
for the Project. 
Contractor responsible for 
insuring other parties are 
bound by the same conditions 
relating to confidentiality, 
ownership and return of 
information (7.7). 





RFP and its contents 
remain property of the 
buyer, buyer may request 
immediate return and 
destruction of RFP 
documents and copies 
(12.1) 
All documents forming the 
proposals become buyer’s 
property (12.2) 
Ownership of intellectual 
property in the proposal 
remain property of the 
respondent. However, 
respondent grants buyer a 
non-exclusive non-
transferable, perpetual 
licence for the purpose 
related to the RFP 
process(12.3) 
Both parties will take 
reasonable steps to protect 
confidential information and 
will not disclose without 
consent (9.1) 
Both parties may disclose 
confidential information to 
parties directly involved in RFP 
process (9.2), Both parties 
recognise the Official 
Information Act 1982 (9.3). 
 
Ownership of intellectual 
property in the proposal 
remain property of the 
respondent. However, 
respondent grants buyer a 
non-exclusive non-
transferable, perpetual 
licence for the purpose 





6.14 RETAINING KEY PERSONNEL AND ASSIGNMENT  
Contractor selection is typically based on performance and reliability under ECI (Turner and 
Riding, 2015). Ma and Xin (2011, p83) found that terminating the relationship with the 
contractor, and the associated loss of knowledge, could be highly problematic for the client. 
This makes retaining key personnel and restricting assignment important features for ECI 
contracts. With the majority of interviewees describing informal ECI procedures, again, most 
were unaware of any requirements around key personnel or assignment. The following 
summarizes the ECI document provisions:  
• Contractor requires approval to change key personnel: JCT PCSA (4.2.1); NEC ECI 
Clause (4.1); Doc C (25).  
• Contractor to provide reasonable attendance of key people and supply chain at 
meetings (JCT PCSA, 2.1.2, 2.1.3) 
• Contractor restricted from assignment: The JCT PCSA and the New Zealand contracts 
(C and D).  
• Client may remove contractor personnel for unsatisfactory conduct or performance: 
(JCT PCSA (4.3) 
Doc E is a RFP so requires tenderers to nominate their project team and demonstrate 
capability. The other pre-construction contracts may leave this to the invitation to treat and 





Table 11: Key personnel 
Code Title Standards Availability Changes 
Doc A:  JCT PCSA 2.1 The Contractor 
shall perform the Pre-
Construction 
Services in 





the Programme and 
with due regard to 
the Cost Plan and 
any Third Party 
Agreements. 
2.1 
.2 ensure that, unless 
otherwise agreed with the 
Employer, Contractor’s Key 
Personnel shall fulfil their 
identified roles and that they 
and the Contract’s 
Representative (or 
competent deputies) are at 
all reasonable times 
available for communication 
and consultation with the 
Employer and Project Team; 
and  
.3 duly consult with members 
of his supply chain and, at 
the Employer’s request, 
endeavour so far as 
practicable to ensure the 
attendance at relevant 
Project meetings of those 
suppliers whose attendance 
is necessary or desirable. 
Contractor’s Representative and 
Contractor’s key Personnel – changes 
4.2 
.1 The Contractor shall not remove the 
Contractor’s Representative or any of the 
Contractor’s Key Personnel from their post or 
replace such person without the Employer’s prior 
approval of the removal or of the replacement 
appointee. Where practicable, the Contractor 
shall arrange an appropriate handover period. 
The Employer shall not unreasonably withhold or 
delay his approval. 
.2 If the Contractor’s Representative or any of 
the Contractor’s Key Personnel ceases for any 
reason to hold their post, the Contractor shall, 
subject to such approval, promptly appoint a 
replacement. 
4.3 After consultation with the Contractor, the 
Employer may require the removal of the 
Contractor’s Representative, of any of the 
Contractor’s Key Personnel or any other person 
engaged in the Pre-Construction Services if, in 
the Employer’s reasonable opinion, their 
performance or conduct is or has been 
unsatisfactory. 
Doc B:  NEC ECI Clause   Stage 1 key people listed in Contract Data (p11).  
4.1 The Contractor does not replace any key 
person during Stage One unless: 
·         He is instructed by the Project 
Manager to do so or 
·         The person is unable to continue to act in 
connection with this contract. 
Doc C:  Preferred 
Contractor 
Contract 
  Contractor must dedicate key personnel to the 
Services until the Principal is satisfied they have 
completed their function. Can only be released 
if; approved, permanently leave the firm, or 
becomes incapable of continuing (25). 
Contractor must replace key personal promptly 
and demonstrate that they have the necessary 
skills and experience, approved by the Principal 
(26). 
Doc D:  Preconstruction 
Services 
Agreement 
   






nominate their project 
team and 
demonstrate their 





6.15 CLIENT OBLIGATIONS 
Clients incur obligations implied through legislation and common law. For example, the 
Construction Contracts Act (2002) provides default payment provisions and the Building Act 
(2004) requires owners to obtain consents and approvals. Courts may also imply obligations 
for cooperation and non-hindrance (Steensma, 2010). Following are key client obligations in 
the analysed ECI contracts:  
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• Provide site access: Doc C (52) 
• Provide design packages in accordance with the programme: Doc C (29) 
• Arrange services from other consultants: Doc C (53) 
• Once notified by the contractor, promptly, correct any delay or hindrance to the 
contractor caused by delay or default by the project team, as far as reasonably 
practicable: JCT PCSA (3.3).  
• Supply health and safety information: JCT PCSA (3.1) 
• Promptly notify of changes, updates or corrections to information supplied: JCT PCSA 
(3.1) 
• Provide decisions, approvals and instructions within reasonable time: JCT PCSA (3.2) 
Doc D (7.1) reduces the client’s liability for supply of information. The client does not warrant 
the ‘completeness or accuracy of such information.’ The Contractor must ‘undertake such 
investigations or measurements as may be necessary before submitting its offer.’ This 
generally reflects the legal position at common law (see Craig, 1999, p474). 
 
6.16 PRICE FORMATION AND PAYMENT  
2S-ECI can provide more transparent pricing. The effect on overall project pricing is depends 
on a number of factors such as whether the contractor charges for early involvement, whether 
consultants (particularly the PQS) increase their fees, and the effect of potentially reduced 
pricing competition. However, these factors can have a positive or negative effect depending 
on the market conditions.  
 
In New Zealand the most common approach to 2S-ECI price formation appears to be fixed-
price P&G costs and margins following concept design, then open-book subcontractor 
selection to arrive at an agreed lump sum construction contract (usually construction only) (19 
interviewees mixed disciplines). This aligns with case study findings in New Zealand by Finnie, 
Ameer Ali, and Park (2018). This contrasts the different approach identified by literature. For 
example, in the UK, ECI is often based on partnering and a target value (Turner and Riding, 
2015) and contractor selection is based on track record and capability, ‘not by lowest price bid 
because there is not yet a design to bid for’ (Scheepbouwer and Humphries, 2011 p45). In 
Australia where ECI tends to be based on first-stage partnering and a second-stage target 
value design and build contract (Whitehead, 2009).  
 
2S- ECI need not remove all aspects of competitive pricing, and nor can it. Once appointed, 
the head contractor can competitively tender the subcontract packages. Subcontractors may 
be attracted to 2S-ECI through improved odds of securing contracts (as selected tenderers) 
though this may inflate their prices. It is not possible to eliminate market pressures. For 
example, the only subcontractor offering specialist piling equipment can hold their price 
regardless of the procurement system. Pricing the P&G consumes less resource than pricing 
the whole construction works in traditional tenders. In this way, 2S-ECI could reduce industry 
tendering costs, by eliminating unnecessary duplication (three contractors).   
 
Clients may pay a premium for 2S-ECI due to less competitive tension (seven interviewees, 
mixed disciplines) with contractors incentivised to submit the highest justifiable rates through 
negotiation, rather than the lowest possible tender price. However, 2S-ECI is used in heated 
markets (such as Auckland) to attract head contractors and subcontractors who might not 
otherwise bid through competitive tender. It also provides a means of negotiation to support 
ongoing relationships (in Otago).  
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In some instances, PQSs may incur considerably more work, evaluating head contractor rates 
and subcontractor terms (‘de-tag’). Consultant views varied about whether they increased their 
fees for 2S-ECI. However, a PQS working on large projects in the heated Auckland market 
described: 
 
Our procurement fee is often now 4 to 6 times bigger for ECI and 2 stage (or more) 
procurement with multiple trade reviews and recommendations. This is regardless of 
schedules. Even without Schedules, a single trade review, detag and rec could be as 
much QS time as if we did schedule and then review trade. Depends how good or 
motivated the Contractors QS is on their review and detag, too often they have 
inexperienced guys who just throw money at each and every sub tag (& not what the 
contractor would be doing with subs on a competitive bid!!!) and then we sort it out / 
push back / reject/ redo – sometimes 10 weeks for a single trade on big jobs. 
 
A key influence of 2S-ECI effect on project costs is whether contractors are paid for their early 
involvement (15 interviewees, mixed disciplines). Interestingly, eight interviewees (mixed 
disciplines) described projects where the contractor was not paid for their early involvement. 
Others described the contractor’s ECI fee forming part of their P&G. Other factors influencing 
costs include whether the contractor or PQS measure schedules of quantities (seven 
interviewees, PQSs and contractors) and how much real value the contractor adds.  
 
The transparency of 2S-ECI pricing may help to address the cyclic market pressures of the 
construction industry. Contractors are more likely to retain their margins during heated markets 
through the ECI open book pricing compared to completive tender (three contractors). 
Conversely, open book pricing means fairer margins during downturns. The open-book 
negotiation may require more accurate pricing because ‘contractors can’t just bury risk within 
their pricing’ (contractor), supporting that 2S-ECI reduces unnecessary pricing assumptions 
(Mosey, 2011). Turner and Riding (2015, p181) offer a contractor’s perspective of best practice 
ECI where the ‘service provider is engaged as a single-source basis and receives monetary 
recognition of their involvement, regardless of whether their solution is accepted and a long-
term relationship started’ (p181). The service provider is appointed based on qualification-only 
criteria. The service provider then passes through a series of ‘defined staged gates as the 
design progresses’ (p181) before arriving at a target cost which is checked by an independent 
estimator. Laryea and Watermeyer (2016) provide case studies of two construction projects 
for Wits University in South Africa procured through two-stage ECI in which the contractor 
received ‘no remuneration for the involvement in design development’ as, ‘they value the 
benefits of developing early cost models and production plans.’  
 
Selecting stage 1 contractors may also reduce wider industry procurement costs because only 
the appointed contractor prices the construction works (two contractors). Competitive bidding 
is considered inefficient for procuring customized products in Lean Construction (Elfving, et 
al., 2005). Pheng, et al (2015) found that ECI can improve Lean efficiency through reducing 
non-value-adding activities. Reducing wider procurement costs is an example of this. Ma and 
Xin (2011) highlight the waste associated with multiple contractors investing their own 
resources on investigation and design analysis in traditional tenders, when they typically have 
a one-in-three chance of winning the bid. The Project Procurement and Delivery Guidance 
Using Two Stage Open Book and Supply Chain Collaboration (King’s College London, 2014) 
also provides that ‘the two—stage open book model reduces industry bidding costs.’ However, 
some interviewees (three contractors and one client) pointed out that the resources invested 
by contractors (often comprising senior managers) during ECI was higher than their 
estimators’ time in a single-stage tender. Though this may add value to the project.  
 
Price certainty can be considered at two stages; pre-construction and construction. The 
general consensus amongst interviewees was that 2S-ECI could improve final price certainty 
through planning and de-risking, to reduce contract variations, though there may be less price 
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certainty at the pre-construction stage (five interviewees, mixed disciplines). Most 
interviewees (17 interviewees, mixed disciplines) felt there was at least a moral obligation on 
contractors to minimise variation claims following early involvement, but none were able to 
articulate any actual contractual implications. One of the greatest challenges of 2S-ECI is the 
difficulty in measuring the actual value added compared with other procurement pathways 
such as traditional competitive tenders (11 interviewees, mixed disciplines). The following 
client statement expresses a commonly held view:  
 
The theoretical benefits of ECI may not be realized, if the contractor does not provide 
effective planning, buildability and value management services. 
 
The need for at least a concept design to select contractors on P&G and margins is supported 
by Ma and Xin (2011) who highlighted the need for sufficient design to enable competitive 
pricing. A potential reason for the different approaches may be that much of the prior literature 
(including Turner and Riding, 2015; Whitehead, 2009) focused on infrastructure work where 
unforeseen risks may be higher than commercial construction possibly making target value 
contracts and early involvement more attractive. 
 
The JCT PCSA and the New Zealand contracts (C and D) stipulate agreed lump sum 
construction contracts. Both New Zealand contracts specify pricing based on P&G, margins 
and open-book subcontractor selection. The New Zealand contracts also require the head 
contractor to source a minimum of three prices per trade and negotiate subcontractor terms 
in consultation with relevant consultants before submitting for approval. Doc C enables the 
head contractor to also tender for the carpentry and concrete works (30). This provides a 
mechanism to evaluate the head contractor’s rates for carpentry and concrete through 
competitive pricing, potentially reducing the need for negotiating contractor rates. The JCT 
PCSA leaves the parties to agree the ‘Second Stage Tender Requirements’ (2.7). In contrast, 
the NEC ECI Clause is for use with cost reimbursement or target value contracts. 
 
6.17 TIMING OF CONTRACTOR INVOLVEMENT 
While all interviewees identified that 2S-ECI can be used to fast-track projects, this was not 
seen as a lead driver. One PQS noted that: 
 
Fast-tracking does not necessarily provide the benefits of ECI. For example, fast-
tracking can be used to stage building work without contractor input for logistical 
planning and value management etc. 
 
Overall views on timing varied. Some perceived similar timing for 2S-ECI. One client and one 
contractor warned that design packages should be fully complete before agreeing lump sum 
construction contracts. For this reason, an architect suggested 2S-ECI provides similar timing 
to traditional tender. A contractor said that 2S-ECI timing might be similar when the design is 
finalised before construction, ‘though the tendering period may be reduced, because it 
overlaps with the design stage.’ Others perceived 2S-ECI as potentially prolonging the design 
stage. One client identified the risk of contractors exploring too many options, supporting 
Whitehead’s (2009) identified risk of ‘too many chefs in the kitchen.’ One contractor said the 
design stage can be elongated, but ‘for the right reasons, i.e., to reduce budget or buildability 
problems later.’ One PQS suggested 2S-ECI procurement could take longer, but that early 
staging may maintain completion dates. Another PQS said that any ‘programming advantages 
should be weighed up against the potential premium paid for ECI’ and that ‘tight timeframes 
also reduce the time available for negotiation.’ This supports the need for clear pre-
construction milestones (King’s College London, 2014).  
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Most interviewees described contractor involvement between concept and detailed design. 
One contractor did describe working with developer clients from early stages to work through 
resource consent applications and manage stakeholders, although this was regarded an 
exception to the norm. Appointment after concept design aligns with findings that contractors 
may have limited input at early design stages (Francis and Kiroff, 2015) and that this could 
risk too many chefs in the kitchen (Whitehead, 2009). 
 
None of the PCSA documents specified when the contractor should be involved. Though 
provisions requiring the contractor to submit a fixed fee for P&G would require a concept 
design in order for the contractor to determine temporary works costs such as craneage and 
scaffolding. Docs A (2.7.1) and D (3.2.6 and 4.1) provide dates by which the contractor must 
submit their construction offer. According to Kings College (2016) pre-construction milestones 
are a key driver of ECI performance.  
 
6.18 TERMINATION, SUSPENSION AND WHETHER PAYMENT FOR EARLY INVOLVEMENT 
Turner and Riding (2015, p181) describe ECI best practice from a contractor’s perspective in 
Australia where a single contractor is engaged and receives payment ‘regardless of whether 
their solution is accepted and a long-term relationship started’.  However, the majority of the 
contractors interviewed said they sometimes do ECI without payment, generally as a means 
of client negotiation. Only one contractor said they would not do ECI without payment. This 
supports Pearman (2007) who found that the ability to negotiate projects is an advantage of 
ECI. Laryea and Watermeyer (2016) case studied two ECI projects for Wits University in South 
Africa where the contractor received ‘no remuneration for the involvement’ because, ‘they 
value the benefits of developing early cost models and production plans.’  
 
2S-ECI may help to address the cyclic market pressures of the construction industry, and 
reduce overall tendering costs. Contractors are more likely to retain their margins during 
heated markets through the ECI open book pricing compared to completive tender (three 
contractors). Conversely, open book pricing means fairer margins during downturns. Two 
contractors saw potential for 2S-ECI to reduce overall procurement costs across the industry 
because only the successful stage 1 contractor prices the construction works. However, some 
interviewees (three contractors and one client) pointed out that the resources invested by 
contractors (often comprising senior managers) during ECI was higher than their estimators’ 
time in a single-stage tender.  
 
One question is whether contractors should receive reimbursement if there is no agreed 
construction contract, due to no fault of the contractor, particularly when the contractor invest 
substantial costs in early involvement. All four ECI contract give the client the right not to enter 
into a construction contract. The JCT PCSA and the New Zealand contracts (C and D) 
expressly enable the client to terminate the contractor’s employment at any time upon serving 
notice. 
 
The JCT PCSA and New Zealand contracts (C and D) contain payment procedures for the 
pre-construction stage. However, only the JCT PCSA and Doc D specifically address payment 
if no construction contract is agreed. Doc D Schedule 2 provides for a ‘total amount payable 
for the Services…’ and invoicing procedures. Then, once a construction contract is agreed, 
the contractor’s P&G is deemed to include their ECI fee (5.3). Clause 4.6 reimburses the 
contractor if the contract is terminated but, if for default; payment is based on reasonable 
added value or expenses for proper performance (5.2). Similarly, The JCT PCSA (10.6) 
reimburses the contractor upon termination for costs plus a proportion of their ECI fee, unless 
termination is for insolvency or breach (10.6.2.3), in which case the client can deduct 
reasonable costs of procuring another contractor. 
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The JCT PCSA and Doc C enable the client to suspend and recommence the works. JCT 
PCSA enables the contractor to terminate their own employment for continued suspension or 
non-payment. In New Zealand the Construction Contracts Act (2002) provides a statutory right 
to suspension for non-payment.  
 
 
Table 12: Termination  
Code Title Termination by client Termination by contractor Frustration  
Doc A:  JCT PCSA Termination at will or for 
default/insolvency or under 
regulation 73(1) of the PC 
Regulations 
Employer may terminate 
Contractor’s employment giving 14 
days’ notice (10.5.1) 
If either party is insolvent, the 
other may give notice to 
immediately terminate the 
Contractor’s employment (10.5.2) 
If either party commits a material 
breach (default), the other may 
give notice requiring its remedy. If 
not remedied within 7 days, the 
party may give notice to terminate 
with immediate effect (10.5.3) 
Where PC Regulations apply, 
Employer may terminate the 
Contractor’s employment (10.5.4) 
Extended suspension – 
termination by the Contractor 
Contractor may serve notice to 
terminate if Employer does not 
instruct to remobilise within 6 
months.  
Contractor gives Employer 14 
days’ notice (10.4) 
If either party is insolvent, the 
other may give notice to 
immediately terminate the 
Contractor’s employment (10.5.2) 
If either party commits a material 
breach (default), the other may 
give notice requiring its remedy. If 
not remedied within 7 days, the 
party may give notice to terminate 
with immediate effect (10.5.3) 
 
 
Doc B:  NEC ECI Clause Client may appoint another 
contractor if failure to agree pricing 
to contractor fails to achieve 
performance (5.3). 
No provision No provision 
Doc C:  Preferred 
Contractor 
Contract 
Client may terminate at any time 
for any reason giving 10 days’ 
notice (96) or for breach (97,98) 
 
 
No provision Force majeure: Obligations 
suspended, other party may 
terminate after 90 days (119-
121). 
Doc D:  Preconstruction 
Services 
Agreement 
Principal may serve notice to 
terminate giving five days’ notice 
(6.1), or for immediate effect if the 
contractor is in serious or 
persistent default (6.2). The 
Principal may also suspend 
service in writing (6.3) 
 No provision No provision 





No provision  No provision No provision 
 
 
Table 13: Suspension  
Code Title Suspension by client Suspension by contractor 
Doc A:  JCT PCSA Suspension by Employer  
The Employer may suspend the whole or part of 
the works giving 14 days’ notice. The Employer 
shall pay the Contractor (10.1): 
any accrued instalments of the Fee and any 
Additional Payment then unpaid (10.1.1); 
a fair proportion of the next instalment having 
regard to the services performed (10.1.2); 
Contractor’s right of suspension 
Contractor may suspend for no payment after giving 
notice (6.6.1) 




all Reimbursable Expenses accrued; and 
(10.1.3) 
any demobilisation costs properly and 
necessarily incurred by the Contractor in 
complying with the notice (10.1.4) 
Remobilisation 
Employer may instruct Contractor to remobilise 
within 6 months. The Contractor shall remobilise 
as soon as reasonably practicable. The 
Employer pays any remobilisation costs (10.2). 
Doc B:  NEC ECI Clause No provision No provision 
Doc C:  Preferred 
Contractor 
Contract 
Proposed Construction Works Contract 
Client may suspend at any time for any reason 




Doc D:  Preconstruction 
Services 
Agreement 
No provision  No provision 









ECI has been found to reduce levels of conflict and disputes (Jelodar, Yiu and Wilkinson, 
2015; Mosey, 2011). The majority of interviewees who felt that relationships may be improved 
through 2S-ECI and that 2S-ECI requires effective relationships supports this. One contractor 
specifically thought ‘ECI Projects are less prone to disputes due to the early collaborative 
planning work.’ 
Construction contracts commonly require the parties to first attempt negotiation and mediation 
(interest-based methods) before engaging in arbitration or litigation (rights-based methods).  
 
The New Zealand contracts (C and D) require the parties to resolve disputes through methods 
alternative to the courts. Bothe require parties to first attempt negotiation. Doc D (8.1 - 8.3) 
then requires expert determination, and Doc C (107-118) requires mediation before arbitration. 
The inclusion of arbitration clauses mean that courts are likely to stay any hearings until the 
parties have undergone arbitration as they agreed contractually to, then awards can generally 
only be appealed for procedural breaches, even where decisions may be erroneous (see 
Finnie, 2016). Outcomes of alternative dispute methods also remain private. Doc D requires 
that, in the failure to resolve the dispute through good faith negotiations, the parties must agree 
on an expert to determine the matter, or otherwise appointed by the New Zealand Law Society.  
 
In contrast, the JCT PCSA and the NEC ECI Clause do not restrict access to courts through 
requiring alternative dispute resolution. This has the potential to enable continuous learning 
from public court judgements and help overcome the issue highlighted by (Whitehead, 2009) 
about ECI standard contracts needing to become familiar and tied and tested.  
 
 
Table 14: Disputes  
Code Title Negotiation  Mediation  Adjudication  Expert 
determination 
Arbitration 
Doc A:  JCT PCSA   Adjudication   
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10.77 If a dispute or 
difference arises under 
this Agreement which 
either Party wishes to 
refer to adjudication, the 
Scheme shall apply 
except that for the 
purposes of the Scheme 
the adjudicator shall be 
the person (if any) and 
the nominating body shall 
be that stated in the 
Particulars. 
Doc B:  NEC ECI Clause      









  Arbitration 
(112—118) 





good faith to 
resolve the 
dispute (8.1), 
   if not resolved in five 
working days, dispute 
may be referred to an 
expert, or failing 
agreement within two 
business days, appointed 
by the President of the 
New Zealand Law 
Society (8.2). Expert 
must give decision within 
10 working days or such 
period by agreement. 
Expert’s decision is final 
and binding. Unless 
expert determines 
otherwise, costs are 
shared equally between 
the parties (8.3). 
 




     
 
6.20 SUMMARY OF CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS  
Contractual procedures in New Zealand are often informally with little or no written contract 
terms for early engagement. The interview findings such that, while some large clients have 
developed their own ECI contracts, there is no sign of any standard form of ECI contract. The 
content of the ECI contracts analysed varied, but generally include provisions for liabilities, 
scope of services, advanced warning, good faith, professional indemnity insurances, 
intellectual property, and termination, suspension and dispute resolution.  
 
The main drivers when considering whether to use 2S-ECI include securing resources in 
markets, maintaining client/contractor relationships, planning the logistics of construction 
around existing operations, or providing specific design buildability and value management 
advice. 2S-ECI may be particularly beneficial for projects where the cost of disruption might 
outweigh any premium paid for the benefit of logistical planning and reliability, such as airport 
extensions or hospital alterations. Specialist subcontractors may be involved through the head 
contractor, or independently, to provide design input for the likes of facades, structural steel, 
lifts, and piling. 
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The most common approach for 2S-ECI in New Zealand appears to be involving a head 
contractor once a conceptual design exists, with pricing based on fixed price P&G and 
margins. Once appointed, the head contractor procures subcontractors on an open-book basis 
to arrive a fixed lump sum construction contract. 
 
2S-ECI may help to address the cyclic market pressures of the construction industry, and 
reduce overall tendering costs. The more open-book approach may discourage contractors 
disclosing excessive profit margins during heated markets. Equally they should be able to rely 
on fair margins during downturns. However, this should be balanced against potentially higher 
consultant fees, whether the contractor charges for early involvement and the actual added 
value, something difficult to measure.  
 
Contractors appear to bring greater leadership to the table through 2S-ECI> Contractors can 
better plan construction and integrate early planning with their site teams regardless of the 
actual value management and buildability input provided, are able to. This is particularly 
beneficial given that 2S-ECI was found particularly suited to projects requiring logistical 
planning of construction to existing client operations.  Risk management and buildability 
analysis appear integrated. Buildability analysis includes logistical planning of construction 
around existing client operations; analysis of design risk in terms of constructability and 
resource and systems availability.  
 
Key challenges of 2S-ECI include:  
• Lack of clear contractual procedures and pre-construction contract documentation, 
leading to unclear obligations and expectations; 
• Reluctance from clients and consultants, perceived lack of competitive tensions, and 
difficulty measuring added value;  
• Lack of genuine quality pre-construction services,  
• Increased risk transfer to contractors through amended standard from contract terms 
and performance-based specifications; and  
• Declining quality of design documentation possibly attributable to design coordination 
capability.  
 
Potential opportunities to improve 2S-ECI include: 
 
• Standardizing pre-construction contracts with pre-construction milestones, scope of 
services and obligations and the flexibility to suit client preferences and project types. 
One area of potential conflict could result when designers adopt alternative systems 
recommended by contractors. Contractors may incur uncertainty about their liabilities 
and insurance requirements. Only the JCT PCSA specifically provides for (excludes) 
the contractors’ liability when providing design advice.   
• Educating clients and consultants including optimal project types for 2S-ECI, 
expectations and timing of contractor involvement, using the contractor to de-risk the 
project through exploratory works, insuring designs are complete at the time of 
agreeing a fixed lump sum construction contract;   
• Developing contractual mechanisms for specialist subcontractor early input;  
• Contractors developing specialist ECI skills, particularly in value management, design 
buildability and coordination.  
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The PCSA analysed were inconsistent in their approach to specifying the scope of pre-
construction services. A clearer approach could be to provide a list of pre-construction services 
under specific constructions. Obligations such as advanced warning and buildability analysis 
could be standard obligations, while carrying out exploratory investigations could be specific, 
as demonstrated in the following table.  
 
Table 15: Suggested contractual scheduling of pre-construction services  
Pre-construction services Standard Specific 
Design management  x 
Stakeholder management  x 
Buildability advice x  
Advance warning  x  
Methodology x  
Planning and programming x  
Risk management  x 
Value management  x 
Procuring subcontractors and suppliers x  
Cost and budget  x 
Investigations, demolitions and construction enabling works  x 
Other  x 
 
 
Conducting ECI on large complex projects (sometimes $100’s millions) on an informal basis 
could expose the parties to increased uncertainty around what happens if the project does not 
proceed to construction, what constitutes sufficient performance by contractors, and who 
accepts responsibility for projects being over-budget, late or for design documentation or 
performance problems. This makes measuring the success of ECI difficult and risks its overall 
perception as a procurement pathway. 2S-ECI appears to be gaining popularity in New 
Zealand despite a small number of high-profile failures. 2S-ECI formation through existing 
relationships between the client and contractor, and contractor selection based on past-
performance and reliability may be reasons that more problems do not arise.  
 
An important consideration is whether the contractor is paid for their early involvement. Parties 
could agree no payment unless the construction contract is not agreed, through no fault of the 
contractor. Otherwise, the contractor’s P&G is deemed to include their ECI fee if the project 
does proceed. The JCT PCSA and Doc D support this position. Both provide procedures for 
termination of the pre-construction contract.  
 
Findings benefit parties looking to develop or revise their own PCSA contract, and toward the 
development of a standard form PCSA contract for New Zealand construction. Further areas 
to explore include how to best involve subcontractors through ECI, negotiate subcontractor 










Chapter 7: Survey questionnaire  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents analysis of the survey findings. The survey questionnaire was sent to 
all interviewees eight months after completion of the last interview to improve the validity of 
the research findings. The interviews provided rich and deep findings, however one drawback 
was that a later interviewee might raise a valuable point that the interviewer would like to have 
discussed with prior interviewees. For example, the second-last interviewee might provide an 
interesting suggestion for improving 2S-ECI. The survey questionnaire was developed based 
on the coded interview findings to provide all participants with the chance to rate for relevance 
or provide comment.  
 
7.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The interview sample was surveyed because they were considered an expert panel who had 
participated in in-depth discussion about the use of 2S-ECI. All participants had responsibility 
for or awareness of procurement pathways of projects within their region and typically had 
communications on a national level. A wider survey across industry groups was ruled out due 
to the lack of clarity around what constitutes 2S-ECI, given the lack of a contractual framework. 
Analysis of previous research demonstrated how this can distort findings. Surveying an expert 
panel aligns with the Delphi method. The Delphi method typically comprises a three-step 
process used to move toward establishing consistency from the panel (see Kerzna, 2013, 
p890). However, a single-round questionnaire was adopted because a consistency of findings 
was not expected. For example, clients, PMs and PQSs may hold different perceptions to 
contractors, and participants in Otago may have different experiences to those in Auckland. 
Perceptions may also vary depending on the market conditions. For example, interview 
findings suggested that 2S-ECI is used as a means of negotiating a transparent price where 
strong client/contractor relationships exist, whereas 2S-ECI appears primarily used in 
Auckland as a means to secure contractors in a boom market. Comparing the different 
perceptions was therefore felt to provide more meaningful findings than pursuing consistency 
through conducting repeated survey rounds.  
 
The use of an expert panel, rather than a wider industry survey, is supported by Hallowell and 
Gambatese (2010, p99). They describe how the Delphi method is particularly useful in 
contemporary construction research when objective data is unattainable, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence, experimental research is unrealistic or unethical, or when the 
heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assure validity of the results.  
 
Most questions received 13 responses from the sample of 21 interviewees who were invited 
to participate. An expert panel of 13 still aligns with typical Delphi method studies. Ibrahim, 
Costello and Wilkinson (2013) suggest a panel of eight to 12 experts should be adequate. 
Data was analysed using the mean rather than the mode, as it was felt the mean was better 





7.3 RESPONSE SAMPLE  
The survey questionnaire (Appendix 2) was distributed using Qualtrics software. The 
questionnaire was reviewed by a mathematician (Head of College of Engineering, 
Construction and Living Sciences at Otago Polytechnic) and the head of Organisational 
Research at Otago Polytechnic, for structure and response options (e.g., number of Likert 
options). The survey was then tested by the Organisational Researcher and the PhD 
supervisors before being emailed as a link to the 21 participants. Three reminders were sent 
by email through Qualtrics. A total of 13 responses were received out of the 21 interviewees 
invited to participate. One of the interviewees sadly passed away before completing the 
survey. All types of construction participants were represented in the survey responses 
(clients, PMs, PQSs, architects, and contractors).  
 
Table 16: Survey response sample 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Client 1 7.7 7.7 
PM 1 7.7 15.4 
PQS 2 15.4 30.8 
Architect 1 7.7 38.5 
Head 
Contractor 
8 61.5 100.0 
Total 13 100.0   
 
 
Only one response was received from each of the groups clients, PMs, and architects, and 
two responses from PQSs. The gathering and reporting of the data from industry participants 
is not an exact science in that participants’ perspectives are not definitive judgements on their 
experiences to date, however every response is valid.   Each survey response represents one 
participant’s perception and must be taken seriously.  The collective responses to the survey 
are representative of those who provided the feedback. Likewise, responses from what might 
appear to be an unrepresentative minority are still valid and they cannot be disregarded simply 
because they are few; nor however should be they taken as a definitive indication about the 
perceptions of that industry group as a whole. Importantly, the survey questionnaire does not 
form a primary research method for this study. Rather it is used to support the deeper interview 
findings.   
 
7.4 RESPONSES  
The following sections analyse participants’ responses to the 16 questions about 2S-ECI 
contractual provisions. Due to the qualitative methodology of this research and small sample 
size of senior construction professionals (considered an expert panel) the focus is on 
descriptive analysis rather than statistical analysis, although percentages of responses are 
sometimes shown to indicate themes of participant perceptions. 
 
 
7.4.1 Project suitability 
Participants were asked to rate factors to consider when deciding project suitability for 2S-EC 




with projects benefiting from logistical planning around maintaining clients’ existing operations 
as the most substantial factor, except that tight time-frames was a more dominant factor in the 
survey findings. While interviewees identified that 2S-ECI enables project staging to fast-track 
projects, some highlighted that fast-tracking does not necessarily provide contractor 
buildability input generally associated with 2S-ECI. Nevertheless, the head contractor’s P&G 
and open-book subcontractor pricing does provide an effective way to negotiate pricing across 
multiple stages.   
 



















0% 0% 8% 92% 100% 4.85 
Tight time-frames 0% 8% 38% 54% 92% 4.00 
Designers wanting 
contractor buildability 
advice for innovative 
design solutions 
0% 8% 54% 38% 92% 3.69 
A means to secure 
resources in a busy 
market 
0% 15% 46% 38% 85% 3.62 
Utilising specialist 
contractor input, 
such as for building 
services of cladding 
systems 
0% 23% 46% 31% 77% 3.38 
A means to negotiate 
with a preferred 
contractor based on 
client - contractor 
relationships 
0% 23% 62% 15% 77% 3.08 
 
 
7.4.2 Advantages of 2S-ECI  
Participants were asked to rate the perceived benefits of 2S-ECI when compared with 
traditional competitive tender: 1 - worse using 2S-ECI, 2 - same, 3 - minor benefit, 4 - moderate 
benefit, 5 - substantial benefit. A mean over 3.0 indicates at least minor benefit. Items with a 
mean of less than 3.0 are highlighted in the tables below. 
 
 
Table 18: 2S-ECI Advantages over competitive tender 
Advantages Mean 
Better planned construction works, e.g., more time to understand and 
plan works 
4.4 
Improved knowledge transfer from pre-construction to construction stage 
workforce 
4.2 
More senior input from head contractors during pre-construction (i.e., not 
just estimators) 
4.2 




Improved project decision-making 4.1 
More transparent pricing 4.1 
Reduced risk of client disruption on project involving alterations or 
extensions 
4.1 
Supports ongoing relationships 4.0 
Improved price certainty, i.e., reduced variation claims or disputes during 
construction stage 
3.7 
Faster project completion 3.6 
Improved project timing certainty 3.3 
Reduced chance of remedial works 3.0 




Contractors rated ‘Supports more equitable risk transfer’ as the most significant benefit with a 
mean of 4.5. Contractors rated ‘Reduced tendering costs (i.e., only the successful contractor 
prices the construction stage’ as having a minor advantage with a mean of 3.0, though overall 
this was not found a significant advantage, with a mean of 2.8. The tables below presenting 
results by role type rank the risks in order of importance perceived by contractors, being the 
larger sample population, and to enable comparison with other role types. 
 
Table 19: 2S-ECI Advantages over competitive tender per role type 
 Advantages Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
Supports more equitable risk transfer 3.0 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.5 
Better planned construction works, e.g., more 
time to understand and plan works 
5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.4 
More transparent pricing 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 4.3 
Improved project decision-making 3.0 5.0 3.5 4.0 4.3 
Improved knowledge transfer from pre-
construction to construction stage workforce 
5.0 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.3 
Reduced risk of client disruption on project 
involving alterations or extensions 
5.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 
More senior input from head contractors during 
pre-construction (i.e., not just estimators) 
5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 
Supports ongoing relationships 5.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.1 
Improved price certainty, i.e., reduced variation 
claims or disputes during construction stage 
2.0 5.0 3.5 3.0 3.9 
Faster project completion 3.0 5.0 3.5 3.0 3.6 
Improved project timing certainty 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.4 
Reduced chance of remedial works 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 
Reduced tendering costs (i.e., only the successful 
contractor prices the construction stage 
2.0 4.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 
 
Participants were given the opportunity to rate ‘other’ advantages in addition to those listed in 
the questionnaire.  The following were added as ‘substantial benefits’: 
 
• Gives better understanding of Client drivers - why they are doing the project 
 
• Higher Quality and less Defects (as a result of the right price and de-risking time and 





Two of these comments could be considered additional commentary to the listed benefits, i.e., 
better planned projects (understanding client drivers), and reduced chance of remedial works 
(higher quality and less defects). Increased opportunity for innovation is a benefit that was not 
listed in the survey and does align with findings in prior studies (Rahman and Alhassan, 2012; 
Whitehead, 2009).  
 
 
7.4.3 Pre-construction services 
Participants were asked to rate the pre-construction services in terms of typical benefit. A 1 to 
4 rating scale was used to establish the mean responses: 1 – no benefit, 2 - minor benefit, 3 
- moderate benefit, 4 -  substantial benefit.  
 
Table 20: Pre-construction services benefits 
Pre-Construction Services Mean 
Risk management 3.4 
Collaborative 'open-book' subcontractor selection 3.3 
Design buildability advice 3.2 
Contractor contributing design elements 3.1 
Site logistics planning 3.0 
Value management 3.0 
Warning of design document errors or inconsistencies 2.9 
Contractor liaison with external stakeholders (e.g., neighbours and local 
authorities 
2.5 
Contractor providing design coordination (e.g., services coordination) 2.5 
Contractor providing document control systems 2.1 
Building information modelling (BIM) 2.1 
Contractor leading design management 2.0 
 
Interestingly, the PM and PQSs perceived only minor benefit in the contractor ‘Warning of 
design document errors or inconsistencies’. In contrast, architects and contractors perceived 
this as a moderate benefit and the client perceived this as a substantial benefit. No 
interviewees could clearly articulate how the contractor’s early involvement influenced the 
contractor’s entitlement to claim for design related issues during the construction stage.  
 
 
Table 21: Pre-construction services benefits per role type 
Pre-construction services Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
Risk management 4.0 4.0 2.5 4.0 3.4 
Site logistics planning 2.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.3 
Value management 4.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.3 
Collaborative 'open-book' 
subcontractor selection 
4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 
Design buildability advice 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 
Warning of design document errors 
or inconsistencies 
4.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.1 
Contractor contributing design 
elements 




Contractor liaison with external 
stakeholders (e.g., neighbours and 
local authorities 
2.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.8 
Contractor providing design 
coordination (e.g., services 
coordination) 
4.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.6 
Contractor leading design 
management 
1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 2.5 
Contractor providing document 
control systems 
1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.5 
Building information modelling (BIM) 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 
 
 
7.4.4 Risks to consider at pre-construction stage 
Participants were asked to rate risks to consider during the pre-construction stage in terms of 
importance: 1 – no importance, 2 – minor importance, 3 – moderate importance, 4 – 
substantial importance. ‘Disruption to existing building operations during construction’ was 
ranked most important. This aligns with logistical planning around existing client operations 
being the most significant driver for 2S-ECI project suitability. All role types perceived all the 
risks to have at least minor relevance. Other buildability related risks such as ‘design being 
difficult or impossible to build’, ‘ground conditions’, ‘resource availability’, ‘quality of design 
documentation’, ‘building services coordination,’ ‘site logistics’, ‘long lead delivery items’, and 
‘connectivity between construction elements’, were all considered to have moderate to 
substantial importance.   
 
 
Table 22: Risks to consider pre-construction 
Risks to consider at pre-
construction Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
Disruption to existing building 
operations during construction 
4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Design being difficult or impossible 
to build 
4.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.8 
Ground conditions 4.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.6 
Resource availability 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.5 
Quality of design documentation 4.0 3.0 2.5 4.0 3.5 
Weather-tightness 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.4 
Building services coordination 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.4 
Health and safety 4.0 3.0 2.5 4.0 3.4 
Site logistics (e.g., access, 
craneage, public protection) 
4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.4 
Long lead delivery items 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.3 
Subcontractor performance 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 
Connectivity between construction 
elements 
3.0 4.0 2.5 4.0 3.0 
Passive fire design 4.0 3.0 1.5 4.0 3.0 







7.4.5 Head contractor or consultant manager 
Participants were informed that the entity employed to plan and manage construction (during 
the construction stage) may be a head contractor (contract for works) or a consultant 
construction manager (contract for services), and asked to select their typical preference. Only 
one participant selected consultant construction manager.  
 
 
Table 23: Head contractor or consultant manager 
  Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
Head contractor (contract for works) 1 1 2 1 7 
Consultant construction manager 
(contract for services) 
0 0 0 0 1 
 
Participants were also given the opportunity to provide comment. The comments tend to focus 
on contractor versus consultant performance (rather than the form of contract) and therefore 
tend to align with interview findings that the early collaboration of 2S-ECI is generally 
perceived as advantageous, but that this relies on contractors demonstrating real added value. 
The comments support interview and survey findings that opportunity exists for contractors to 
develop specialist ECI skills particularly in buildability analysis and value management, and 
for New Zealand to develop clear contractual provisions and guidance to support 2S-ECI.   
 
Three participants provided comments: 
 
i. ECI is a good idea and works well overseas, unfortunately the majority of main 
Contractors in NZ lack experience and maturity to provide effective ECI services. There 
tends to be a lack of continuity between the pre-construction team and the Construction 
team, as such contractors site teams revert to the traditional model and behaviours 
once the second stage is awarded, and tend to ignore any pre planning advice 
provided by their pre-construction teams. i.e. they use it as a means to get their foot in 
the door. 
 
ii. Consultant construction Manager, tend to have a higher level of maturity and follow 
the spirit of the ECI process through the entire project lifecycle 
 
iii. The current 2-stage ECI process I consider is flawed as has been seen in 2 major 
projects in Christchurch having failed to reach agreement after the pre-construction 
services and the project reverting to a traditional tender with one project being 
abandoned altogether and the other significantly delayed while going back to the 
market. A Managing Contractor process as is utilised in Australia I believe has a much 
better potential of a successful outcome. 
 
The third comment above (iii) also highlights the need for clear pre-construction obligations 
and milestones as recommended by Mosey (2011).  
 
 
7.4.6 Preferred timing of contractor involvement 
Participants were asked to select their typically preferred timing for early contractor 
involvement. Perceptions were mixed about the preferred timing of contractors during the pre-
construction stage. This makes sense as timing of contractor involvement will depend on the 
type of project, client and contractor relationships, and whether it is a head contractor, or 






Table 24: Preferred timing of early involvement  
  Count Total N % 
Before or during preliminary design brief 4 30.8% 
After preliminary design brief, before concept design 4 30.8% 
After concept design, during detailed design brief 5 38.5% 
 
 
7.4.7 Whether payment for early involvement 
Participants were asked to select their preference for whether the contractor is paid for their 
early involvement. All participants felt that contractors should receive financial compensation 
for their early involvement, whether through payment for their involvement, or through profiting 
from the construction project, with no payment for early involvement unless the project does 
not proceed.  No respondents felt that the contractor should simply receive no payment for 
their early involvement. Interestingly, contractors were slightly more inclined to be satisfied 
with no payment for early involvement than consultants. This aligns with the interview findings 
that revealed some contractors did not charge because they saw value in securing the 
construction contract and enjoying a better planned project, and supports findings from prior 
studies (Laryea and Watermeyer, 2016; Rahman and Alhassan, 2012; Song, et al., 2006).  
 
 
Table 25: Whether payment for early involvement  
  Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
Contractor paid for early involvement, 
unless they breach obligations 
1 1 1 1 6 
Contractor not paid 0 0 0 0 0 
Contractor not paid, but reimbursed if 
project does not proceed, subject to any 
breaches 
0 0 1 0 2 
 
 
7.4.8 Form of payment for early involvement 
Participants were asked to select their preferred option for early contractor payment against 
three different times of early involvement. Perceptions were mixed between preferences for a 
fixed fee for early involvement versus some form of cost reimbursement. Cost reimbursement 
was preferred when the contractor is involved before any preliminary design brief, 53.8% 
(23.1% without target value + 30.8% with target value) versus 45.4%. Fixed fee is generally 
preferred after concept design, 46.2% versus 30.8% (23.1% + 7.7%). Fixed fee is slightly 
preferred after design brief before concept design, 46.2% versus 38.5% (15.4% + 23.1%). 
Note that the percentages do not total 100% because not all of the 13 respondents completed 
this question.  
 
 
Table 26: Form of payment for early involvement  
    Count 
Column Total 
N % 
Before or during preliminary design brief Cost reimbursement 3 23.1% 
  Cost reimbursement with 
target value 
4 30.8% 




After prelim design brief, before concept 
design 
Cost reimbursement 2 15.4% 
  Cost reimbursement with 
target value 
3 23.1% 
  Fixed fee 6 46.2% 
After concept design, during detailed 
design 
Cost reimbursement 3 23.1% 
  Cost reimbursement with 
target value 
1 7.7% 
  Fixed fee 6 46.2% 
 
 
7.4.9 Preferred timing of early involvement 
Contractors were split exactly 50:50 on whether to be involved before or after concept design. 
The PM preferred contractor involvement before or during design brief, the Architect preferred 
contractor involvement after design brief before concept design, and the client preference was 
for after concept design. Again, the findings are only relative to the type of project. For 
example, the PM interviewed described a project involving repairs to an existing building 
where the builder was engaged from the beginning largely for their knowledge of the existing 
building. One contractor described being engaged by a developer to work through a resource 
consent for a change of use, and manage stakeholders before any design brief, where the 
client was likely to sell the land once the resource consent was obtained.   
 
 
Table 27: Preferred timing of early involvement  
 Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 






After preliminary design brief, 
before concept design 
  
100.0% 100.0% 12.5% 
After concept design, during 
detailed design brief 
100.0% 




7.4.10 Form of construction stage price 
Participants were asked to select their generally preferred option for the construction stage 
price. The majority of respondents preferred a fixed lump sum over some form of cost 
reimbursement 84.6% versus 23.1% (7.7% + 15.4%). This suggests that 2S-ECI is more 
commonly used in New Zealand commercial construction projects as a means to 
collaboratively plan and negotiate toward a fixed price construction contract, rather than more 
partnering-based models used overseas for infrastructure projects with high unknowns and 
prices based on target value with pain share/ gain share (Rahman and Alhassan 2012; Mosey, 
2011; Whitehead, 2009).   
 
 
Table 28: Preferred form of construction stage price 
  Count Total % 
Cost reimbursement 1 7.7% 
Cost reimbursement with target value or guaranteed maximum 
price 
2 15.4% 






7.4.11 Design and build or construction only  
Participants were asked to select their preferred form of construction-stage contract, 
construction only or design and build. All participants preferred construction only contracts 
over design and build, except for one contractor who generally preferred design and build.  
 
 
Table 29: Preferred form of construction stage price 
 Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
Construction only, possibly with 
some elements of design (e.g., 
facades) 
1 1 2 1 7 
Design and build 0 0 0 0 1 
 
This aligns with the interview findings and again contrasts the assertion by Francis and Kiroff 
(2015) that design and build is the most common form of ECI in the Auckland commercial 
construction market.  
 
 
7.4.12 Whether same contractor for construction stage 
Participants were asked to select their preferred option for the construction stage in terms of 
whether the same contractor is used for both the pre-construction and construction stage, 
unless they breach obligations or a construction price cannot be agreed, or the construction 
stage is tendered separately and open to other contractors.  
 
 
Table 30: Preferred form of construction stage price 
 Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
Same contractor used for pre-
construction and construction-stage, 
unless they breach obligations or a 
construction price cannot be agreed 
1 1 2 1 8 
Construction stage tendered 
separately, and open to other 
contractors 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
All participants felt that the same contractor should be used across the pre-construction and 
construction stage contract. This supports findings by Turner and Riding (2015) and aligns 
with survey participants rating the following benefits as substantial:  
 
Better planned construction works, e.g., more time to understand and plan works, rated 
second most substantial benefit. 
 
Improved knowledge transfer from pre-construction to construction stage workforce, rated 
fourth most substantial benefit. 
 
  
7.4.13 Effect on contractor pricing 
Participants were asked to select the effect of 2S-ECI on head contractor pricing compared 





Perceptions of contractor pricing varied. Admittedly, this question could have been clearer. 
During the questionnaire period, one participant phoned the researcher and asked whether 
this question related to overall contractor pricing for the project, when the original intent of the 
question was to ask whether contractors might apply more or less profit margin on the basis 
that contractors declare their margins in 2S-ECI, but not for competitive tenders. Nevertheless, 
the responses indicate that the client perceived contractors pricing higher in all market 
conditions, the PM, Architect and PQSs perceived higher pricing in recessionary or average 
markets, but the same or lower pricing in boom markets. Contractors’ responses were more 
mixed, though the majority perceived the same or higher pricing in recessionary or average 
markets and the same or lower in boom markets. This supports the interview findings that 2S-
ECI may help to even out the cyclical boom/bust nature of pricing in the construction industry. 
It also supports some interview responses from contractors that wider use of 2S-ECI may 
reduce tendering costs across the market, which supports prior literature (King’s College 
London, 2014; Ma and Xin, 2011). 
 
 
Table 31: Effect of 2S-ECI on head contractor pricing 
  Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
In a recessionary 
market 
Contractor pricing 
lower using 2S-ECI 
        4.2% 
  Same   33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 12.5% 
  Contractor pricing 
higher using 2S-ECI 
33.3%   16.7%   16.7% 
In an average 
market 
Contractor pricing 
lower using 2S-ECI 
        8.3% 
  Same   33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 4.2% 
  Contractor pricing 
higher using 2S-ECI 
33.3%   16.7%   20.8% 
In a boom market Contractor pricing 
lower using 2S-ECI 
  33.3%  16.7% 33.3% 12.5% 
  Same   
 
16.7%   4.2% 
  Contractor pricing 
higher using 2S-ECI 
33.3%       16.7% 
 
 
Participants also provided the following comments: 
 
i. Assume pricing refers to costs to margin, in an ECI project you would expect the pricing 
to include all that is required to complete the project. In a traditional tender you will get 
pricing only for what is detailed not necessarily what is required. ECI entry price should 
be close to the exit price 
 
ii. Contractors are able to manipulate the open book tender process to reduce their own 
commercial risk with subcontractors & suppliers, which results in a higher construction 
cost compared with a competitive tender, there doesn't to be a reduction in the 
quantum of variations through the build period. 
 
iii. This really depends on the 2S-ECI model used rather than the markets. There are a 





iv. ECI 2S works better in a quiet market (far more available resources to meet 
deliverables) but harder to achieve and justify commercially given the hunger in the 
main contractor market.  
 
The first comment (i) suggests the disconnect between interpretation of construction contract 
obligations by construction professionals (PMs, architects, engineers, QSs) and lawyers, as 
evaluated in chapter 5. Similarly comment (ii) supports the interview findings that construction 
professionals are unclear about the contractual effect that early involvement has on contractor 
entitlement to design buildability related claims during the construction stage contract.  
Comment (iii) highlights the need for flexible contract provisions supporting 2S-ECI and 
comment (iv) supports that 2S-ECI may reduce cyclic boom/bust pricing through contractors 
obtaining high prices during recessionary market conditions.  
 
 
7.4.14 Effect on consultant pricing 
The general perception from respondents was that consultant pricing is the same across all 
market types. Although the PQSs perceived sometimes higher prices in boom markets. This 
reflects the interview findings about PQSs sometimes facing considerably more work 
evaluating subcontractor tags and negotiating head contractor rates on large projects. 
Interestingly, only the client perceived both higher contractor and consultant pricing across all 
market conditions. This perhaps reflects one of the challenges identified by respondents being 
reluctance from clients to adopt 2S-ECI.  
 
Table 32: Effect of 2S-ECI on head consultant pricing 
  Client PM PQS Architect 
Head 
Contractor 
              
In a recessionary 
market 
Consultant pricing 
lower using 2S-ECI 
    
5.6% 
  Same 
 
33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 22.2% 
  Consultant pricing 
higher using 2S-ECI 
33.3% 
   
5.6% 
In an average 
market 
Consultant pricing 
lower using 2S-ECI 
     
  Same 
 
33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 27.8% 
  Consultant pricing 
higher using 2S-ECI 
33.3% 
   
5.6% 
In a boom market Consultant pricing 
lower using 2S-ECI 
    
5.6% 
  Same 
 
33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 
  Consultant pricing 








Participants also provided the following comments: 
 
i. Answered based on Designers. Big differences for PM and QS though which can be 
more.  
 
ii. For the QS, the increased workload is in procurement. 2 stage and progressive trade 
letting of 40 to 50 trades and open book audit nature can in some cases take years not 
weeks/months. Can save time in front end estimating and in post contract and price is 





iii. Consultants tend to have higher fee submissions due to increase in meetings, 
correspondence and dealing with the contractor as there is a tendency for the 
contractor to do a lot of optioneering through the project, which don't always align with 
the expected benefits and requirements of the project. (i.e. minor cost savings at the 
expense of value and whole of life costs) 
 
Comments (i) and (ii) recognise the potential increase in consultant workload, particularly for 
PQSs working on large projects. Comment (iii) further reinforces for the need for clear pre-
construction obligations and milestones to mitigate the risk of delay resulting from ‘too many 




Participants were asked to rate the listed challenges to using 2S-ECI: 1 – no challenge, 2 – 
minor challenge, 3 – moderate challenge, 4 – substantial challenge. All challenges were 
perceived as at least minor.  ‘Difficulty measuring actual benefits’, ‘incomplete design 
documentation when agreeing a fixed price construction contract’, ‘unclear client 
expectations’, ‘theoretical benefits not being realised, i.e., lack of real added value’, ‘lack of 
clear definition of 2S-ECI’ and ‘perceived lack of competitive pricing’ were the biggest 
challenges (between moderate and substantial). These suggest an overall lack of clarity about 
2S-ECI contractual provisions. This might suggest that ‘lack of standard form pre-construction 
contract documentation’ would be ranked higher (minor to moderate). However, none of the 
interviewees were aware of any standard form PCSAs, and when shown the JCT PCSA and 
NEC ECI Clause, some interviewees highlighted the need for flexible provisions to suit project 
types and user preferences.  
 
It is conceivable that amending contract terms to transfer risks to contractors may feature more 
in single-stage tenders, rather than in 2S-ECI where risks can be managed more 
collaboratively. However, ‘amendment of standard form contracts (such as NZS3910) to 




Table 33: Challenges to using 2S-ECI  
  
Mean 
Difficulty measuring actual benefits 3.2 
Incomplete design documentation when agreeing a fixed price construction 
contract 
3.2 
Unclear client expectations 3.2 
Theoretical benefits not being realised, i.e., lack of real added value 3.2 
Lack of clear definition of 2S-ECI 3.1 
Perceived lack of competitive pricing 3.1 
Unclear responsibilities 2.8 
2S-ECI perceived as more expensive 2.8 
Consultants transferring design risks to contractors 2.8 
Lack of standard form pre- construction contract documentation 2.7 
Use of 2S-ECI on wrong project type 2.6 
Amendment of standard form contracts (such as NZS3910) to transfer 
contractual risks to contractors 
2.5 




Difficulty involving specialist subcontractors early, in terms of contractual 




Contractors generally rated all the challenges more substantial than the consultants, with 
‘perceived lack of competitive pricing’, and ‘2S-ECI perceived as more expensive’, top of the 
contractors list. This suggests that contractors see benefit in securing projects through 2S-ECI 
and feel that they struggle to convince consultants of the benefits, although ‘unwillingness 
from consultants to involve contractors early’ was rated slightly lower (minor to moderate 
challenge). This is somewhat reflected by the comment provided by a consultant: ‘Contractors 
treating the process as little more than a foot in the door to negotiate a project at Stage 2.’ 
 
 
Table 34: Challenges to using 2S-ECI per role type  
 
Client PM PQS Architect Head 
Contractor 
Perceived lack of competitive pricing 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 3.5 
2S-ECI perceived as more 
expensive 
3.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 3.3 
Unclear client expectations 4.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.3 
Difficulty measuring actual benefits 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 
Incomplete design documentation 
when agreeing a fixed price 
construction contract 
4.0 1.0 3.5 4.0 3.3 
Theoretical benefits not being 
realised, i.e., lack of real added 
value 
4.0 3.0 3.5 2.0 3.1 
Consultants transferring design risks 
to contractors 
2.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Lack of standard form pre- 
construction contract documentation 
3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.9 
Lack of clear definition of 2S-ECI 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 2.8 
Unclear responsibilities 4.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 2.8 
Unwillingness from consultants to 
involve contractors early 
3.0 1.0 2.5 1.0 2.6 
Use of 2S-ECI on wrong project type 3.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 2.5 
Difficulty involving specialist 
subcontractors early, in terms of 
contractual and pricing procedures 
3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.4 
Amendment of standard form 
contracts (such as NZS3910) to 
transfer contractual risks to 
contractors 
2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.4 
 
 
7.4.16 Opportunities to for improvement 
Participants were asked to rate the listed strategies to improve 2S-ECI: 1 – no benefit, 2 – 
minor benefit, 3 – moderate benefit, 4 – substantial benefit. Perceptions were fairly consistent 
across role types. Interestingly, contractors saw substantial opportunity for ‘contractors 
improving 2S-ECI capability (e.g., value management, design coordination and design 
buildability analysis)’ as did the client and consultants. ‘Improving quality of design 
documentation when agreeing fixed price construction contracts’ was also perceived as 
substantial, which aligns with the strong feedback from interviewees that the quality of design 




standard form pre-construction services agreement, while maintaining flexibility for different 
clients and project types’ was generally perceived as providing moderate opportunity for 
improving 2S-ECI. A standard form PCSA may also help address other opportunities such as 
‘improving the clarity of pre-construction responsibilities’ (rated moderate to substantial).  
 
 
Table 35: Opportunities to improve 2S-ECI  
  
Mean 
Contractors improving 2S-ECI capability (e.g., value management, design 
coordination and design buildability analysis) 
3.8 
Improving quality of design documentation when agreeing fixed price 
construction contracts 
3.7 
Improving the clarity of pre-construction responsibilities 3.5 
Improving contractual mechanisms for involving specialist subcontractors 
early 
3.3 
Reducing amendment of standard form construction contracts (e.g., 
NZS3910) transferring risks to contractors 
3.1 
Producing 'how to' guidelines for using 2S-ECI (e.g., suitable project 
types, expected benefits, responsibilities, pricing options etc.) 
3.1 
Developing a standard form pre-construction services agreement, while 




Table 36: Opportunities to improve 2S-ECI per role type 
 
Client PM PQS Architect Head 
Contractor 
Contractors improving 2S-ECI capability (e.g., value 
management, design coordination and design 
buildability analysis) 
4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 
Improving quality of design documentation when 
agreeing fixed price construction contracts 
4.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.8 
Improving the clarity of pre-construction 
responsibilities 
4.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.6 
Developing a standard form pre-construction 
services agreement, while maintaining flexibility for 
different clients and project types 
3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.1 
Improving contractual mechanisms for involving 
specialist subcontractors early 
4.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.1 
Reducing amendment of standard form 
construction contracts (e.g., NZS3910) transferring 
risks to contractors 
3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 
Producing 'how to' guidelines for using 2S-ECI 
(e.g., suitable project types, expected benefits, 
responsibilities, pricing options etc.) 
3.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.9 
 
 
Participants provided the following comments: 
 
i. Establishing a commercial arrangement for the whole project before entering into pre-
construction services; potentially with a pain/gain sharing arrangement 
 






Comment (i) again highlights the need for flexible 2S-ECI contract provisions to support timing 
and pricing arrangements and (ii) reinforces the need for clear pre-construction obligations 
and milestones.  
 
7.5 SUMMARY OF KEY SURVEY FINDINGS 
The interview findings generally align with the interview findings, improving validity of the 
research findings through triangulation.  
 
All participants felt that the 2S-ECI was best suited to projects benefiting from contractor’s 
logistical planning to plan construction around ongoing client operations. All thought that the 
same contractor should be retained across the pre-construction and construction stages, 
recognising the benefits associated with better planned projects and improved knowledge 
transfer from pre-construction to construction stage.   
 
Findings suggest there is opportunity to improve 2S-ECI through developing clearer 
contractual provisions. No interviewees were aware of standard form PCSAs, leaving New 
Zealand clients and consultants to draft their own, often informal, bespoke provisions.  
 
A key theme was the need for clear pre-construction obligations and milestones. This aligns 
with interview findings and prior literature (Mosey, 2011, Whitehead, 2009). This could operate 
to protect both parties. For instance, if the contractor is paid for their early involvement on a 
cost reimbursement basis, the client runs the risk of incurring extra contractor costs if design 
development takes longer than expected. If the contractor is paid a fixed fee for early 
involvement, this effectively becomes a fixed-price contract. The contractor may then be 
entitled to claim prolongation costs if delayed by the client’s consultants, constituting an act of 
prevention at common law. The client would not risk this in the case of single-stage tender. 
Some interview responses demonstrated how this can influence perceptions of 2S-ECI. One 
contractor said they had never charged for their early involvement. They held a positive view 
of ECI, saying that on those projects ‘ECI added real value.’ In that instance, the contractor 
noted strong ongoing client/contractor relationships. Two contractors said that when they do 
not charge for ECI or charge a fixed fee, they are incentivised to drive the design process in 
order to get started on site without incurring escalating ECI costs. One contractor estimated 
their actual ECI costs at approximately $90,000 for a $16 million project. On the other hand, a 
PQS had worked on projects where the contractor was paid for early involvement, and the 
contractor claimed increased fees when the design was delayed. That PQS commented that 
‘we remain dubious about the real benefits of ECI.’  
 
Another theme was the need for flexible contract provisions to support 2S-ECI. The mixed 
perceptions around timing and payment of early involvement demonstrate that any standard 
form PCSA needs to provide flexibility to accommodate the different project types and user 
preferences. Accordingly, different project types will likely benefit from different pre-
construction services.  Therefore, any PCSA should provide a range of pre-construction 
services for parties to select from to suit their project and agree clear milestones for all parties 
to fulfill their obligations.  
 
Findings across interviews and survey responses also suggest a disconnect between 
interpretation of construction contract obligations between construction professionals and 
lawyers, particularly in terms of contractor entitlement to claim for design related issues and 


















Chapter 8: Conclusions - 2S-ECI Framework application 
 
This chapter discusses the framework for 2S-ECI in New Zealand construction in terms of its 
effect on risks, optimal contractual ingredients, effect on market pricing and overall benefits, 
challenges and opportunities for improvement and scope for further research. Figure 14 
depicts the key contractual parameters as informed through this research. The flexible 
contractual arrangements needed to support different project types, as suggested by 
interviewees, are evident from the range of scope of pre-construction services and options for 
pricing and form of construction contract.  
 
 






8.1 EFFECT ON RISK 
It is contractors who are the masters of how. When applied well 2S-ECI should help to improve 
the quality of risk management particularly associated with design buildability. Through 2S-
ECI, contractors can be engaged early (before detailed design) to explore the optimal design 
methodology and working with (not against) the consultant design team. The contractor’s 
methodology may include enabling works such as testing ground conditions, uncovering latent 
structural, services, or non-compliance work such as passive fire, seismic works or asbestos. 
Through 2S-ECI, project budgets can be staged alongside the method development. 
 
Engaging contractors early can be particularly beneficial on projects when the clients’ building 
operation are to remain in operation during the construction works. Any price premium paid 
for negotiating with a good contractor may be far the cost incurred to disrupt schools, hotels, 
accommodation, airports, or hospitals. It is the contractor who is named responsible for ‘how’ 
the building is to be built using labour and materials in NZS3910 and the New Zealand Building 
Act and therefore seems sensible to afford them some level of input to design thinking of 
complex buildings with complex methodologies. The more open-book pricing approach of 2S-
ECI also supports supply-chain integration, and lessons learnt from project to project for 





9.2 OPTIMAL PCSA INGREDIENTS  
A proposed standard form pre-construction services agreement (PCSA) has been drafted (see 
Appendix 4) based on the findings of this research. The structure and drafting style has been 
modelled on the NZIQS Contract for Quantity Surveying Consultancy Services. A clear theme 
from the interviews was the lack of clarity around 2S-ECI with many practitioners seeing 
benefit in the development of a standard form PCSA. This study has established the key 
ingredients of a standard form PCSA for use in New Zealand commercial construction 
projects. Based on the findings, the PCSA should clearly set out among other things:  
(i) the scope of services to be provided by the contractor such as planning, 
budgeting, buildability evaluation, risk management, value management, and 
subcontractor procurement;  
(ii) key milestones for communication exchange and supply of elements;  
(iii) who owns intellectual property;  
(iv) whether or how the contractor is paid for their early-involvement;  
(v) under what grounds the client can terminate the project;  
(vi) what happens if the project does not proceed to the construction phase; and  
(vii) parties’ obligations around design and construction, whether for individual 
elements or for the overall design, and the contractor’s early notification of 
design issues.  
The following sections explain these key ingredients.  
 
9.2.1 Project scope 
The scope should include a description of the works, including any project staging, exploratory 
or enabling works, and the project duration and any liquidated damages for late completion. 






9.2.2 Duty of care 
The contractor is employed to provide pre-construction services not to construct a product. 
Therefore, the PCSA should require the constructor to take reasonable skill and care.  
 
9.2.3 Liability for providing design advice  
The contractor may critique the design and provide alternative design options. These options 
are approved by the design team. Therefore, the PCSA should specify that the contractor 
takes no liability for any design, and that the terms of the construction contract will prevail once 
a construction contract is agreed. This follows the approach taken in the JCT PCSA. This 
provides for the design being novated to the contractor. 
 
9.2.4 Selection of pre-construction services  
The PCSA should list the possible pre-construction services under specific conditions. This 
enables the parties to agree on the scope, and provides flexibility for different project types. 
The pre-construction services can be linked to pre-construction milestones for clarity and to 
minimise the risk of the design stage being delayed due to ‘too many chefs in the kitchen.’  
 
9.2.5 Pre-construction milestones  
Specifying pre-construction milestones protects all parties from the design stage being 
delayed. The contractor risks incurring costs over and above their fixed ECI fee or the client 
risks incurring unnecessary costs if the contractor is employed on a cost reimbursement basis.  
Delay to the design stage also risks condensing detailed drawings or the construction period 
available, or delay to the project completion.  
 
9.2.6 Payment and termination provisions  
The contractor may be employed on a fixed ECI fee. One popular option is to not pay the 
contractor an ECI fee unless the project is terminated. If the project proceeds, the contractor’s 
P&G is deemed to include their ECI fee. This may be set at zero if the parties agree on the 
basis that the contractor benefits from the early involvement and earns fair profit for the 
construction contract. Contractors incur costs in competitive tendering where they may only 
secure say one in ten projects. However, they are likely to incur more cost through 2S-ECI 
when they involve project managers and site management to analysis buildability and explore 
design options.  
 
9.2.7 Insurances   
The PCSA should require the contractor to provide professional indemnity insurance for 
providing services and construction works for any enabling works. There should be provision 
for maintaining the professional indemnity insurance beyond the project completion.   
 
9.2.8 Project team and retaining key people  
The PCSA should state the parties to the contract. It should also state the ECI team 
composition of the contractor’s ECI team and restrict the contractor from removing or 
substituting key people without agreement with the client.  
 
The contractor may provide project managers and site managers to evaluate design 
buildability. Some contractors are involving employees with backgrounds in building services 
engineering or architecture. The composition of the contractor’s ECI team may influence what 
is reasonable foreseeable in the construction contract, such as NZS3910: 2013 2.7.4 





9.2.9 Provisions for documentation inconsistencies or ambiguities  
2S-ECI provides greater opportunity to iron out issues during the design stage to reduce 
claims and disputes during construction. Most interviewees expected contractors to minimise 
claims during construction, but could not articulate any contractual requirement for this. Some 
interviewees described how the quality and completeness of design documentation is crucial 
when agreeing a fixed price construction contract in order to minimise the risk of time and 
budget blowouts.  
 
PCSA provisions should require the contractor to warn of document inconsistencies and 
ambiguities that are reasonably foreseeable by the contractor’s ECI team, ahead of agreeing 
a fixed-price construction contract. This will reduce the contractor’s entitlement to claim 
variations under NZS3910: 2013 2.7.4 for reasonably unforeseeable ambiguities that, after 
clarification from the engineer, result in additional time or cost.  
 
A provision may also be included that enables the contractor to approve the quality of design 
documentation before agreeing fixed price construction contract.  
 
 
9.3 2S-ECI EFFECT ON MARKET PRICING 
 
2S-ECI may help address the problem of contractual risk transfer in New Zealand. Risks can 
be identified and managed collaboratively through 2S-ECI rather than transferred onto 
contractors who bid competitively, with the lowest price typically winning the bid.   
 
The open-book approach to 2S-ECI may reduce the cyclical boom/bust nature of construction 
industry pricing. Open book pricing generally means more consistent and fairer rates, rather 
than purely market driven supply and demand.  
 
If more projects were procured through 2S-ECI, then contractors’ tendering costs may be 
reduced. Only the contractor appointed for the pre-construction stage invests the resource to 
price the construction works, compared to open tender where contractors may have a one in 
10 chance of winning the bid. Open tenders inevitably drive tender prices down in highly 
competitive markets, which may seem attractive to clients and consultants. However, this 
increases the risk of contractors claiming aggressively or taking shortcuts to complete the 
project within their budget, or worse, the contractor goes into liquidation midday through the 
project.  
 
The perceptions were mixed in New Zealand about the effect of 2S-ECI on overall project cost. 
More research is needed in this area. The United Kingdom government has reported 
substantial savings in the order of 15-20% through ECI and supply chain integration. Such 
savings would be significant for the New Zealand construction sector. While the United 
Kingdom government has focused on public sector construction and infrastructure works, the 
findings from this research study suggest potential for gains in the private sector, particularly 







2S-ECI provides a synergy between partnering relational procurement with traditional 
competitive tender bid. The collaborative approach to risk management early in design, is 
generally seen as a key advantage of 2S-ECI.  
 
2S-ECI provides a comparatively fair and transparent pricing system. Pricing by agreement 
supports ongoing supply chain integration, where parties continuously improve project-to-
project through lessons learnt and better understanding each other’s operations. Then, the 
construction contract is agreed, the head contractor adopts the same standards or stricter, 
than they would have through a traditional tender bid. The threshold of what may be 
reasonably foreseeable in terms of contractors warning of documentation issues or physical 
conditions may be considered higher after the contractor has been involved in design 
development, and taking into account the composition of their ECI team which may include 






Contractors may also add value through contributing to value management, being close to 
subcontractors and suppliers and having access to detailed pricing. However, all this is heavily 
contingent on the contractor having the motivation, skills and resource to demonstrate real 
added value. The starting point is selecting the right project type for 2S-ECI that lends itself 
improvement by contractor input.  
 
Moving from a traditional lost bid mind-set to a more collaborative and relational focus may 
require training and cultural changes. This can take time and money. There is also a current 







8.4 2S-ECI GUIDANCE 
One of the main challenges identified with 2S-ECI is the difficulty in measuring the benefits of 
engaging the contractor during the design stage. The benefits of 2S-ECI may be difficult to 
measure objectively given that every project is unique, and using 2S-ECI on the wrong project 
or under the wrong conditions may result in expectations not being met. The following 
guidance is aimed at ensuring 2S-ECI provides optimal value based on the findings of this 
study.  
 
8.4.1 Project suitability  
The starting point is deciding whether 2S-ECI should be used on the particular project. 2S-
ECI is best suited to the following project features:  
 




(ii) 2S-ECI as a means of open-book negotiation to support client/contractor 
relationships, or to secure resources in heated markets (all clients, PMs, architects 
and contractors, and 4 PQSs);  
(iii) Complex design solutions benefiting from contractor input (all PMs, architects and 
clients, 4 PQSs, and 4 contractors), and;  
(iv) Projects requiring fast-tracking (3 contractors, 3 PQSs, and one architect).  
There may be little benefit that contractors can contribute to straightforward on-time projects. 
A single-stage competitive tender process may be suitable for those projects. This could be 
on a selective or open tender basis.  
 
8.4.2 Whether head contract or consultancy contract for services  
The entity employed during the pre-construction stage provides services. The same duty of 
care applies whether the entity operates as a head contractor or a consultant construction 
manager (CCM). The difference is that the CCM continues to provide services during the 
construction stage, representing the client, whereas, the head contractor enters into a 
construction contract, typically on a fixed price basis. The head contactor has a stricter liability 
and provides single-point accountability. For example, the contractor must remedy any defects 
or pay liquidated damages for late completion without the client having to establish negligence. 
Clients that are experienced in construction may opt for the CCM procurement pathway where 
they employ the trade contractors directly and engage a consultant (or an employee) to 
manage them. The remainder of this section uses the term ‘contractor’ for the PCSA as the 
provisions at the pre-construction stage are effectively the same.   
 
8.4.3 Single or multiple contractors  
There are clear benefits in maintaining the same contractor from the pre-construction to the 
construction stage. A key advantage of 2S-ECI is the ability for contractors to better plan the 
construction works, regardless of the value they might add to design buildability. Through 2S-
ECI contractors have more time to examine the drawings, prepare construction programmes 
and methods and order materials. Contractors can also involve their site management team 
in the planning process to better integrate pricing, project management and site management 
planning. This is supported by the interview findings and literature (Laryea and Watermeyer, 
2016; Turner and Riding, 2015).  
 
Involving multiple contractors during the design stage is likely problematic. Once appointed 
for the pre-construction stage, contractors should be more invested in the project because 
they are reasonably assured of securing the construction contract. This incentivises 
contractors to ensure the project does proceed within the client’s budget. Contractors are more 
likely to invest greater time in planning and avoid unnecessary pricing assumptions (Mosey, 
2011). Involving more than one contractor during the pre-construction stage means that only 
one contractor is reasonably assured of securing the construction contract. This is similar to a 
selective tender process. Depending on market conditions, contractors may invest less time 
and effort. If both contractors are paid for their early involvement, there is little incentive to 
drive project efficiency. Instead, if both contractors are reimbursed for their time, they may 
enjoy an extended design process while they pursue other projects, increasing costs to the 
client. Contractors may also be reluctant to share intellectual property such as pricing 
information or innovative construction methods when these may be shared with another 
contractor. A preferred approach would be to focus on engaging the best contractor. The open-
book pricing of 2S-ECI supports a quality based contractor selection. The contractor’s ECI 
team can be interviewed for their ability to foresee risks and add value, as recommended by 
Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi, Savicky (2009). This research showed no evidence of multiple 





8.4.5 Whether construction only or design and build 
A potential drawback of design and build procurement is that the contractor may be 
incentivised to pursue cost and time efficiencies at the expense of design aesthetics. 2S-ECI 
enables contractor design input while the client retains design decision-making. However, the 
client may choose for the design to be novated to the contractor in order to enjoy single-point 
accountability for design and construction, and to reduce the contractor’s ability to claim for 
design related issues. However, contracts such as NZS3910:2013 reduce the contractor’s 
liability for design from absolute liability to that of reasonable skill and care, meaning that 
design related issues can be passed on to the client, possibly through a contingency sum. 
This research has found that most of the time 2S-ECI is used with construction-only contracts 
in New Zealand.  
 
8.4.6 Timing of involvement 
Timing of contractor involvement depends on the type of project. Most commonly the head 
contractor is involved after concept design and some detailed design is complete. The 
contractor’s ability to add value is reduced if the design is too advanced. Head contractors can 
typically price their P&G and set an ECI fee based on concept design, project duration and 
any liquidated damages.   
 
2S-ECI provides an opportunity to reduce project risk through the contractor carrying out 
exploratory works. In traditional competitive tenders, it is impractical for multiple contractors to 
test ground conditions or explore building elements by removing linings within the building. 
Involving the contractor too late may reduce the opportunity to mitigate the risk of, for example, 
re-designing foundations for unforeseen ground conditions, or uncovering asbestos or 
unexpected structure or building services.  
 
Some projects may benefit from involving the contractor earlier. For example, the contractor 
may be employed to provide preliminary budgets and work through resource consent 
applications and manage stakeholders. While this tends to be the exception, the PCSA should 
provide flexibility for different project types.  
 
8.4.7 2S-ECI and effect on off-site manufacturing and pre-fabrication  
 
The following journal article has been published based on this section:  
 
• Finnie, D, Ameer Ali N and Park K. (2018) Enhancing offsite manufacturing and 
prefabrication through early contractor involvement (ECI) in New Zealand. 
Management Procurement and Law, 171(4):1-35 
https://doi.org/10.1680/jmapl.17.00029  
 
2S-ECI supports projects that require early planning, such as off-site manufacturing and 
modular construction. Off-site manufacturing (OSM) is a form of modern method of 
construction (MMC) in which a key principle is to transfer work off-site, and includes systems 
such as modules, volumetric pods, panels and hybrid components (Wilkinson and Scofield, 
2010). 
 
Some of the benefits have been described by Wilkinson and Scofield (2010), including 
reduced on-site congestion, shortened project durations, reduced time-related costs allowing 
for earlier building close-in, reduced labour costs and improved quality through producing work 
in more controlled environments. However, there are numerous challenges associated with 
OSM. The design must be finalised earlier, making changes during the construction phase 
more difficult. In addition, tolerances can be difficult to maintain, resulting in connectivity 
issues; transported units are subject to size and weight restrictions; units require protection 




when promised. Tradespeople who are passionate about their craft may be reluctant to adopt 
OSM processes. 
 
Despite drivers towards the MMC concept, its uptake is not without challenges. Shahzad 
(2011) classifies the main barriers to the adoption of OSM in New Zealand into seven broad 
categories (in descending order of impact and relative contributions): industry and market 
culture (16.2%), skills and knowledge (15.5%), logistics and site operations (14.8%), 
cost/value/productivity (14%), supply chain and procurement (13.7%), process and 
programme (13.6%) and regulatory issues (12.2%). Under the category of industry and market 
culture, a conservative market approach and client mind-set was found to be a prominent 
constraint. The limited expertise of designers to handle OSM designs and the lack of 
experienced manufacturers were constraints under skills and knowledge. The lack of research 
and development into OSM was also noted. Design-related issues were the most prominent 
constraints under process and programme. The main issue is that OSM design choices must 
be made during design development, resulting in limited freedom to make design changes 
after the construction phase starts. Another issue relates to connectivity problems on-site and 
the potential ‘mismatch between design and the manufacturing process’ (Shahzad, 2011: p. 
47). Issues associated with transporting large modular or pre-fabricated units and site 
restrictions affecting space required for craneage and manoeuvrability of heavy plant and 
equipment were the most significant constraints under logistics and site operations. This 
correlates with the main constraints under the cost/value/productivity category, which include 
concerns about increased project costs for transportation of OSM units, particularly modular 
or large units, and for the increased use of craneage. 
 
Most of the constraints, including difficulties for designers to incorporate OSM technology, 
connectivity and potential mismatch between design and manufacturing and issues with 
transportation and site restrictions, may be summarised as design buildability issues. Some 
of these may also contribute to the first constraint – conservative market culture – particularly 
given the need to finalise design decisions earlier and the consequent difficulty to make 
changes during construction. Because OSM integrates design and manufacturing, it is critical 
to involve key manufacturers in the design process. Indeed, the integration of construction 
knowledge to maximise project performance is at the heart of the definitions of ‘constructability’ 
(see CII (1998) and CIIA (1992)), which, according to Jergeas (2009), is used interchangeably 
with the term ‘buildability’. 
 
The most prominent barrier to the uptake of OSM was the reluctance to adopt unfamiliar 
processes. Jergeas and Put (2001) found the risk aversion by owners and lack of knowledge 
of latest construction methods to be a key barrier to innovation. A key advantage of traditional 
lump sum contracts is that the procedures are well understood and the standard forms of 
construction contract provide familiarity and reliability through being well tried in case law 
(Ashworth, 2012; Kirkham, 2007). Traditional lump sum contracts remain the dominant 
contract form, accounting for about 75 percent of construction projects by number in the United 
Kingdom, with design and build the second most used at around 17.5 percent (RICS, 2010).  
 
Therefore, the optimal procurement strategy to enhance OSM should enable contractor 
involvement in the design, effectively allocate the risks of design and buildability, enable 
competitive lump sum pricing, and be developed in the form of a standard model than can 
become familiar and tested over time.  
 
Design and build procurement would be suitable for projects with OSM where the design is 
straightforward and changes during construction are unlikely. Under 2S-ECI the consultant or 
head contractor can provide input to the design around planning and buildability, while the 
client retains ownership of the design. The project can be fast-tracked by overlapping design 
and construction and OSM elements can be ordered in time to avoid delay. If pricing is equal, 




consultant construction manager (CCM) for lay clients. Under the construction management 
(CM) procurement model, the client employs the specialist contractors directly with a 
consultant CCM to manage them and so adopts more risk than the single-point accountability 
of a head contractor. 
 
2S-ECI offers advantages for projects that use OSM technologies. Designers and contractors 
can work collaboratively in developing the design, managing risks, undertaking value 
management exercises, and procuring specialist subcontractors. The contractor can evaluate 
costs and buildability of design options, for example comparing OSM technology with more 
traditional assemblies, and adopt clearer contractual responsibility for design buildability than 
is afforded under many standard forms of construction contracts. The more integrated 
approach overcomes current segmentation, enabling clients and designers to make more 
informed decisions about adopting OSM, and can reduce the potential for future buildability 
problems and related variations and disputes during construction. Depending on whether or 
how the contractor is paid for their early involvement there may be little or no additional cost 
to the client - recognizing the benefit to the contractor of a better planned and more buildable 
project.  
 
A standard form PCSA could help overcome the barrier to OSM relating to conservative 
market culture by becoming familiar and tested over time. Provision for competitive lump sum 
pricing across all tiers of the supply chain may also suit risk adverse clients. To the extent that 
a standard model for two-stage ECI becomes recognised for reducing design buildability risk, 
it is conceivable that in extreme cases consultants could potentially be held negligent for not 
recommending ECI processes for complex projects for exposing their client to unjustifiable 
design buildability risks.  
 
8.5 OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
8.5.1 Education 
 
Interviewees highlighted the lack of 2S-ECI definition and the reluctance of clients and 
consultants to adopt 2S-ECI. A clear framework for 2S-ECI and development of a standard 
form PCSA would provide greater clarity, making it possible to incorporate 2S-ECI into tertiary 
construction programmes when teaching about procurement pathways.  
 
This study has also highlighted the need for construction tertiary education programmes to 
incorporate content covering contract law, value management, buildability analysis, and 2S-
ECI as a procurement pathway. The majority of interviewees were unable to articulate the 
effect of early contractor involvement on the contractor’s ability to claim for design delated 
issues during construction. A theme from the interviewees was that 2S-ECI requires a different 
approach and skillset from that of the traditional building company who simply tenders and 
builds what has been designed. Generally, interviewees saw the benefit of early collaboration 
through 2S-ECI, but qualified this with the need for contractors to provide genuine added 
value, particularly in value management and design buildability analysis, including design 
coordination. From the survey findings, the highest rated opportunity to improve 2S-ECI was 
found to be: ‘Contractors improving 2S-ECI capability (e.g., value management, design 
coordination and design buildability analysis).’ In response to these findings, the following 
courses have been incorporated in Otago Polytechnic’s Bachelor of Construction (Quantity 
Surveying) degree as an outcome of this research. Once introduced, the curriculum influence 
may be studied through interviewing or surveying graduates and their employers. 
 
• A Construction Law (15 credit) level 7 course focusing on claim entitlement to design 





• Value Management (15 credits) level 6 course with a focus on value management 
processes and buildability analysis. 
 
• A new third-year course is also being developed, Design Buildability and Building 
Information Modelling BIM (15 credits) level 7. Students will develop skills in 
coordinating construction elements through using computer aided clash detection 
systems. They will also learn to navigate building designs in 3D BIM.  
 
There may be opportunity for tertiary education to focus on qualifications for commercial 
construction site managers. Site managers may contribute valuable planning and buildability 
input during the pre-construction stage. Five interviewees (across disciplines) highlighted the 
advantage of communicating pre-construction thinking across construction-stage site teams 
and potential involvement of site managers in the contractor’s ECI team. In New Zealand, site 
managers are typically drawn from tradespeople who have become forepersons and then site 
managers (CareersNZ, 2019) rather than diploma or degree graduates who often enrolled into 
tertiary programmes from secondary school or retrained from other vocations. Many site 
managers have developed rich knowledge about how buildings connect together through their 
onsite trade experience, including the detailed sequencing of tasks and coordination of 
subcontractors. Yet, from the researcher’s experience, many experienced site managers are 
operating with trade qualifications. A potential reason for this is the time required to study a 
degree or diploma part-time while working. Recall the argument by one PQS: ‘Need resource 
(across all sides of the table), specifically more skilled design managers (many projects don’t 
have them), more experienced site managers giving advice who know how to build (and not 
fresh faced “paper” PM’s out of school.’ Most interviewees perceived a benefit of early 
collaboration through 2S-ECI but qualified this with the need for contractors to focus on 
upskilling in the areas of value management and buildability analysis. Further research could 
explore opportunities to upskill and qualify experienced construction site managers.  
 
 
8.5.2 Contract development 
 
The key ingredients of a standard form PCSA have been established in this study. The next 
stage is to draft a PCSA contract document. Then feedback on the draft may be obtained from 
potential users, lawyers and professional bodies. Once published, use of the PCSA may be 
researched through case studies toward continuous improvement.  
 
Further research is needed to measure the effect of 2S-ECI on overall project cost. A theme 
from the interviews was the lack of clear measurables when using 2S-ECI. A clear 2S-ECI 
contractual framework and standard form PCSA enables clearer comparisons with traditional 
procurement methods. For example, case studies may explore user perceptions of project 
costs using the PCSA. The method used by the United Kingdom government could also be 
applied where final construction costs of projects procured through 2S-ECI are compared with 
industry benchmark costs. This approach could be used in New Zealand to compare costs 
between commercial projects procurement through 2S-ECI with average benchmark costs 
sourced through the QV Cost Builder (Quotable Value Limited, 2019). 
 
Further research could explore subcontractor perceptions of 2S-ECI toward developing the 
optimal contractual mechanisms for involving them during the design stage. Some 
interviewees spoke about developing their own contractual procedures for involving specialist 
subcontractors during the design stage. A limitation of this study is the exclusion of 
subcontractors from the interviewees. Specialist subcontractors are commonly involved during 





The perceptions of 2S-ECI could be explored when used during the rebuild in Christchurch 
following the 2011 earthquakes. The lack of focus on Christchurch is not considered to reduce 
the quality of this study because (i) many interviewees worked for nationwide companies and 
communicated across divisions, and (ii) the Christchurch earthquake represents an 
exceptional market environment, not the norm. Nonetheless, the high-profile project failures 
using 2S-ECI and feedback from interviewees, suggest that Christchurch may provide further 
lessons learnt about 2S-ECI under very challenging conditions.  
 
 
8.5.3 Toward a universal pre-construction services agreement (PCSA) for two-stage early 
contractor involvement (2S-ECI) 
 
It is submitted that a universal PCSA could be developed for use with many standard 
construction contracts, such as AS4000, FIDIC, JCT, NZIA SCC and NZS3910, to support 
better project planning through 2S-ECI. In 2S-ECI, parties generally work toward agreeing a 
construction contract. The construction contract may be either construction-only or novated 
design and build, with a price based on fixed lump sum, cost reimbursement or target value. 
 
This study has established the optimal ingredients for a standard form PCSA for New Zealand 
commercial construction projects through evaluating case law, contractual documentation and 
industry perceptions. A standard form PCSA can provide basic ingredients for the pre-
construction stage. Then parties enter a construction contract of their choice. There seems 
potential for such a standard form PCSA to be used with construction contracts internationally 
by, for example, avoiding specifying the legal jurisdiction within the PCSA (as the JCT PCSA 
does).   
 
Despite the well-established benefits of standard form contracts, parties using 2S-ECI must 
draft their own contract agreements for the pre-construction stage, with no standard terms to 
draw on. This is despite the widespread use of standard form construction contracts. Kings 
College London (2014) found that 2S-ECI can achieve substantial efficiencies and savings in 
the order of 10-20% in United Kingdom infrastructure works, and in 2017 published the FAC-
1 Framework Alliance Contract. This contract supports supply chain integration using 2S-ECI 
processes. However, commercial construction projects are often procured on a limited or one-
time basis for private clients who lack the buying power of government bodies who can 
leverage ongoing long-turn relationships with their supply chains. A standard form PCSA 
enables clients to pick up a readymade standard form contract without having to employ 
lawyers to draft something new. This likely helps overcome key barriers to the uptake of 2S-
ECI, being lack of process clarity and clear measurables, and (likely leading to) resistance 
from clients and consultants. The pre-construction stage benefits from standard terms 
covering insurances, consents and payment and the like. These are important for such early 
works as design input, demolition or destructive testing to reveal structure and services, and 
testing for asbestos and ground conditions or carrying out demolition. As one New Zealand 
contractor said about 2S-ECI contracts - ‘there’s no I in team, until everything goes wrong’. 
Yet, only two standard form PCSAs exist, the JCT PCSA and the NEC ECI Clause. The JCT 
PCSA is for use under English law and makes several references to English regulations. The 
NEC ECI Clause is only for use with the NEC design and build or cost reimbursement 
contracts. A universal PCSA that strikes the right balance between consistency and flexibility 
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Appendix 1: Interview schedule 
 
 
• Section 1: General Questions: Collects information on the interviewees and their 





4. No of years’ experience? 
 
• Section 2: Background Information: Collects data relating to the number, type 
and scope of projects procured through ECI that the interviewees have been 
involved in [3 questions].  
 
1. Number of projects procured through ECI? 
2. Range of value? 
3. Types (residential, commercial, industrial)? 
 
• Section 3: Case Study Project Information: Collects data relating to a typical 
construction project (e.g., facility type, complexity, location, cost, timescale, 
procurement method: contractor or consultant, reason for using ECI) [7 questions]. 
 
1. Facility type? 
2. Complexity (simply/ moderate/ complex)? 
3. Location? 
4. Cost ($0 – 100k/ $101 – 500k/ $501k – 1M/ $1M – 10M/ $11 – 50M/ $51 - 
100M/ $101 – 500M/ $500M +)? 
5. Time scale (less than one year/ approx. years)? 
6. Head contractor or consultant manager? 
7. Reason for using ECI? 
 
• Section 4: Issue Identification: Collects data relating to issues identified from the 
literature and risk allocation framework (e.g.., timing of contractor involvement pre-
construction services offered, whether contractor paid for early-involvement, form 
of pricing, procedures for early-termination, ownership of intellectual property, 
obligations and liabilities) [14 questions]: 
 
1. When was the contractor or consultant involved? 
2. What pre-construction services did they provide? 
a. planning and sequencing 
b. buildability 
c. risk mitigation 
d. value management 
e. subcontractor procurement 
f. design management 
g. liaison with local authorities 
h. document or software control (including BIM) 




4. How was the service provider employed for the pre-construction stage: (lump 
sum, declared margins on subcontractors and variations, rates for direct works, 
cost reimbursement)? 
5. Was the service provider paid for their pre-construction services? 
6. What was the form of pricing for the construction stage (lump sum, cost 
reimbursement with or without target value or GMP)? 
7. What were the procedures for early termination? 
8. What were the provisions for intellectual property? 
9. Was the contractor responsible for DB or construction only? 
10. Did the head contractor subcontract all work packages? 
11. Were contractual risks considered at the pre-construction stage?  
12. Were there any interesting issues?  
13. Can you compare how managing issues differs between the entity being 
employed through a contract for works and contract for services?  
14. How clear were contract obligations clear, i.e., absolute liability or reasonable 
skill and care? 
 
• Section 5: Perceptions Information: Collects data relating to perceptions of risk 
and pricing (clarity of recourse for performance breach, pricing transparency, 
control over design decision-making, effect on time, cost, quality, most suitable 
project type) [5 questions]  
 
 
1. What effect does 2S-ECI have on: 
a. Pricing? 
i. Price certainty? 
ii. Overall project cost: 
Transaction cost theory: 
iii. Information cost (information gathering)? 
iv. Project procurement cost (attending meetings, translation of client’s 
needs, training, project preliminary design, transition observation, site 
visits)? 
v. Administration cost (contract administration, decision-making, conflict 
resolution)? 
vi. Enforcement cost (contract enforcement, verifying compliances)? 
 
b. Clarity of contractual risk? 
c. Timing? 
d. Quality? 
e. Design decision-making? 
f. Composition of the project team? 
g. Quality of relationships? 
 
 
2. What is the best suited project type for 2S-ECI? 
3. What are the main barriers to use of 2S-ECI? 
4. What key contractual risks should be considered at the pre-construction stage?  








Appendix 2: Survey schedule: 
 
two stage early contractor involvement 
 
 
Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 
Q1 Introduction   
    
This survey explores the use and perceptions of 2-stage early-contractor involvement in New 
Zealand.    
The questions are based on findings from literature review, document analysis and 21 
interviews conducted in 2018 with senior construction participants across New Zealand.    
2-Stage early contractor involvement is defined as a process where the entity responsible for 
planning and managing construction is (1) employed to provide pre-construction services 
during the design stage, and (2) to deliver the construction works.    
   
 
 






Q2 Consent (part 1) 
 You are invited to participate in this research project being conducted by David Finnie toward 
fulfilment of a doctoral degree at the School of Engineering and Advanced Technology, 
Massey University. The purpose of the project is to develop a process model for two-stage 
early-contractor involvement for the New Zealand construction industry.    
 
 Coding of any comments will be discussed with the research supervisors before 
disseminating. Names of respondents and all comments will be coded to ensure anonymity. 
Any personalized comments will be objectified. For example, if a project participant 
complained about the performance of another, the researcher will establish objective issues, 
such as for example levels of project team relations. Problems such as building defects will 
be described so not to identify contractors. 'Connectivity issues' can describe problems such 
windows or stairs not fitting. 'Delivery issues' can describe late delivery of elements. 'Technical 
supervision' can describe delay caused by for example, engineers not signing-off fire 
penetrations. Sensitive figures such as profit margins, quoted prices etc. will not be stated. If 
provided, they may portray the complexities of evaluating pricing between 2S-ECI and CM to 
inform a decision criteria framework without stating dollar figures. 
    
A summary of the coded findings will be emailed to everyone who completes the survey.  All 
data will be stored securely and destroyed within three-years of the thesis completion.   
   
 
 







Consent (part 2.)   
    
Participant’s Rights   
You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have the 
right to:     decline to answer any particular question; withdraw from the study within one 
month of accepting;   ask any questions about the study at any time during participation; 
provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you give 
permission to the researcher;   be given access to a summary of the project findings 
when it is concluded      
  Compulsory Statement 
 This project has been reviewed and approved by the Massey University Human Ethics 
Committee: Northern, Application NOR 17/48. If you have any concerns about the conduct of 
this research, please contact Dr Ralph Bathurst, Acting Chair, Massey University Human 
Ethics Committee: Northern, email humanethicsnorth@massey.ac.nz    
      
By selecting NEXT you are agreeing to the terms of this research study. 
 
End of Block: Default Question Block 
 
Start of Block: Block 2 
 











Projects requiring logistical planning 
around client's existing business 
operations (1)  o  o  o  o  
Tight time-frames (12)  o  o  o  o  
Designers wanting contractor 
buildability advice for innovative 
design solutions (13)  o  o  o  o  
A means to negotiate with a 
preferred contractor based on client 
- contractor relationships (14)  o  o  o  o  
Utilising specialist contractor input, 
such as for building services of 
cladding systems (2)  o  o  o  o  
A means to secure resources in a 
busy market (3)  o  o  o  o  




























More transparent pricing (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Reduced tendering costs 
(i.e., only the successful 
contractor prices the 
construction stage (12)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Improved project decision-
making (13)  o  o  o  o  o  
Better planned construction 
works, e.g., more time to 
understand and plan works 
(14)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Improved knowledge 
transfer from pre-
construction to construction 
stage workforce (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
More senior input from head 
contractors during pre-
construction (i.e., not just 
estimators) (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Reduced risk of client 
disruption on project 
involving alterations or 
extensions (15)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Improved price certainty, 
i.e., reduced variation 
claims or disputes during 
construction stage (16)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Improved project timing 
certainty (17)  o  o  o  o  o  
Faster project completion 
(18)  o  o  o  o  o  
Reduced chance of 
remedial works (19)  o  o  o  o  o  
Supports ongoing 
relationships (20)  o  o  o  o  o  
Supports more equitable 
risk transfer (21)  o  o  o  o  o  



















Site logistics planning (1)  o  o  o  o  
Value management (12)  o  o  o  o  
Risk management (13)  o  o  o  o  
Collaborative 'open-book' 
subcontractor selection (14)  o  o  o  o  
Design buildability advice (2)  o  o  o  o  
Warning of design document 
errors or inconsistencies (3)  o  o  o  o  
Contractor contributing design 
elements (15)  o  o  o  o  
Building information modeling 
(BIM) (16)  o  o  o  o  
Contractor providing document 
control systems (17)  o  o  o  o  
Contractor leading design 
management (18)  o  o  o  o  
Contractor providing design 
coordination (e.g., services 
coordination) (19)  o  o  o  o  
Contractor liaison with external 
stakeholders (e.g., neighbors 
and local authorities (20)  o  o  o  o  




















Ground conditions (1)  o  o  o  o  
Disruption to existing building 
operations during construction (12)  o  o  o  o  
Long lead delivery items (13)  o  o  o  o  
Resource availability (14)  o  o  o  o  
Subcontractor performance (2)  o  o  o  o  
Design obligations (3)  o  o  o  o  
Design being difficult or impossible 
to build  (15)  o  o  o  o  
Quality of design documentation 
(16)  o  o  o  o  
Weather-tightness (17)  o  o  o  o  
Connectivity between construction 
elements (18)  o  o  o  o  
Building services coordination (19)  o  o  o  o  
Health and safety (20)  o  o  o  o  
Passive fire design (23)  o  o  o  o  
Site logistics (e.g., access, cranage, 
public protection) (24)  o  o  o  o  







Q14 The entity employed to plan and manage construction (during the construction 
stage) may be a head contractor (contract for works) or a consultant construction 
manager (contract for services). Please select your typical preference: 
▢ Head contractor (contract for works) (1)  


















Q16 Please select your typically preferred timing for early contractor involvement: 
▢ Before or during preliminary design brief (1)  
▢ After preliminary design brief, before concept design (2)  
▢ After concept design, during detailed design brief (3)  
 
 






Q18 Please select your preferred option for early contractor payment: 
▢ Contractor paid for early involvement, unless they breach obligations (1)  
▢ Contractor not paid (2)  
▢ Contractor not paid, but reimbursed if project does not proceed, subject to any 
breaches (3)  
 
 






Q20 Assuming the contractor is paid for early involvement, please select your preferred 





with target value (2) 
Fixed fee (3) 
Before or during 
preliminary design 
brief (1)  o  o  o  
After prelim design 
brief, before concept 
design (12)  o  o  o  
After concept design, 
during detailed design 







Q21 Please select your generally preferred option for the construction stage price: 
▢ Cost reimbursement (1)  
▢ Cost reimbursement with target value or guaranteed maximum price (2)  




Q22 Please select your preferred option for the construction stage: 
▢ Same contractor used for pre-construction and construction-stage, unless they 
breach obligations or a construction price cannot be agreed (1)  




Q26 Please select your preferred form of construction-stage contract: 
▢ Construction only, possibly with some elements of design (e.g., facades) (1)  


















Q24 Please select the effect of 2S-ECI on head contractor pricing, compared with 
single-stage tender: 
 
Contractor pricing lower 
using 2S-ECI (1) 
Same (2) 
Contractor pricing 
higher using 2S-ECI 
(3) 
In a recessionary 
market (1)  o  o  o  
In an average market 
(12)  o  o  o  





Q25 Please select the effect of 2S-ECI on consultant pricing, compared with single-
stage tender: 
 
Consultant pricing lower 
using 2S-ECI (1) 
Same (2) 
Consultant pricing 
higher using 2S-ECI 
(3) 
In a recessionary 
market (1)  o  o  o  
In an average market 
(12)  o  o  o  

























Lack of clear definition of 2S-ECI (1)  o  o  o  o  
Unclear client expectations (12)  o  o  o  o  
Difficulty measuring actual benefits (13)  o  o  o  o  
Unclear responsibilities (14)  o  o  o  o  
Unwillingness from consultants to 
involve contractors early (2)  o  o  o  o  
Lack of standard form pre- construction 
contract documentation (3)  o  o  o  o  
Difficulty involving specialist 
subcontractors early, in terms of 
contractual and pricing procedures (15)  o  o  o  o  
2S-ECI perceived as more expensive 
(16)  o  o  o  o  
Perceived lack of competitive pricing 
(17)  o  o  o  o  
Incomplete design documentation 
when agreeing a fixed price 
construction contract (18)  o  o  o  o  
Theoretical benefits not being realised, 
i.e., lack of real added value (19)  o  o  o  o  
Use of 2S-ECI on wrong project type 
(20)  o  o  o  o  
Amendment of standard form contracts 
(such as NZS3910) to transfer 
contractual risks to contractors (23)  o  o  o  o  
Consultants transferring design risks to 
contractors (24)  o  o  o  o  


















Contractors improving 2S-ECI capability 
(e.g., value management, design 
coordination and design buildability 
analysis) (1)  
o  o  o  o  
Improving quality of design 
documentation when agreeing fixed price 
construction contracts (12)  o  o  o  o  
Developing a standard form pre-
construction services agreement, while 
maintaining flexibility for different clients 
and project types (13)  
o  o  o  o  
Reducing amendment of standard form 
construction contracts (e.g., NZS3910) 
transferring risks to contractors (14)  o  o  o  o  
Improving the clarity of pre-construction 
responsibilities (2)  o  o  o  o  
Improving contractual mechanisms for 
involving specialist subcontractors early 
(3)  o  o  o  o  
Producing 'how to' guidelines for using 
2S-ECI (e.g., suitable project types, 
expected benefits, responsibilities, 
pricing options etc.)  (15)  
o  o  o  o  












Appendix 4: New Zealand Pre-Construction Services 




















































This Pre-Construction Services Agreement (PCSA) is appropriate: 
 
For employing a head contractor to provide services during the pre-construction stage. This 
may be used toward agreeing a construction contract for the construction stage (two-stage 
early-constructor involvement (2S-ECI)). 
 
Contractor involvement in pre-construction planning may be of particular benefit for projects 
involving alterations or extensions to existing buildings where the client’s operations are to 











































PART 1 – AGREEMENT 
1.1 PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT 
a) This is a consultancy contract between the Client and Contractor for pre-construction services. 
(b) Project details: 
i. Project name:  





(c) Client’s details: 
i. Client’s name: 
ii. Client’s company number: 
iii. Client’s contact person:   
iv. Correspondence  address:   
v. Phone number:  








(d) Contractor’s details: 
i. Contractor’s name: 
ii. Contractor’s company 
number: 
iii. Contractor’s contact person: 
iv. Postal address: 
v. Phone number: 












(a) Services to be provided by the 
Contractor during the pre-construction 
stage: 
These are examples only. Please update to 
reflect actual services provided. 
(b) Milestone dates for providing specific 
services and requirements from others 
• Prepare financial feasibility studies. 
• Prepare an initial cost estimate and a cost 
plan 
• Provide cost planning advice to the design 
team and the Client during the design 
stage. 
• Provide a construction programme 
• Undertake design buildability analysis 
• Undertake value management exercises 
• Provide a document management system 
• Provide input into a building information 
modelling (BIM) 
• Liaise with third parties  
• Undertake enabling works 















1.3 PROGRAMME FOR SERVICES 
(a) The services will be undertaken step by step to generally satisfy any indicative programme stated 






ENTER THE NAME AND DATE OF ANY INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 
b) The following documents form this contract: 
i. Part 1 – Agreement and specific contract terms 










ENTER OTHER DOCUMENTS [IF ANY] 
1.4 TIMING OF SERVICES 





(b) Date for submitting offer for 
the construction contract: 
 
……………………………………………… 
If a date is not stated, the Quantity Surveyor must complete the 
services within a reasonable time.  
1.5   PRE-CONSTRUCTION SERVICES FEE 
The following is the Contractor’s fee for providing the pre-construction services: 
If not stated, the fee is a fixed lump sum. 
 










Agreed targets for payment such as pain share/ 

















ENTER ANY DISBURSEMENTS TO BE PAID TO THE CONTRACTOR 
 
(b)The Contractor’s minimum 
level  of professional indemnity 




If not stated, the minimum level of professional indemnity 
insurance is five times the value of the Quantity Surveyor’s fee or 
NZD 250,000 whichever is lower. 
(c)The Contractor’s minimum 




If not stated, the minimum level of public liability insurance cover 
is NZD 2,000,000. 
(d) The Contractor’s maximum  
limit of cumulative liability is 
(see Part B.8.1.5): 
 
NZD……………………………………………………… 
If not stated above, the maximum limit of cumulative liability is five 
times the value of the Quantity Surveyor’s fee or NZD 250,000 
whichever is lower. 
(e) Insurance cover held by any 




ENTER TYPE AND MINIMUM THIRD PARTY INSURANCE 
COVER 
1.7 CONTRACTOR’S KEY PERSONNEL 
(A) The following are the 
Contractor’s Key Personnel 
(see 2.8, Part 2) 
(a) The following rates apply to any variations (see 2.12, Part 




ENTER NAME OR POSITION 
ENTER NAME OR POSITION 
ENTER NAME OR POSITION 
ENTER NAME OR POSITION 
ENTER NAME OR POSITION 
If no rates are stated, then reasonable hourly rates will apply to any services variations. 
1.8 SPECIAL CONTRACT TERMS – PRE-CONSTRUCTION 
a) The following terms, if any, modify the contract terms in Part 2: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
ENTER SPECIAL TERMS OF CONTRACT [IF ANY] 
 
1.9 SPECIAL CONTRACT TERMS – CONSTRUCTION STAGE 
CONTRACT 
a) The following terms, if any, will apply to the construction contract if entered into: 
i. Terms of construction contract:………..……………………………….……………...  
ii. ii. Liquidated damages: ………………………………………………………………… 
iii. iii. Start and finish dates or duration period:.……………………………….………… 
iv. iv. Other: …………………………………………………………………………………. 
ENTER SPECIAL TERMS OF CONTRACT [IF ANY] 
If not stated, the terms of construction contract will be NZS3910 Conditions of contract for building 
and civil engineering construction 
1.10 PRICE STRUCTURE FOR THE CONTRACTOR’S 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT OFFER 
(a) The Contractor’s offer for the construction contract will be based on the following (see 2.5, 









If not stated, the price is a fixed lump sum. 
Percentage margin for profit and off-site 




 ……………………………………... Percent 
Other (specify)  
Other (specify)  
1.11   SIGNATURE 
(a) The parties agree to be bound by this contract. 
(b) Client’s authorised 
signatory: 
i.    Signature: 
ii.   Full name: 
iii.  Date: 
 
c) Contractor’s authorised 
signatory: 
i.    Signature: 
ii.   Full name: 
iii.  Date: 
 





PART 2 - STANDARD TERMS OF CONTRACT 
 
2.1 GENERAL TERMS 
(a) This contract does not form a partnership or joint venture between the parties. 
(b) The New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 does not apply to any services 
provided for the Client’s business purposes. 
(c) Any waiver given by either party must be in writing. 
(d) Unless otherwise expressly stated, a waiver does not limit the parties’ liability. 
(e) Neither party can assign their rights or obligations under this contract to another 
person unless the parties agreed to it in writing. 
(f) New Zealand law applies to this contract. 
 
2.2 INTERPRETATION 
(a) No inconsistency, omission or error in the contract documents invalidates this 
contract. 
(b) Words used in the singular also include the plural, and words used in the plural also 
include the singular, as the context requires. 
(c) Reference to any statute includes any subsequent amendments.  
2.3 CLIENT AND CONTRACTOR’S GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
(a) Both parties must: 
I. act in the spirit of mutual cooperation; 
II. comply with all health, safety, and other legal obligations owed in law and 
under this contract; 
III. comply with all health and safety practices on site; 
IV. keep each other adequately informed of matters affecting the services; 
V. take up all insurance cover as required by this contract; and 
VI. undertake all their obligations in a timely manner. 
2.4 CONTRACTOR’S GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
(a) The Contractor must: 
 
I. carry out the services in line with this contract and other services that may be 
agreed to be provided under this contract between the Client and third party; 




III. request the Client to make decisions when required; 
IV. get the Client’s approval before ordering any goods or services on the Client’s 
behalf that are additional to the services; 
V. ensure that the Contractor’s Key Personnel fulfil their roles and are 
reasonably available for communication and consultation with the Client and 
the Client appointed project team;  
VI. duly consult with members of the Contractor’s supply chain and, at the 
Client’s request, endeavour as far as reasonably practicable to ensure 
attendance at relevant project meetings; and 
VII. notify the Client as it becomes aware of any matter, which is likely to impede 
the performing its services. 
(b) If it forms part of the services, the Contractor may give instructions to a third party 
engaged by the Client or others. The Contractor must not give instruction to vary any 
work without the Client’s consent. 
(c) The Contractor must carry out the services with the reasonable skill and care 
expected of a contractor experienced in projects of similar size, scope and 
complexity and providing similar services. 
(d) The Contractor is not responsible for the work of a third party that has been engaged 
by the Client or others. 
(e) If an actual or potential conflict of interest arises, the Contractor must inform the 
Client and any other interested party of the conflict, and encourage the Client to get 
independent professional advice. The Contractor must not act or continue to act for 
the Client unless the Client provides written instructions and consent that 
acknowledges the actual or potential conflict.  
(f) The Contractor must notify the Client if the completion of the services will be delayed. 
The Contractor must take reasonable measures within their control to reduce any 
delay to the services. 
(g) The Contractor must report on the progress of the services when reasonably 
requested by the Client. 
(h) The Client may instruct the Contractor to purchase materials and store for the 
construction stage of the project. The Contractor must identify where the materials 
are stored and include evidence of transfer of ownership and insurance to the full 
value of the materials in an appropriate form before payment of the materials.  
2.5 CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT OFFER 
(a) The Contractor must duly prepare and submit their offer for the construction contract 
in accordance with the following requirements and the cost breakdown stated in 1.10, 
Part 1.   
(b) The Client is under no obligation to accept any offer for the construction contract and, 
unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, no binding construction contract exists.  
(c) Unless otherwise agreed, the Contractor’s offer for the construction contract will be a 
fixed lump sum price based the Contractor’s preliminary and general works (P&G) 
and percentage margin rates stated in 1.10, Part 1 along with agreed prices for the 
subcontractors and any agreed trade works done by the Contractor.  





(e) The Contractor must tender for subcontractors based on the following:  
I. As far as reasonably practicable, the Contractor will invite four to five 
subcontractors to price for each trade, with a minimum of three (it is 
understood and accepted that this level of competition may not be possible 
for certain trades);  
II. Subcontract bids will be based on the information provided by the Client’s 
project team; 
III. Any terms of construction contract as stated in Part 1 along with any 
requirements the Contractor may have, such as for health and safety and 
quality assurance; 
IV. The subcontract tenders will close at a location chosen by the Client and 
tenders will only be opened in the company of the Client; 
V. The Contractor will review subcontract tenders and negotiate any 
subcontractor terms with the Client and appropriate members of the Client’s 
project team, and then submit its recommendations to the Client; and 
VI. Upon approval by the Client, the Contractor will formally accept the 
subcontractors concerned. Approval by the Client does not limit, vary or 
reduce the Contractor’s liability for the subcontractor. 
(f) If the Contractor wishes to carry out trade works using their own employees, the 
Contractor must provide a schedule of quantities with priced rates per item to the 
Client for the purpose of negotiation. The Contractor must provide further workings of 
their quantities and rates as reasonably requested. 
(g) If the Client wishes to under-take any enabling works, such as demolition, 
uncovering, borings, testing, sampling, constructing and the like, during the pre-
construction stage, the parties may enter into a separate construction contract for 
this. The Client is under no obligation to appoint the Contractor for such works and 
may tender the works to others, giving the Contractor the opportunity to bid.  
(h) The Contractor must notify the Client of any inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the 
Information received by the Contractor before submitting their offer for the 
construction contract.  
2.6 CLIENT’S GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
(a) The Client must: 
I. pay the Contractor in line with this contract; 
II. promptly provide information to the Contractor when requested; 
III. make decisions within a reasonable time when requested by the Contractor; 
and 
IV. allow the Contractor access to the site and other locations as required. 
(b) If the Contractor’s scope of services includes issuing instructions to a third party 
engaged by the Client, all instructions must be given through the Contractor. 
(c) The Contractor may request the Client to make decisions about some of the services 
to be provided by the Contractor. The Client must respond to a request within a 
reasonable time. 
(d) The Client must ensure it obtains advice from suitably qualified design consultants or 
other professionals regarding its design requirements or other professional services 





(a) All notifications must be in writing, dated, and securely sent to the relevant parties by 
e-mail or registered post. 
(b) The Client must identify a contact person who is authorised to make decisions about 
the services. The Contractor must be notified in writing if the Client’s contact person 
changes. 
(c) The Contractor’s contact person is responsible for coordinating the services and all 
communication with the Client. The Client must be notified in writing if the 
Contractor’s contact person changes. 
2.8 KEY PERSONNEL  
(a) The Contractor must not remove or replace any of its Key Personnel stated in Part 1 
without the Client’s prior approval. The Client must not withhold or delay their 
approval unreasonably. The Contractor must promptly appoint a replacement subject 
to such approval, and where practicable, arrange an appropriate handover period.  
 
(b) After consultation with the Contractor, the Client may require the removal of any 
member of the Contractor’s Key Personnel if in the Client’s reasonable opinion their 
performance or conduct has been unsatisfactory.  
2.9 SUBCONTRACTING 
(a) The Contractor must not subcontract any of its services under this contract without 
the Client’s written consent, which must not be unreasonably withheld. The 
Contractor remains fully responsible for any subcontracted services. 
2.10 TIME OBLIGATIONS 
(a) The Contractor must complete the services in line with 1.3, Part 1. 
(b) The Contractor must take reasonable measures within its control to reduce any delay 
to the services. 
(c) Each party must notify the other promptly if the completion of their obligations will be 
delayed. If the Contractor did not cause the delay, the date for completing the 
services must be extended by agreement between the parties. 
(d) The Client may suspend the Contractor’s services for up to six months. The 
Contractor must make arrangements to suspend the services and minimise further 
expenditure. The Contractor may provide written notice to terminate the contract if 





(a) The Contractor may invoice the Client once a month for progress payments for 
services performed to date including the cost of disbursements listed Part 1. 
(b) Each invoice must be submitted not later than the 5th of the month after the services 
are performed. Unless agreed differently, the invoice must be paid on or before the 
20th of the month after the services are performed. 
(c) If the Contractor’s invoice includes payment of materials authorised by the Client 
under 2.4(h), the invoice must identify where the materials are stored and include 
evidence of transfer of ownership and insurance to the full value of the materials in 
an appropriate form. 
(d) If the Contractor’s invoice is intended to be a payment claim under the New Zealand 
Construction Contracts Act, it must state that the invoice is made under the Act and 
include any information required by the Act. 
(e) The Client may assess the Contractor’s payment claim and respond with a payment 
schedule no later than the 15th of the month after the services are performed. 
(f) The Client’s payment schedule must: 
I. be in writing; 
II. identify the payment claim to which it relates; 
III. state a scheduled amount and how it was calculated; and 
IV. provide reasons for any difference between the scheduled amount and the 
claimed amount; and 
V. explain why, if the difference in 2.9 (e) (iv.) is because the Client is 
withholding payment. 
(g) Late payment of the claimed or scheduled amount entitles the Contractor to interest 
on unpaid undisputed amounts at 2% above the Quantity Surveyor’s overdraft rate 
and costs incurred by the Contractor to recover the debt. 
 
2.12 VARIATIONS TO SERVICES 
(a) The Client may vary the Contractor’s scope of services by giving written notice. 
(a) The Contractor may notify the Client within 10 working days if it thinks any 
circumstance gives rise to a variation. The notice must set out: 
I. details of the estimated cost of the variation; 
II. the likely or estimated impact on the programme; 
III. the likely or estimated completion date for the services; and 
IV. recommendations on how to proceed. 
(b) After receiving a notice under 2.10(b), the Client must notify the Contractor within 10 
days whether or not it considers the circumstance to be a variation. 
(c) If a variation by the Client to the Services will result in the Contractor incurring 
additional cost, the Client and Contractor must seek to agree on the adjustment to 
the Contractor’s fee and time for completing the services. 
(d) The Contractor must seek to obtain approval from the Client for any adjustment to 
the fees before undertaking any variation to the services. 
(e) The parties may agree to vary the rates stated in 1.10, Part 1 for the pricing of the 





2.13 LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 
(a) The Contractor is liable to the Client for any reasonably foreseeable claims, 
damages, losses, or expenses caused directly by any 
(a) The Contractor is not liable for: 
I. Any indirect, consequential, or special damages of any kind; 
II. The work of a third party that has been engaged by the Client or other; and 
III. The act or failure to act by the Client or others engaged by the Client. 
(b) For any damage that has been caused by more than one party, the responsible 
parties will only be liable in proportion to how much they contributed to the damages. 
(c) Unless stated differently in this contract, the Contractor’s maximum cumulative 
liability is five times the value of the Contractor’s fee or NZD 250,000 whichever is 
lower. 
(d) The Contractor must hold professional indemnity and public liability insurance cover 
for at least the minimum levels stated in Part 1 of this contract. The Contractor must 
use reasonable endeavours to ensure the professional indemnity insurance required 
by this contract remains valid for six years after completion of the services. 
(e) Where requested, the Contractor must give the Client evidence of the required 
professional indemnity and public liability insurance cover. 
(f) The Client must ensure that any third party it engages is required to hold insurance 
as stated in Part 1 of this contract. 
(g) Unless otherwise stated provided in PART 1 of this Contract, the Contractor has no 
liability for design work. If the parties enter a construction contract, the terms of the 
construction contract will prevail for any design obligations.  
2.14 CONFIDENTIALITY 
(a) The detailed terms of this contract are confidential to the parties. 
(a) Neither party may make public statements about details of this contract or 
confidential details of any project without the other party’s consent. 
(b) If the Contractor obtains confidential information about the Client’s affairs, the 
Contractor must not use the information for any purpose except the purpose for 
which it was obtained. 
(c) Neither party may disclose confidential information to others unless it is: 
I. required to allow that party to undertake the services; 
II. authorised by the other party; 
III. permitted or compelled by law; or 





2.15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(a) All intellectual property that existed before this contract started remains the property 
of the original owner. 
(a) The parties jointly own all intellectual property produced by the Contractor while 
providing the services. 
(b) The Client and Contractor grant to the other an unrestricted royalty-free licence in 
perpetuity to copy or use such intellectual property. 
(c) The Client may only use documents produced by the Contractor for the purposes 
intended under this contract. 
2.16 TERMINATION 
(a) Either party may terminate this contract by giving 20 days’ written notice if the other 
party has materially breached the contract terms. 
(a) Following termination, the Client must pay the Contractor all amounts due up to the 
date of termination. Payment of the Contractor’s Fee will account for: 
I. the amount of actual resource used in relation to the original Fee; 
II. the reasonable costs incurred by the Contractor to reallocate it’s resources; 
and 
III. the impact of any breaches by the Contractor or the Client. 
(b) Following termination, the Contractor must provide reasonable assistance to the 
Client when transferring the services to a new Contractor. 
(c) The provisions of this contract regarding insurance, confidentiality, and intellectual 
property remain in effect after the contract is terminated. 
 
2.17 DISAGREEMENTS 
(a) The Client must notify the Contractor of any breach of this contract, and the 
Contractor must promptly remedy those breaches. 
(b) The parties must attempt to settle disagreements by negotiation or mediation in good 
faith. 
(c) The parties may at any time refer disagreements to arbitration in line with the 
Arbitration Act 1996. If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, either party may 
write to the authorised person of the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New 
Zealand Inc. for a sole arbitrator to be nominated. The arbitrator will decide the 
procedures and rules of the arbitration.
 
